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"With AU Deliberate Speed": The NAACP and the Implementation of Brown v. 
Board o f Education at the Local Level, Little Rock, Arkansas
Director: Michael S. Mayer, Ph.D.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
began implementing the Supreme Court's historic Brown v. Board o f Education 
ruling in 1954. The implementation procedure was carefuUy orchestrated by 
the NAACP's National Office, based in New York City. The Association's 
southern branches fought physical, economic, and psychological reprisals to 
successfuUy bring about school desegregation. Events between 1954 and 
actual desegregation varied from community to community, but aU contained 
im portant simUarities. The story of Little Rock from 1954-1957 provides an 
exceUent look at the NAACP and its post-Brown desegregation efforts.
In the beginning, events in Little Rock favored the NAACP. A liberal 
southern town. Little Rock contained a business class that recognized the 
economic importance of good race relations, an experienced and competent 
school Superintendent, and a progressive image that its residents coveted.
Most citizens opposed school desegregation, but they favored complying with 
Brown as the law of the land. However, the board successfuUy resisted 
desegregation for the first two years, and southern segregationists grew in 
strength. In September, 1957, Governor Orval Faubus ordered National Guard 
troops to refuse any black students entrance into Central High, the school 
Little Rock chose for desegregation.
The local NAACP was inltiaUy optimistic about the city’s dedication to 
providing integrated schools. Within eighteen months, however, the branch 
realized Superintendent Blossom's reluctance to implementing the Supreme 
Court decision, and it filed suit in Federal Court to force compliance. The 
brsmch lost the initial suit, partly because of disagreements with the National 
Office attorney that assisted it. The branch lost the appeal in the spring of 
1957, but desegregation was set for the faU. After Governor Faubus' actions the 
branch demanded and worked to achieve compUance with the Federal Court.
On September 25, President Eisenhower ordered the 101st Airborne to escort 
n in e  Little Rock blacks into the haUs of Central High.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"W ith AU D eliberate Speed": The NAACP and th e  Im plem entation o f
Brown v. Board o f  Education a t the Local Level, Little Rock,
A rk a n sa s
"Although newspapers, periodicals, and, more recently, several books have 
given a fairly adequate background of the Little Rock school-integration 
crisis, they have thrown only lim ited light on the part played by the local 
branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP)."!
Introduction
Not enoi^h attention has been paid to the dvfl rights movemait of the 
1950s. Many historians have neglected these formative years of the movement 
and focused on die more obvious and evriting manifestations of black unrest 
which occurred during the following decade. A resulting lack of knowledge 
about what might be called the early dvil rights movement, particularly the 
era between the Brown v. Board o f Education ruling and the now-infamous 
Greensboro sit-in of February 1960, is being remedied, albeit at a much slower 
and perhaps more deliberate pace than what preceded it.
This thesis contributes to this growing held of knowledge. It examines 
the process by which the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) sought to implement its historic 1954 victory in Brown v.
Board o f Education, Topeka, Kansas. It demonstrates the intricacies of the 
NAACP's attem pts to implement the decision, from both the national and the 
local perspective, and emphasizes the importance of the structure of the 
NAACP in the process. In particular, the focus is on the desegregation of the 
public school system of Little Rock, Arkansas, which fînaUy occurred in the 
faU o f 1957—three years after the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 
school desegregation unconstitutional. This thesis highlights the difficulties 
associated with bringing about school desegregation in the South, and it shows
ijane Cassels Record and Wilson Record, eds.. Little Rock. U.S.A. (San Francisco: 
Chandler Publishing Company, 1960), 283.
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how the NAACP was forced to undertake a job which American society was 
unwilling to do.
The Little Roclc Storv
On September 25, 1957, the 101st Airborne of the United States Army 
escorted nine black children into Central High School in Little Rock. It was 
the first of Little Rock’s schools to be desegregated, and the occasion marked 
an end to a  three-year battle fought between the local Branch of the NAACP 
and the Little Rock School Board. This battle is the untold story behind the 
desegregation of Central High.
The Brown decision marked a momentous victory for the NAACP. The 
culmination of over twenty-five years of litigation aimed a t eliminating the 
'separate-but-equal' doctrine established in 1896, Brown ended public school 
segregation throughout the nation and set the stage for legal attacks on other 
forms of segregation. It guaranteed that race relations as previously 
established would never be the same, and it ordered the South to begin 
planning for desegregation immediately.2
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's ruling was not self-enforcing. From 
the beginning, the NAACP realized that, although it had won a major victory, 
difficult battles lay ahead. During the summer and fall of 1954, the Association 
developed its desegregation program, rallied its Branches, and expanded the 
Branch Departm ent's field staff. Newly-hired fieldworkers were sent to a 
number of southern states to help implement the historic decision. Trained 
specifically to effectuate desegregation a t the local level (in accordance with 
the National Office of the NAACP's directives), these new fieldworkers 
undertook their work w ith optimum, enthusiasm , and fear.
2Brown v. Board o f Education, Topeka, KS, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Still, the Association initially nnderestiniated the resistance that it 
would face in the South. Its desegregation program for the first year and a 
half was moderate and almost naively optimistic. Drawn up by the national 
staff in coordination with the NAACP Board of Directors, and then passed down 
the NAACP hierarchy in the spring of 1954, the program focused on making 
desegregation work a t the local level. It emphasized the importance of 
community support for desegregation, and it favored relying on the good faith 
of local School Boards rather than legal action. Though the Association pushed 
for southwide desegregation by the fall of 1955, it chose not to force the issue 
on the region. The Association apparently believed that the Supreme Court's 
ruling on an implementation decree in Brown would establish a timetable for 
desegregation and thereby alleviate the significant difficulties that otherwise 
lay ahead.
Unfortunately for the NAACP, this was not to be. The Supreme Court's 
ruling on implementation, announced in May 1955 and commonly referred to 
as Brown II, failed to establish a timetable for desegregation in the South. 
Instead, it ambiguously ruled that implementation of the original decree 
should begin immediately and proceed "'with all deliberate speed.'"^ 
Furthermore, subsequent federal court rulings in the summer of 1955 
worsened the situation for the NAACP. Rulings in both South Carolina and 
Virginia favored an elastic interpretation of the Brown decisions and allowed 
the continuance of segregation for the 1955-56 school year.'^ By 1955, perhaps 
even more than before, the struggle to make desegregation a reality faced 
form idable obstacles.
^Brown v. Board o f Education, Topeka, KS, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4Minnie Finch, The NAACP: Its Fight For lustice (Metchen, NJ: The Scarecrow 
Press, Inc., 1981), 193; Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp 776 (1955); Davis v. County 
School Board, Prince Edward County, VA, 142 F. Supp 616 (1956).
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In the meantime, work had begun in Arkansas. Slowly a t first, but with 
increasing swiftness, the Arkansas State Conference of the NAACP rallied its 
Branches and pressed for desegregation. Carefully following the dictates of 
the National Office, the State Conference filed petitions with dozens of district 
School Boards during the summer and fall of 1954. In October the State 
Conference held its annual meeting in little  Rock, where it adopted the 
resolutions of the National Office's desegregation program and pressed its 
member Branches to step up their efforts to desegregate schools. Shortly 
thereafter, the State Conference gladly welcomed Vernon McDaniel, a 
desegregation specialist assigned by the National Office to work in Arkansas, 
into its camp. Battling financial problems and weak leadership in its rural 
Branches, as well as pressure from the National Office to produce results, the 
Arkansas NAACP was relieved and bolstered by McDaniel's appointment. The 
battle for desegregation'in Arkansas geared up during late 1954.
The city of little  Rock held promise in  terms of school desegregation 
from  the beginning. A progressive community by southern standards, the 
city reacted calmly to the Supreme Court's ruling in die spring of 1954. The 
local School Board quickly announced that it would comply with the decision, 
and it initiated a num ber of research projects during the summer of 1954 to 
determ ine how to desegregate its schools most effectively and smoothly. That 
fall, Virgil Blossom, the Superintendent of Litde Rock's public schools, 
announced that a  desegregation plan for the city had been developed. The 
plan became known as the Blossom Plan. It provided for desegregation in the 
little  Rock public school system to begin in 1956 at the high school level, and 
it pledged to establish a citywide attendance zone for the public schools. It was 
a reasonable plan. None of the racial demagoguery that would later 
characterize Little Rock was evident in 1954.
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For its part, the local Branch of the NAACP was divided over what course 
to pursue. A minority within the Branch was upset with the superficiality of 
recent improvements in  race relations and favored pushing ahead m ilitantly 
to force the issue of school desegregation on the community—even to the point 
of filing a desegregation suit against the School Beard immediately. Forced to 
mitigate its rhetoric and militancy by the dictates of the National Office of the 
NAACP and the sentiments of fellow Branch members, this minority 
nonetheless continued to favor immediate legal action to bring about 
desegregation. The m ajority within the Branch, on the other hand, feared 
losing the gains which had been made and preferred to give the city and the 
local School Board the benefit of the doubt. Impressed by the city's race 
relations record, which had improved significantly in the previous decade, 
and its swift response to the Brown ruling, this faction moderated the more 
m ilitant members and attem pted to work with the School Board to effectuate 
desegregation.
In part because of the division within the NAACP, relatively little 
progress toward desegregation occurred in Little Rock during 1954. Following 
the program of the National Office, the Branch filed a desegregation petition 
with the School Board in August and held a hearii% with the Board in the 
early falL The Branch also began to educate the black community about the 
significance of the Brown ruling, and it worked to gam er support for 
desegregation from other community organizations. Still, the pace of efforts 
to desegregate Little Rock proceeded slowly, and only on the eve of Brown II 
did the local Branch’s efforts picked up significantly.
Nineteen fifty-five proved to be a crucial year in Little Rock. Just as the 
local NAACP picked up its desegregation activities, the Little Rock School Board 
announced modifications to its previously-accepted desegregation plan.
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Superintendent Blossom, who proposed the changes, e^qplained that a more 
gradual process of desegregation would increase support for the Board's plan 
w ithin Little Rock's white community. His alterations significantly reduced 
the amount of desegregation scheduled to occur in the Little Rock school 
system, and ensured that what desegregation did occur would take place over a 
prolonged period of time. The new plan, dubbed the Phase Program, set up a 
three-stage process of desegregation, to begin at the high school level in 1957, 
where it would be carefully m onitored and regulated by the School Board. The 
alterations, combined with the reluctance of the School Board to cooperate 
with the local Branch and other community organizations, produced an 
increased militancy within the local Branch and the black community in 
general. By the end of the year, a  m ajority of Branch members favored tiling 
a  lawsuit contesting the altered desegregation plan, and a  growing number of 
blacks in the community supported this stance. The Branch consulted State 
Conference and Regional NAACP attorneys about the prospect of tiling a suit, 
and in  December the Branch voted in favor of the action.
Ironically, about the same time the Little Rock Branch voted to file suit 
against its School Board, the National Office of the NAACP, tirustrated by the 
lack of desegregation occurring throughout the South, decided to increase the 
num ber of suits its legal staff would tile on behalf of local black communities. 
Though it began 1955 with the same hopeful optimism it had exhibited during 
1954, the National Office modified its perspective significantly over the course 
of the year. The change resulted from the elasticity of the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Brown II, federal court rulings that allowed for the maintenance of 
segregation during the 1955-56 school year, and rising segregationist activity 
below the Mason-Dixon line. Moreover, though the National Office had stepped 
up its desegregation efforts significantly in mid-1955, it had met with little
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
success. Its in itia l optmüsm weathered by a year and a half of southern 
intransigence and stubborn opposition, the National Office became 
increasingly m ilitant in its rhetoric, and by the end of the year it decided to 
employ widespread litigation to force the issue of desegregation on the South.
Nineteen fifty-six was a year of significantly heightened tensions in 
the South. Responding m an  infiux of desegregation suits sponsored by the 
NAACP, southern segregationists rallied and began an attack on the 
Association that would last well into the next decade. The NAACP countered 
this increasing resistance by redoubling its efforts, and the organization 
plowed ahead with a record num ber of desegregation suits, a  stepped-up 
membership and fundraising campaign, and a determination to expand the 
desegregation effort to include transportation, housing, and virtually every 
other aspect of southern life. By year's end, battle lines had been drawn.
Developments in Little Rock unfolded amid this rising tension. In late 
January, the local Branch organized a hearing with Superintendent Blossom to 
attem pt to register a  num ber of local black children in the public school 
systenL After being turned away, the parents of the children formally 
appealed to the Branch for legal representation. The Branch filed suit in  early 
February 1956 on behalf of the black faniilies who attem pted to enroll their 
children in Little Rock's all-white public school system. Following the filing 
of the suit, the Branch was occupied by fundraising efforts, pre-trial 
hearings, and community events to gam er support for the suit. The Branch 
left the legal aspects of the suit to the NAACP's State Legal Redress Committee, 
which periodically consulted with members of the Regional and National Legal 
Staff.
Unfortunately for the Branch, however, the various NAACP attorneys 
never worked well together, and the suit was handled poorly. In mid-August,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the Federal District Court of Eastern Arkansas heard the case, and Judge John E, 
Miller upheld the School Board's desegregation program. Juc%e Miller, 
convinced of the sincerity of the School Board to desegregate, found the 
Board's plan well within the confines of the Brown decisions. Discouraged by 
the outcome and the way in which the suit had been handled, the local NAACP 
refocused its efforts on motivating the Little Rock community to support 
desegregation a t the earliest possible date. That fall, after conferring with the 
National Office of the NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the 
Branch decided to appeal Judge Miller's decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.
Exactly why the suit was handled so poorly is one of the most intriguing 
aspects of the Little Rock stoiy. A combination of interrelated factors 
(including a  breakdown within the Association's legal hierarchy, personal 
disagreements and personality differences, and the extraordinarily large 
am ount of litigation the Association sponsored at this time), account for the 
way the case was handled. Another consideration was the increasingly 
effective attack southern segregationists waged on the NAACP.
In early 1956, the Arkansas State NAACP received a new fieldworker, 
Frank Smith, a  state school adrninistrator from Arkansas, became the NAACP's 
newest southern field secretary in February. His addition filled the gap left by 
the departure of Vernon McDaniel in  late 1955, and Smith's time in the field 
contributed significantly to the desegregation of the state's schools. Moreover, 
Smith spent a  considerable am ount of time in Little Rock, and his work there 
illustrated the hierarchical nature of the NAACP as it operated in Little Rock 
during the next twenty months. Smith organized efforts in behalf of 
desegregation along the lines of the National Office's implementation 
program .
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The arrival of a  new field secretary in  Arkansas coincided with 
increasing resistance to desegregation in  the state. Nineteen fifty-six marked 
the year in which southern segregationists grew in strength and authority, 
leading to increased physical, psychological, and economic reprisals against 
those fighting segregation. Segregationist activity in Arkansas reflected this 
trend. Many southern segregationists, in  fact, believed that Arkansas' stance 
on desegregation would influence the position of other key southern states, 
and they expressed the conviction that segregation m ust prevail in  Arkansas, 
come hell o r high water. During 1956, Smith and the State Conference battled 
segregationists throughout the state, including a growing num ber in little  
Rock.
The climax of the desegregation battle in  Little Rock rame in 1957. 
Viewed as the gateway to the Deep South by both southern segregationists and 
the NAACP, Arkansas had become a  major battleground for desegregation. The 
NAACP recognized its importance as early as the summer of 1954, and this led 
to  placing Frank Smith in the state. Similarly, segregationists saw Arkansas as 
the key to the Deep South—if this crucial border state were allowed to 
desegregate, it would mean th at integration was headed toward the heart of 
Dixie.
During the spring and summer of 1957, tensions in the state's capital 
city incre^ed . Segregationists stepped up their campaign to have the School 
Board's court-approved desegregation plan discarded, and the NAACP worked 
just as feverishly to insure its implementation. In mid-March, segregationists 
lost a  bid to take control of the little  Rock School Board, but they continued to 
press the community to reject the integration of the public schools after the 
election. By summer, when segregationists began a concerted effort to force 
the Governor of Arkansas to take a side on the desegregation issue, both the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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NAACP and die School Board acknowledged that they were losing support 
w ithin the litd e  Rock communiiy.
In April, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the School Board's 
desegregation plan. This proved to be a setback for both the litd e  Rock NAACP 
and Arkansan segregationists, because the ruling sanctioned the School 
Board's gradual desegregation plan. Combined with March’s School Board 
election results, the ruling boded well for the desegregation of litd e  Rock's 
public school system, though integration would be token and minimal. Still, 
tensions within the community continued to rise over the course of the 
summer, as segregationists pressed the Board to abandon its plan and the local 
NAACP prepared the blacks chosen for integration.
No one in litd e  Rock expected Governor Faubus to block the 
desegregation of Central High in September. Known throughout the South as a 
moderate, particularly with regards to race relations, Faubus took the city and 
the nation by surprise when he called out the Arkansas National Guard and 
ordered it to  block the entrance of Negroes into the school. Motivated by 
thoughts of a  third  term  and political commitments to Arkansas 
segregationists, Faubus acted with determ ination. His actions quickly placed 
him in open défiance of a  federal court order and the judicial branch of the 
United States government.
After an attem pt to negotiate a setdem ent with Faubus faded, President 
Dwight Eisenhower responded by nationalizing the Arkansas Guard and 
sending the 101st Airborne to protect the entry of nine black students in to  
Central High. Under the continuing protection of federal troops and the 
Arkansas Guard, nine black students conspicuously joined over two thousand 
whites in  the haUs of the now-notorious school, and litd e  Rock slowly 
retreated  from the national limelight.
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Since September 1957 historians have attem pted to explain the events 
surrounding the desegregation of Central High. Many books identified the 
causes of the "crisis" at Central High, and several have attem pted to tie these 
events into the larger struggle for civil rights. Still, none have analyzed the 
role of the NAACP in  the affair.
An examination of the NAACP's role in Little Rock sheds light on the 
NAACP's activities in  the years immediately following the iniiial Brown ruling. 
How did the NAACP plan to implement this historic decision? What steps did 
the National OfHce and its Branches take to bring about school desegregation? 
What difhculties did the NAACP face, and how did it overcome them? How did 
the National Office and its branches work together to bring about 
desegregation? The story of the NAACP's activities in little  Rock begins to 
answer these questions.
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Chanter One: The Seeds of Change. 1954 
For the National M sociation for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), making the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board o f Education a 
reality was a  complex undertaking. The implementation process, directed by 
the National Office of the NAACP, featured im portant similarities regardless of 
local circumstances. It involved the coordination of national, state, and local 
activities for hundreds of NAACP representatives and Branches across the 
nation. Following the Brown decision, the entire hierarchical machinery of 
the Association was directed toward the goal of total and complete school 
desegregation a t the earliest possible date.
Ihs-MAAGE-Hisraicliy
The National Office of the NAACP, including the Board of Directors and 
the full-time staff, made up the highest level of the Association's hierarchy. 
Based at the NAACP's headquarters in New York City, the National Office made 
the major policy decisions for the Association. From the start, it was 
determ ined to oversee and manage the Association's desegregation efforts, 
though it recognized that m ost of the actual implementation work would occur 
at the local level. The desire to exercise control over the affairs of the NAACP 
was in  keeping with the historically centralized nature of the Association.^
Realizing th a t a favorable decision in the pending school desegregation 
cases would initiate the most im portant project in NAACP history, the 
Association's Board of Directors and national staff met to formulate a top-down 
implementation program in the spring of 1954.2 The resulting program
1 Finch, 20; Aldon Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: 
Free Press, 1984), 13.
2John H. Bracey and August Meier, eds.. Parsers of the_ NAACP 
(microfilm)(Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1995), Part 16b, reel 
21, "Report of the Secretary for the Month of March, 1954", April 12, 1954, 2. 
Henceforth the NAACP Papers will be cited as Papers of the NAACP.
12
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granted considerable autonomy to local chapters while still allowing the 
national NAACP to m ain ta in  its authority through Association conferences and 
conventions. State NAACP oversight of local chapters, and National Office field 
representatives.
Below the National Office in the NAACP's hierarchy were the state units 
of the Association, referred to as State Conferences. Theoretically subservient 
to the NAACP’s Regional Offices, many State Conferences were overseen by 
weak regional supervision, and were thus either watched closely by the 
National Office or left relatively free to carry out their own policies, 
depending on the circumstances. This was because the NAACP's Regional 
Offices were in their developing stages in  the early 1950s.3 The Arkansas State 
Conference, for its part, was linked fairly closely to the National Office, 
because of the importance the NAACP placed upon the successful 
desegregation of Arkansas and the fact that regional supervision of the state 
was lacking.'* The State Conference acted as an im portant adm inistrative link 
between the National Office of the NAACP and the local chapters.^
The local Branches represented the lowest level of the NAACP 
hierarchical structure. Relatively autonomous within the param eters of 
national policy, the Branches were alternatively directed, instructed, prodded, 
and cajoled by the National Office and State Conferences.^ The Little Rock 
Branch, for its part, worked more closely with the Arkansas State Conference
^Finch, 122.
^The Arkansas State Conference was a  member of the Southwest Region of the 
NAACP, a weak conglomeration of southwestern State Conferences which 
lacked a  Regional Secretaiy. Papers of the NAACP. Part 17, reel 26, 
Memorandum to Mr Wilkins from Mr Current: 12/1 /54  (Re: For submission to 
the Budget Committee), 1.
Swaxren St. James, The National Association for ffie Advancement of Colored 
People: a case study in pressure groups (Smithtown, NY: deposition Press, 
1958), 98.
6lbid., 77-98.
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than the National Office. This was partly due to the fact that the Arkansas State 
Conference president, Mrs. Daisy Bates, resided in Little Rock and was a 
member of the Little Rock Branch’s Executive Committee.
The Little Rock Branch included some sixteen hundred members on 
paper, bu t only a small core consistently participated in formulating and 
carrying out policy. This core was the Branch’s Executive Committee, which 
included several black ministers and attorneys, as well as two white professors 
from nearby Philander Smith College.^ During the spring and summer of 
1954, the Branch geared up slowly to work toward the implementation of 
Brown v. Board o f Education.
Little Rock:___Prg-1954 R a «  Relations
Little Rock, Arkansas, established itself as a progressive city in the 
decade after the end of the Second World War. A small but growing city of 
about one hundred thousand located on the banks of the Arkansas River, Little 
Rock enjoyed a reputation as a clean and beautiful city. Its business leaders 
boasted of a  steadily expanding economy, the result of a concerted effort to 
attract new industrial development to the area; and the community was proud 
of its relatively progressive race relations. In general. Little Rock was a 
community of "considerable prosperity and comfort."®
Not all of Little Rock's citizens, of course, shared in this prosperity. 
Blacks in  Little Rock lived on the lower end of the city’s standard of living. As 
did blacks throughout the South in the 1950s, blacks in Little Rock existed on 
the m argin?; of white society, o r within a separate and unequal black sphere of 
life. Schools and housing for blacks were substandard in  comparison to  their
?Tony Allen Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 26-27. Freyer lists most of the Executive 
Committee by name, though he offers no descriptions.
«Ibid., 18.
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white counterparts, and black community organizations had little say in Little 
Rock’s decision-making processes.^ In many ways. Little Rock was typical of 
the southern racial situation in the 1950s. As historian Numan Bartley aptly 
described the situation, “The Negro’s place—by tradition, by nature, by law— 
was a t the bottom of the social order.”^0
Still, Little Rock had developed a favorable reputation in the field of 
race relations by the mid-1950s, and justifiably so. In 1948, blacks were 
adm itted to the University of Arkansas’s medical school, and the University’s 
Graduate Center, in Little Rock. Little Rock's municipal library was integrated 
in the early 1950s, and local blacks joined die city's police force, served on 
juries, visited integrated hospitals, and resided in predominantly white 
neighborhoods. By the mid-1950s. Little Rock had established itself as an 
example of liberal southern race relations.
Nonetheless, a hierarchical relationship between blacks and whites 
remained the norm throughout the South in the 1950s, and Little Rock was no 
exception. Little Rock's progressive race relations existed within the bounds 
of the South's established social system. Integration in  Little Rock was never 
significant enough to disturb the predom inantly segregationist-minded white 
community, and its 'interracial' community organizations often included only 
token blacks. The city, in other words, had successfully developed a process 
whereby considerable improvements in the lives of local blacks and the 
overall status of race relations were achieved, bu t which still allowed for the 
m aintenance of a rigidly structured social system insuring that blacks would 
remain near the bottom of the hierarchy. "Pre-1957 race relations in  Little
^Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr., Racial Politics in Little Rock. 1954-1964 (New York: 
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1987), 126.
lONuman V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance; Race and Politics in the 
y;outh Purina the 1950’s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 
237.
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Rock were definitely those of a  superior to an inferior," H  noted Irving 
Spitzberg, bu t as historian Tony Freyer added, "the city and segments of its 
population were making progress in ameliorating established racial patterns
and attitudes." 12
One explanation for the seeming dichotomy of Little Rock’s 
m aintenance of an im penetrable hierarchy of black-white relations while 
allowing for the development of significantly progressive race relations lies 
in the city’s post-World War n economic situation. Beginning in the 
immediate postwar years, the city’s civic and economic elite adopted a  program 
of economic growth for the city and its environs. 1^ Business leaders knew 
that a reputation for moderate or liberal race relations would help attract 
economic development, which often came from industrial giants in the North. 
Accordingly, Little Rock’s civic elite began to m anifest more interest in  the 
city’s race relations, and to play a more active role in bettering the tie 
between Little Rock’s blacks and whites. Historian Elizabeth Jacoway 
explained that, "an integral part of the postwar awakening in Little Rock was 
the growing awareness among civic leaders of the inequities of segregation 
and a  consequent commitment to the improvement of black life in the 
community."
Little Rock’s pre-1954 race relations had a significant impact on the 
im plementation of the Brown decision in the city. Both blacks and whites 
were fully cognizant of the city’s progressive image and recent improvements 
in race relations, and both assumed that implementation in Little Rock would
llSpitzberg, 126. 
iZpreyer, 21 .
l^David R. Colburn and Elizabeth Jacoway, eds.. Southern Businessmen and 
DesegregatAon (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 18. 
I4ibid-, 19.
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occur smoothly. Both blacks and whites also wanted Little Rock to be a model 
for the implementation of the decision for the South, though for different 
reasons—local whites wanted to m aintain the city’s progressive image and 
local blacks wanted desegregated schools. Unfortunately, Little Rock was still 
a typical southern city in the 1950s, and local whites, though determined to 
m aintain the image o f progressivism, were nonetheless intent on maintaining 
as much segregation as possible. Tom  between its progressive image and its 
desire to maintain the status quo. Little Rock slowly chose the latter, and the 
city’s blacks were forced to respond. Until these difficult choices were made, 
however, no one in the city knew quite what to expect.
Little Rock Blacks siu Brink of J^rQwa
The effect of Little Rock's pattern  of race relations on the city’s black 
population is difficult to ascertain. Certainly a significant proportion of Little 
Rock’s black population was impressed with the recent improvements in race 
relations, and pleased with the change in attitude on the part of many Little 
Rock whites. In the coming years, these blacks would initially be wary of 
pressing too hard for desegregation, preferring to work through established 
channels and organizations, and attem pting to effectuate change without 
a lien a tin g  the city’s white population and its white l e a d e r s h i p . ^5 other blacks 
in Little Rock were dissatisfied with the superficiality of the city’s racial 
improvements. These blacks dem anded that cosmetic changes be replaced with 
s ig n ifica n t alterations in the city’s social, political, and economic hierarchy. 
They advocated racial equality in a time and a city no t willing to accept it. 
Increasingly m ilitant over time, these blacks dem anded that Little Rock come 
to term s with its progressive rhetoric and racial hypocrisy.
ispreyer, 27-30.
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These two elements of little  Rock's black community account for the 
significant divisions within the black community over the course of the next 
two years. Until mid-1955, those favoring m oderation dominated the 
pronouncem ents and actions of Little Rock’s blacks, though not without 
occasionally vocal dissent. Only after the city’s white leadership proved 
unexpectedly resistant to meaningful desegregation, a  stance quite apparent 
by the summer of 1955, would the black community join together and rally to 
press for substantial gains. In the meantime, "the very factors that produced 
stable and steadily improving race relations also assured that the overthrow of 
the dual society would take place slowly if it took place a t aU."!®
The above divisions were apparent within the Little Rock Branch of the 
NAACP as well. Most members of the Branch, including the majority on the 
Branch's Executive Committee, favored the utilization of moderate tactics to 
achieve improvements for the city’s black population. Encouraged by Little 
Rock’s progressive image and recent improvements in the status of the city’s 
blacks, these members were wary of disturbing the delicate relations which 
had resulted in much recent progress. These members, including the Branch's 
attorneys and white members, worked to moderate the Branch's 
implementation program. Other Little Rock NAACP members, including a  few 
on the Branch’s Executive Committee, such as L.C. Bates, were more militant. 
These members strove to stimulate the rest of the Branch to press harder for 
substantial desegregation. 1 ̂
Thus, for the first year after Brown^ the Branch was characterized by 
division over what tactics to pursue with regard to desegregation. Both of the 
rnain segments of the Branch favored desegregation, but they were clearly
l^ibid., 29.
l^Record and Record, 286.
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divided over how to achieve this. The moderate stance, characterized by faith 
in the School Board and an aversion to the use of legal action, prevailed 
throughout the first year. The m inority, which favored filing suit shortly 
after the Brown decision and generally more m ilitant action to bring about 
desegregation, retreated to the background, Over the course of the next year 
and a half, the bahmce switched, and a majority within the Branch came to 
favor filing a suit challenging the School Board's desegregation efforts. This 
reversal came after months of frustrating and unfiruitful work with the city's 
School Board.l9
The relationship between the Little Rock NAACP and the city's larger 
black co m m u n ity  followed a pattern similar to the one outUned above.
Initially wary of supporting attem pts to bring about immediate and complete 
compliance with the decision, Little Rock blacks in general favored more 
moderate positions than even those adopted by the local Branch. Beginning 
with the announcem ent of the Brown decision, however, and increasingly 
over the course o f the next two years, local black support for the NAACP grew. 
This trend, which culminated in early 1956 with the filing of a  lawsuit against 
the Little Rock School Board, resulted partly from  the School Board’s resistance 
to meaningful desegregation.^^
The black community was aware of the Branch's role in obtaining the 
racial advancements of the previous decade. It was the Branch’s work with 
sympathetic whites and moderate community organizations such as the Little 
Rock Urban League and the Little Rock m inisterial alliance which had resulted 
in the hiring of blacks by the city's police force and the removal of Jim Crow
l^This segment of the Branch favored litigation before the National Office's 
program  de-emphasizing htigation was handed down.
1 R ecord and Record, 284-88.
20spitzberg, 53.
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signs in the downtown area, among other things. For this the local NAACP was 
respected.21
Still, in 1954 the little  Rock Branch did not enjoy wide support from the 
local black community. Many blacks were afraid of reprisals, physical or 
economic, by the white community, and others were simply too moderate to 
become active in community race relations. Qver time, black support, both 
active and financial, would grow, but in May of 1954 the local Branch 
rem ained small and weak.22 
The Im pact of B ro w n
Considering Little Rock’s relatively progressive racial situation, it was 
not surprising that the little  Rock School Board was the first in the South to 
announce that it would comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling.23 The Board 
met the day after the Court announced its decision and decided that, although 
as a body it disagreed with the Brown decision, it would obey the ruling as the 
law of the land. The group promptly ordered school district Superintendent 
Virgil T. Blossom to begin work on a  desegregation plan that would conform to 
the ruling. In the meantime, the Board drew up a statem ent concerning the 
Brown decision, which it released on May 22. The statem ent explained the 
School Board's plans for the interim  between the Brown decision and the 
Supreme Court's ruling on implementation to be handed down later. These 
plans included developing new attendance areas for each of the city's schools, 
revising pupil records, and examining the results of desegregation research
Zlfreyer, 27-28.
22preyer, 27-29; Record and Record, 286.
23steve Payer, Sarah Flynn and Henry Hampton, Voices of Freedom: An Oral 
History of theXivil Rights Movement From the 1950s Through the 1980s (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1990), 36,
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and studies. The Board's statem ent further solicited community support for 
compliance with the Supreme Court’s d e c i s i o n .^ ^
The Arkansas State Conference of the NAACP reacted optimistically to 
the Board's response. State Conference president Daisy Bates reported to the 
National Office that the situation in Arkansas was favorable for successful 
implementation. On May 18, the Governor of Arkansas announced that the 
state would obey the law and that he was in the process of appointing an 
interracial commission to help alleviate the difficulties of desegregation.^^ 
Newspaper comments across the state had been mostly favorable to the 
decision, and several school districts had already begun plans for compliance. 
Bates predicted that desegregation suits would have to be filed in only three 
counties out of more than two dozen.26
The little  Rock Branch was also pleased by the city’s reaction. A 
majority within the local Branch of the NAACP viewed the Brown decision and 
prospects for its implementation optimistically. Little Rock's school district 
was planning compliance, and race relations in the city were good. The 
Branch expressed joy that the law was finally on the side of the Negro, and it 
announced its hope little  Rock would be the model for implementation for the 
entire South.^^
Natigaal NAM;F Policy
The weekend following the Brown decision, the NAACP held its first 
im plementation conference in  Atlanta, Georgia. Earlier that spring, the Board
24virgü T. Blossom, It Has Happened Here (New York: Harper, 1959), 11-12; 
Freyer, 15-17, 47.
25pat>ers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "little Rock: The Chronology of 
a Contrived Crisis", 1.
26ibid., Part 3 Series C, reel 14, "EXCERPTS FROM REPORTS OF VARIOUS STATE 
LEADERS RE OVER-ALL PICTURE OF STATE REACTION TO SUPREME COURT 
DECISION", May 22,1954,1.
27Record and Record, 286; Freyer, 42.
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of Directors of the NAACP decided to hold this southwide conference of state 
presidents immediately following the ruling. Purportedly held to "formulate a 
program  to bring about the im plementation of the school desegregation 
decision," the conference was more of an  opportunity for the National Office to 
outline, and recommend the acceptance of, its previously-developed program 
o f im plementation to the southern State Conference p r e s i d e n t s .2 8  By 
following this procedure, national officials hoped to insure that their 
implementation program would be carried out on the local level.
From the perspective of the National Office, the conference was a 
success. The delegation of state presidents conferred with national leadership 
and the National Legal Staff and agreed to adopt the proposed resolutions of the 
National O f f i c e .2 9  in  a form letter to southern Branches sent shortly 
afterwards, the National Office reiterated the basis of the implementation 
process: "It is imperative that aU of our units act in concert as directed to 
effectively implement this historic decision."30
The conference delegates also adopted the widely-publicized Atlanta 
Declaration, which set forth the general implementation program of the 
NAACP for the immediate future. In order to press School Boards in local 
communities for compliance, the declaration called upon NAACP Branches to 
collect the signatures of black parents who favored immediate desegregation. 
The declaration also encouraged local Branches to work with other community 
organizations and community leaders to effectuate the process. The statem ent 
further emphasized that the Association was intent upon cooperating with 
local School Boards in implementing the decision and in meeting the
28pat>ers of _the_ NAACP. Part 16b, reel 21, "Report of the Secretary for the 
Month of March, 1954", 2.
29jbid., Part 3 Series C, reel 17, "Press Release for May 23, 1954", 1.
30ibid., Part 3 Series C, reel 5, Untitled letter to "Dear Branch Officer", May 25, 
1954,2.
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difficulties presented by the desegregation process. It read, "We are 
instructing all of our branches in every affected area to petition their local 
school boards to abolish segregation without delay and to assist these agencies 
in working out ways and means of implementing the Court’s ruling." The 
Declaration emphasized that plans for implementation were to begin
immediately .32
Between the Atlanta Conference and the NAACP’s annual convention in 
late June, the National Office worked to energize the local Branches and 
instruct them  about how to begin the implementation process. It sent 
num erous directives to the Branches co n ta in in g instructions and suggestions, 
and it drew up the forms to be used by the Branches for petitioning their local 
School Boards. The National Office also instructed the Branches on the proper 
procedure for petitioning. Its directions were clear and to the point: "We are 
requesting our Branches not to draw up their own petition but to follow the 
petition drafted by our National Legal S ta f f ." 3 3  The National Office wanted to 
insure that the petitions could be used in court, if that proved necessary. The 
National Office prodded local Branches to begin pushing for desegregation 
promptly, under its guidance and that of the State Conferences.34
The National Office also directed the work of its State Conferences. It 
urged them to hold meetings w ith Branch presidents in their states, clarffied 
the petition process and the role of the state units in that process, and 
emphasized the importance of increased fundraising in the implementation 
program. It further directed State Conference leaders to emphasize to the 
Branches that no commitments o r agreements were to be undertaken by the
31lbid., Part 3 Series C, reel 13, "Atlanta Declaration".
32ibid.
33ibid., Part 3 Series C, reel 5, Untitled letter to "Dear Branch Officer", May 25,
1 9 5 4 , 1 .
34ibid.
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Branches without the approval of the National Office and the Branch’s State 
Conference.35 in general, the National Office directed the State Conferences to 
get the local Branches working for school desegregation, along the guidelines 
established by the National Office, as quickly as possible.^^
State Conference leaders, for their part, held conferences with Branch 
presidents to explain the implementation procedure and encouraged local 
leaders to begin desegregation work immediately. The Arkansas State 
Conference, representatives of which attended the Atlanta Conference, 
form ulated and distributed a list of suggestions for Branches under its 
jurisdiction. The Conference highlighted the need for cooperation with other 
community organizations for effective and problem-free implementation, 
encouraged Branches to follow carefully the actions and pronouncements of 
local School Boards, directed Branches to seek the support and aid of local 
ministers, and reminded local units of the annual statewide NAACP meeting to 
be held in October.^^
The little  Rock Branch began its desegregation activities in the period 
between the Atlanta Conference and the Annual Convention. The most 
significant undertaking was the reorganization and rejuvenation of the local 
chapter of the Southern Regional Council (SRC), a southern interracial 
organization devoted to nonconfrontational interracial progress. The 
reorganization, which took place on June 19, established a new interracial 
organization in Little Rock called the Arkansas Council on Human Relations 
(ACHR). This organization would shortly thereafter play an im portant role in 
the desegregation of Little Rock’s public schools. It was a small, liberal group
35ibid.; Ibid., Part 3 Series C, reel 13, "FOLLOW_UP RE ATLANTA CONFER:". 
36lbid., Péirt 3 Series C, reel 5, Untitled letter to "Dear Branch Officer", May 25,
1954,1.
37ibid, Part 3 Series C, reel 1, "STATE CONFERENCE SUGGESTIONS ON 
INTEGRATION PROCEDURE", 1.
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with a  full-time staff in Little Rock, and its meetings brought local black and 
white leaders together to discuss and resolve problems of m utual concern.^® 
The ACHR’s relationship with the local NAACP is difficult to discern, 
though the two shared common memberships and a  dedication to the 
desegregation of Little Rock’s schools as quickly as possible.39 The ACHR’s 
relationship with local m inisters was more clear. Through its meetings, 
luncheons, and conferences, the group allowed for increased cooperation 
between black and white ministers on an informal basis, which undoubtedly 
contributed to growing interracial m inisterial support for the local NAACP and 
school desegregation in general Explained m inisters Ernest Campbell and 
Thomas Pettigrew, "This local council was quite often the instigator of specific 
actions by the clergy in Little Rock and offered an opportunity to ministers to 
work for integration behind the scenes."^ Considering the number of 
m inisters who were leaders in the Little Rock community and the historic tie 
between the NAACP and local black churches, the ACHR provided an im portant 
link between influential segments of the local community."*̂1 
The 1954 Annual Convention
A m onth after the Atlanta Conference, the NAACP held its annual 
convention in  Dallas, Texas. The convention, held from June 29-Jtüy 4, 1954, 
served to solidify the NAACP’s implementation program and to spur the local
38Emest Q, Campbell and Thomas F. Pettigrew, Christians in Racial Crisis: A 
Studv of Little Rock's M inistrv (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), 64; 
Freyer, 21.
39$pitzberg, 53; Record and Record, 198; Freyer, 21; Morris, 75; Papers of the 
NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 2, "Hearing Before the Special Education Committee 
of the Arkansas Legislative Council", 10. Historian Aldon Morris points out 
that organizations working for racial change, and relations between these 
organizations, are often diffîcult to document because of the need for 
obscurity in the face of threats of violence and economic retribution, 
^^am pbell and Pettigrew, 184.
4lBates, 156; Morris, 37.
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Branches of the NAACP into action. After the convention, the implementation 
process began in earnest a t the local level, and the National Office worked to 
oversee its program and direct it as smoothly as possible. The State 
Conferences of the Association served as key links in the hierarchical rhain  
of co m m an d .
The convention focused on school desegregation and the process 
whereby the Brown decision would be implemented.^^ it provided guidance to 
local Branches during the interim  between the Brown decision and the 
Supreme Court’s decree regarding the implementation of Brown^ to be handed 
down following reargum ent by those involved in the original cases. The key 
provisions of the program had already been established by the National Office 
and approved by the State Conference presidents at the Atlanta Conference, 
Now the National Office sold its program to the NAACP Branches and individual 
delegates.
At the convention, the National Office stressed the need for action a t the 
local level. It organized day-long workshops to explain its program and the 
role of the local chapters in  the im plementation of the Brown decision. A key 
tenet of the program was the emphasis on local Branch work to effectuate 
desegregation, rather than  forcing compliance through litigation. The 
conference resolved that "the enjoym ent of many rights and opportunities of 
first class citizenship is no t dependent on legal action but rather on the 
molding of public sentim ent and the exertion of public pressure to make 
democracy w o r k . " 4 3  The National Office preferred implementation by 
voluntary compliance w ith the Brown decision; litigation was to be a last 
resort. Local Branches were also encouraged to seek support and help from
42pat>ers of the NAACP. Part 17, reel 4, "Staff Meeting, March 16,1954", 2.
43ibicL, Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), reel 10, "Resolutions Adopted, Education 
[1954 Annual Convention]", 1.
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local m inisters, labor unions, social and civic groups, and educational 
g ro u p s .^  Finally, the National Office once again directed its Branches to 
begin desegregation activities immediately, using its guidelines: "The 
implementation of legal victories depends on broadening the scope of the 
Association’s activities in the field of local a c t i o n . ' ^ 5
The National Office also spent a good deal of time a t the convention 
working and meeting with the southern State Conference leaders. These 
meetings and workshops were held to make sure that the state units of the 
NAACP understood and followed the national implementation program. The 
National Office distributed the forms for petitioning local School Boards to the 
State Conference representatives and delegated the responsibility for filing 
the petitions to them."*^ After consultation with the State Conference 
presidents, the National Office decided that September, 1955, was to be the 
target date for desegregation in  the South."*^ In April 1955, at the arguments 
on implementation, attorneys for the NAACP would ask that the Supreme Court 
adopt this date as well.^^ Depending as it did on the State Conferences to 
m ain ta in  oversight of the desegregation program, the National Office worked 
to insure that the State Conferences would function effectively. Explained
44ibicL, Part 3 Series C, reel 5, "DEVELOPING COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM TO 
SPEED UP INTEGRATION", 2-3.
^^Ibid., Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), reel 10, "Resolutions Adopted, Education 
[1954 Annual Convention]", 1.
46rbid., Part 3 Series C, reel 5, "DEVELOPING COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM TO 
SPEED UP INTEGRATION", 2-3.
"^^Ibid., Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), reel 10, "Association Press Release, July 
4,1954", 5.
^^IbicL, Part 3 Series C, reel 17, "The Impact and Consequences of the United 
States Supreme Court Decision of May 17, 1954", Madison S. Jones, 5-6; Richard 
Kluger, Simple justice (New York: Random House, 1975), 726-30.
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NAACP Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall after the conference, "the state 
level is the im plem entation level of national policy."^^
The Arkansas State Conference knew the NAACP’s implementation 
program well. At the convention, Daisy Bates, the Arkansas NAACP president, 
chaired the main workshop for explaining the implementation program to the 
southern Branches. This may have been a deliberate plan by the National 
Office to insure that the NAACP president of a key southern state would 
effectively im plement the Brown decision. In a letter written a  week after 
Bates was asked to chair the workshop, NAACP Administrator Roy Wilkins 
highlighted the significance of Arkansas to the National Office: "'Our latest 
information is that white people in the Deep South are watching Arkansas and 
that if Arkansas goes, all except the very small hard core will go. Our 
inform ation is that Arkansas is going our w a y ."'50 Shortly thereafter, 
segregationists would also come to regard Arkansas as the key to the southern 
position on school desegregation, little  Rock would become their 
battleground.
U ttle  Rock: Soring. Summer and  Fall. 1954
Meanwhile, Superintendent Virgil Blossom had begun to develop a plan 
of integration for Little Rock. Blossom, who became the Superintendent of the 
Little Rock school district in  February of 1953, was a competent adrninistrator, 
and he put an enormous amount of effort into researching and planning for 
desegregation. He had adm inistered a num ber of race-related improvements to 
the public school system in Fayetteville, Arkansas, where he worked as 
Superintendent before coming to Little Rock, and he felt confident that his
^^Papers Qf the-MAACP, Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), reel 10, "Remarks of 
Thurgood Marshall a t Press Conference, June 30, 1954".
Part 3 Series C, reel 17, Letter from Roy Wilkins to Mr. CA. Franklin (of 
The Kansas City Call). June 24,1954,1.
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planning would produce an effective program  for desegregation. 
Unfortunately, Blossom's planning did no t incorporate im portant segments of 
the Little Rock community who expressed interest in the desegregation of the 
city's public schools, such as the local m inisterial alliance and the city’s 
newspapers. In fact. Blossom quickly took control of the entire project, and 
chose to supervise it himself from beginning to end.51
Underlying Blossom’s planning from  the start was the decision to 
forego any school desegregation until the Supreme Court decided on some sort 
of an  implementation decree. Thus, although several communities elsewhere 
in Arkansas announced tiiat the desegregation of their public schools would 
begin in the fall of 1954, little  Rock did not follow their lead. Blossom assumed, 
as did the other members of the School Board, that Little Rock whites did not 
favor the desegregation of the public schools and would rather wait to see 
exactly what sort of compliance would be required of them. This undoubtedly 
correct assumption guided the Superintendent’s planning throughout the 
entire desegregation process.^2
On May 21, Blossom organized a meeting of Little Rock's black leaders, 
including members of the local NAACP. At the meeting. Blossom announced 
that the Board had decided to wait until the next Supreme Court ruling to 
initiate any desegregation in Little Rock. Many of the blacks in attendance 
voiced their disappointment. L.C. Bates walked out of the meeting. Other 
blacks, more optimistic about the School Board's actions and Little Rock race 
relations, stayed to hear out the Superintendent. The group met for nearly 
three hours. Blossom, for his part, promised them that the Board was not
SlSpitzberg, 52. Some historians, including Tony Freyer, think this might 
have been because Blossom was considering a future political career, and he 
thought that a well-directed integration plan would win him favor with the 
city 's leaders.
S^Blossom, 10-11.
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delaying merely to avoid desegregating, bu t simply to do the job right, and he 
pledged to cooperate with them in the future.^^ Unfortunately, Blossom's 
pledges went unfultilled, and his words eventually rang hollow.
The meeting highlighted the divisions plaguing Little Rock's black 
community a t this time. Some blacks, encouraged by the recent improvements 
in  race relations in Little Rock and willing to give the new school 
Superintendent the benefit of the doubt, adopted a  moderate stance toward 
school desegregation. The large majority of them  favored desegregation, but 
they were simply unwilling to threaten the new-found racial harmony of the 
city. Others, inspired by the fact that the law now rested on their side and 
upset with the superficiality of recent improvements in race relations, pushed 
more militantly for substantial desegregation. Within the latter camp were 
several members of the local NAACP.
Little Rock’s two black newspapers reflected this division well. The 
Arkansas State Press, produced and published by L.C. and Daisy Bates, took a 
m ilitant line. It prodded local blacks to take more action in support of 
desegregation and other causes and wholeheartedly denounced all vestiges of 
racism within the city. Its competition, the Southern Mediator Journal, 
published by C.H. Jones, took a  more moderate and conciliatory position. Both 
papers supported school desegregation, bu t the two differed significantly in 
term s of what role local blacks should play in attaining this goal, and they 
catered to separate segments of the black c o m m u n i t y .^4 The Bates represented 
the more militant segment of the black community, and L.C. had argued for 
filing a desegregation suit against the Little Rock School Board shortly after 
the original Brown decision. Constrained by the dictates of the National Office
53ibid., 13.
54ibid., 12; Freyer, 27.
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of the NAACP, Bates altered his stance with regards to legal action, but he 
rem ained a vocal proponent for complete and immediate desegregation. His 
wife Daisy, president of the Arkansas State Conference, echoed his 
pronouncem ents. Their words, reflecting the policy of the National Office of 
the NAACP, occasionally alienated them from other members of the little  Rock 
B r a n c h . 5 5  C-H. Jones, on the other hand, appreciated the recent improvements 
in  little  Rock's race relations, and he favored giving the School Board a 
chance to prove its dedication to complying with the law.
Over the course of the summer. Superintendent Blossom initiated a 
num ber of studies and polls designed to facilitate desegregation in little  Rock. 
He worked to develop new attendance areas for the city's schools, revised pupil 
records, and studied community sentiment w ith regards to desegregation. The 
latter, accomplished by a  poll that lasted for several months, led Blossom to 
conclude that the m ajority of little  Rock citizens were wary of desegregation. 
'"In general'", he concluded, "'the people agreed with the School Board that 
they would have to respect the law, but they hoped that enforcement would be 
delayed.'"^^ Blossom also learned from this poll that parents of school-age 
children favored desegregating a t the high school level first, rather than a t a 
younger age as Blossom had been p l a n n i n g . 5 7  Blossom would later 
incorporate this sentim ent, along with other findings firom ^  poll, into his 
desegregation plan. Historian Numan Bartley explains, "As a practical 
adm inistrator dependent upon public support. Blossom devised a functional
55Record and Record, 2 8 8 ,  covers the stance of the National Office; see 
Spitzberg, 1 2 9 ,  for the effects of Mrs. Bates' militancy.
SCgiossom, 1 4 .
S^Blossom had thought that beginning with the youngest children offered the 
best chance for success and promised to mitigate serious resistance to 
desegregation.
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plan tailored precisely on these [survey] findings and  went about explaining it 
to the CQTnTmiTiiTy-"58
Unfortunately, Blossom had virtually excluded the little  Rock NAACP, 
the ACHR, the Little Rock Urban League, and other relevant organizations 
from his work that summer. Almost from the beginning, in  fact. Blossom 
viewed the local NAACP as an organization of extremists, unwilling to 
compromise on the issue of desegregation and committed only to achieving its 
own self-interested goals. That summer, after listening to the local NAACP, the 
Little Rock Urban League, and the Arkansas Council on Human Relations press 
for the desegregation of the Little Rock public school system in the fall of 
1954, Blossom began the process of excluding those organizations from his 
planning. Having already determ ined th a t integration in Little Rock would 
not begin in the fall of 1954, Blossom was uninterested in listening to 
organizations that were pressing for that very goal. Instead, he focused his 
attention on those individuals and organizations that he believed would be 
m ost receptive to his ideas about integrating Little Rock’s schools.59 
For its part, the Little Rock NAACP pushed the School Board to 
desegregate quickly and completely. Blossom’s unwillingness to work with the 
local Branch, though it tried to establish a  working relationship widi the 
Board, heightened the Branch's suspicions of Blossom and led to increasing 
wariness over the way he was handling the desegregation effort. Eventually 
the Branch became estranged from Blossom and the Board; however, this 
develoi>ed only over time, and throughout the first year after Brown, the
58Numan Bartley, "Looking Back a t Little Rock," Arkansas Historical Oiiartt*rlv 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas & Arkansas Historical Association), 
Volume 25 (1966), 105.
S^Blossom, 19; Freyer, 16-18. Blossom generally listened to these organizations, 
bu t he made a point of making im portant desegregation decisions on his own; 
see Spitzberg, 52.
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Branch strove to include itself in the planning. In addition to its work in 
connection with the School Board, the Branch solicited the help and support of 
other community organizations and individuals. As historian Tony Freyer 
explains, "The Little Rock branch of the NAACP was the m ost active proponent 
of school desegregation in the c o m m u n i i y ." 6 0
That summer, the Branch procured the support of local black ministers. 
In late July, approximately 2 7 5  Negro churchmen and community leaders met 
in Little Rock and p le t^ed  their support to the NAACP and to the 
implementation of the Brown ru lin g . They voted to extend financial support to 
the local NAACP, and asked for "'immediate implementation of the sp irit... and 
meaning of the (Supreme (Court's) decision.'"^1 This action conformed with 
the national NAACP’s emphasis on the importance of church support in the 
desegregation process. Following the annual convention in June, the National 
Office had rem inded its Branches that "The church is one of the most 
im portant agencies in  the desegregation p r o g r a m . " ^ ^
Gaining the support of the black ministers was certainly an im portant 
achievement for the local NAACP. Black churches traditionally played a 
s ig n ifica n t role in the affairs of the black community, and the support of the 
black ministers greatly enhanced the odds of increased support from the 
entire black com m u n ity- Churches were also less subject to economic 
in tim id a tion  than Other black institutions, and this allowed ministers greater 
freedom of speech and action. Moreover, the churches themselves could be 
utilized to c o m m u n ica te  news and announcements, or as assembly places for 
mass meetings. Finally, because Little Rock’s black churches were closely
60preyer, 25 .
61p ap ers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 7 , "Southern School News, 
September 3 ,1 9 5 4 " , 3 -4 .
62ibidL, Part 3 Series C, reel 5, "DEVELOPING COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM TO 
SPEED UP INTEGRATION", 2-3.
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linked together through the Greater Little Rock M inisterial Alliance, which 
increased their influence within the black community, obtaining their 
support was doubly im portant to the local NAACP.^3
The little  Rock Branch also began the petitioning process that summer. 
Particularly active after the Association's an n u al convention, the local Branch 
worked diligently w ith national field representative Mildred Bond to collect 
the signatures of local black parents who screed with the NAACP’s position 
favoring the start of desegregation in  Little Rock’s schools in the fall of 1954. 
These signatures were collected a t community meetings, speeches, and 
lectures, as well as by canvassing the community and seeking out those 
individuals most likely to favor immediate desegregation and willing to risk 
signing a petition affirming their position. Along with the petitions, 
signatories were asked to sign authorization forms granting the NAACP the 
right to represent them  in meetings with the School Board and stating that 
they would take part in  legal action against the Board, if it came to that, to 
have desegregatlou cat i ied-ouras^quiddy as p o s s l b l e . ^ 4
The National Office of the NAACP sent field representative Bond to help 
with the petitioning process in mid-July, and she stayed for over a month. An 
NAACP fieldworker who usually worked on voter registration campaigns for 
the Association, Bond frequently traveled to areas that needed help or 
guidance from the National Office. In Arkansas, she helped the NAACP’s State 
Conference with the petitioning process by traveling throughout the state 
securing signatures and generally soliciting support for the NAACP and its 
implementation program. Bond had worked with the Little Rock NAACP on 
several occasions before, and her work in  1954 was based out of Little Rock.
63preyer, 21; Morris, 11.
^P ap ers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Report of the Little Rock, 
Arkansas, Branch on Desegregation Activities, August 30 [1954]", 1.
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National field representatives were one way the National Office maintained 
oversight of its Branches, and Bond was the first national field representative 
to come to Arkansas to work on the desegregation campaign.^^
In late August, the little  Rock Branch turned its desegregation petition 
over to the Chairman of the NAACP’s State Legal Redress Committee, Mr. WUey 
Branton, to have it registered with the State Conference. The petition 
contained nineteen signatures, just on the lower end of the state average. 
Considering the size of Little Rock, this number highlighted the lack of local 
support for the NAACP. Branton made copies of the petition for NAACP records 
and then notarized it as legal representative for the black parents of Little 
Rock before sending an official copy to the Little Rock School Board on August 
24. At the same time, Branton filed petitions with fourteen other school 
districts across the state; the Little Rock petition was in no way exceptional.^^ 
Shortly after filing the petition with the Little Rock School Board, 
Branton wrote the Board and requested a hearing to discuss the petition. 
Following national protocol with regards to the petitioning process, Branton 
asked that NAACP representatives be allowed to attend the hearing to discuss 
the issue of desegregation with the Board. Also in accordance with national’s 
guidelines, he emphasized that at that time the Little Rock NAACP had "'no 
intention of a suit,'" to force compliance, though he hoped that the Board 
would not adopt a  ’"wait-and-see"' attitude toward integration.^^ Probably 
relieved by Branton’s letter, and seeing no harm  in meeting with the NAACP,
65ibid., Part 3 Series C, reel 1, "ACTIVITY REPORT FROM JULY 10 TO AUGUST 20, 
1954", Mildred L. Bond to Gloster B. Current.
^^Ibid., Part 3 Series C, reel 17, "The Status of Desegregation in Arkansas—Some 
Measures of Progress, by Vernon McDaniel, POINTS OF DEPARTURE", 3; Ibid., 
Part 3 Series C, reel 1, "ACTIVITY REPORT FROM JULY 10 TO AUGUST 20,1954 
[Mildred Bond to Gloster B. Current]", 4.
6?Freyer, 41.
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Blossom and the Board agreed to hold a  hearing on the petition in early 
Septem ber.
The hearing was held on September 7, 1954. Branch members presented 
the Board with a second petition containing more signatures than the petition 
filed by Branton and requested that integration begin immediately. Again, 
however, they assured the Board that there was '"no intention of a suit.*" They 
were accompanied by Branton, as well as representatives of other little  Rock 
interracial organizations (most likely the ACHR and the Little Rock Urban 
League, which also favored a degree of immediate desegregation in the Little 
Rock schools)
Blossom responded by outlining a  tentative program for the 
desegregation of Little Rock's schools, emphasizing that im portant studies 
undertaken for the development of a successful desegregation plan would be 
completed within the next month or two. His program, which would become 
known as the 'Blossom Plan’, called for the integration of Little Rock’s public 
schools to begin in the fall of 1956 at the high school level. The reason for the 
delayed implementation. Blossom said, was to allow for the completion of a new 
school building in eastern Little Rock which would serve as an integrated 
high schooL Integration would begin in the junior high schools in 1957, and 
then later in  the elem entary schools. The entire process would take 
approximately six years.^^ In the meantime, the Board planned to establish 
one set of school attendance zones which would be utilized to assign students 
regardless of race.^0
68paners of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Report of the Little Rock, 
Arkansas, Branch on Desegregation Activities, August 30 [1954]", 1; Freyer, 41; 
Record and Record, 286.
69Record and Record, 286.
70ibid.; Freyer, 41; Papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Report of the 
Little Rock, Arkansas, Branch on Desegregation Activities, August 30 [1954]"', 1;
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The Little Rock NAACP supported Blossom's plan, though not 
wholeheartedly. A m inority within the Branch stni favored pushing the 
School Board to move more quickly, though it is unclear what tactics they had 
in  mind. The m ajority within the Branch, however, was wary of unduly 
pressing a  School Board that had voluntarily undertaken to comply with the 
Brown ruling. Moreover, they sincerely believed that desegregation in Little 
Rock might serve to show the rest of the South how it should be done. They 
pointed out that significant school desegregation would occur under the 
Blossom Plan, though the process would take several years.^1 That fall, 
explained NAACP member Georg Iggers, officers of the Little Rock Branch 
"continued to keep in  touch with the Board and the Superintendent, indicating 
their support for the program and urging that the necessary steps for its 
realization be taken as quickly as possible."^^
Many members of the local Branch took it as a  good sign that the Board 
even granted a hearing. Of the fourteen School Boards in the state of Arkansas 
petitioned by the NAACP, only six granted hearings for local chapters. In 
Arkansas, wrote NAACP educational specialist Vernon McDaniel, "responses of 
the School Boards to desegregation petitions were neutral o r n e g a t iv e ." 7 3  This 
consideration, coupled with the relatively progressive actions and 
pronouncements of the Board, convinced most members of the Little Rock 
Branch that the Board was indeed acting in 'good faith.'
That fall. Superintendent Blossom began actively to publicize the 
Blossom Plan and work for its acceptance by the greater Little Rock
Ibid., Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "little Rock: The Chronology of a Contrived Crisis", 
1.
^iRecord and Record, 287.
72ibid., 286; Freyer, 42.
73papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 17, "The Status of Desegregation in 
Arkansas—Some Measures of Progress, by Vernon McDaniel, POINTS OF 
DEPARTURE", 4-5.
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community. Before white, black, and interracial audiences, he delivered over 
two hundred speeches outlining the plan and answered questions. For the 
m ost part Blossom’s presentation was well-received, and there was little public 
criticism of his plan.^"^ Opponents existed, however, on both sides. Blacks 
were increasingly wary of the way Blossom emphasized token compliance with 
the Brown decision when selling his plan, rather than unconditional 
desegregation. Blossom hinted that the Board would m aintain  a  high degree of 
segregation, which he argued would ameliorate the difficulties of the process, 
by overseeing the selection of the black applicants. This seemed like hedging 
on the part of the Superintendent to many little  Rock blacks. Segregationists, 
for their part, opposed the plan simply because it would desegregate the city's 
schools. Still, outspoken criticism came only from a small minority. Blossom 
seemingly convinced the city’s residents that his plan represented the 
minimum the couxts would allow and the mavimnm little  Rock whites would
accept.75
Even as he was selling the Blossom Plan, however. Superintendent 
Blossom was paying very close attention to the pronouncements and actions of 
state education authorities and politicians. In late September, State Education 
Commissioner Arch W. Ford stated that the Arkansas amicus curaie brief to be 
filed with the Supreme Court in  connection with the implementation decree 
for the Brown decision "’will be an effort to point out proper ways of 
implementing it  [Brown] in Arkansas.*" Filed in the late faU of 1954, the brief 
argued that local considerations should weigh most heavily in the 
implementation process and that the Supreme Court should not set a fixed date 
by which desegregation had to be effected. It strongly supported Blossom’s
^^Record and Record, 286.
^Sgartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance. 255; Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at 
Central High (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), X.
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ideas about minimal desegregation and hinted that an even more gradual plan 
would be acceptable Accordingly, Blossom started to revise the Blossom Plan 
in  the late fall of 1954.^^ Blossom’s plan would become more token as 1954 
turned into 1955.
For the time being, however, everything seemed to be working out well 
for desegregation in Little Rock. Certainly the process would not occur as 
quickly as the local NAACP desired, but the School Board’s plan provided for 
significant and voluntary desegregation, had won a  degree of acceptance by 
Little Rock's white community, and would not require legal action to be 
implemented. Local blacks gave Blossom the benefit of the doubt and accepted 
the plan grudgingly.
In the meantime, the National Office of the NAACP was in the process of 
expanding its field staff to help effectuate the desegregation process. During 
the fall of 1954, the National Office placed four new field personnel in the 
southern states to help with petitioning and community organizing. Chosen 
on the basis of past organizing experience and work in the field of education, 
these "education specialists" were trained by the National Office in New York 
City before heading South. The National Office directed them to work only on 
school desegregation projects. Officially employed by, and responsible to, the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the specialists worked to 
im plement the National Office’s program  for school desegregation.^®
^^Freyer, 34: Southern School News (Nashville: Southern Education Reporting 
Service), November 1954, 2; Southern School News. May 1955, 2; Southern 
School News. June 1955,2.
^^Freyer, 35; Papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 17, "Press Release, April 
14,1955", 5.
78papers of the NAACP. Part 18a, reel 6, "Memorandum from Gloster B. Current 
to Thurgood MarshaU"; Ibid., Part 18a, "ACTIVmES AND TENTATIVE PLANS, A 
Report to the Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (National Association
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Due to a  limited supply of funds for these field representatives, the 
NAACP employed them  as temporary staff and sent them only to states which 
fit specific criteria of the National Office. These criteria included, among 
other things, potential for successful desegregation work, a local need for 
national staff or outside help, and the importance of the particular state 
within the Association's larger plan for desegregation. Arkansas fit all of the 
above, and it received an education specialist in the fall of 1954.
The specialist sent to Arkansas was Vernon McDaniel, a  black educator 
on leave from the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. Appointed for a  period of 
one year and assigned to focus specifically on school desegregation in 
Arkansas, McDaniel traveled throughout the state and helped to secure 
signatures for petitions and organize local blacks to press for desegregation. 
Based in Little Rock, McDaniel began much of his work in that community. 
McDaniel played a particularly im portant role in desegregation efforts in 
little  Rock in  early 1955.
The Arkansas State Conference held its annual meeting of Branches in 
late October in Little Rock. Field Secretary Mildred Bond, while on assignment 
in Arkansas over the summer, had suggested that the conference be organized 
around school desegregation, and State president Daisy Bates followed through 
with this suggestion. The conference, which lasted from October 22-24, 
included workshops, strategies for organizing, presentations, and speeches. 
Attended by Branches from throughout the state, as well as national staff and 
national field representatives, the conference solidified the Arkansas State 
NAACP's stance on school desegregation and implored the state of Arkansas to 
begin desegregating its schools immediately, rather than waiting for the
for the Advancement of Colored People), By Vernon McDaniel, Little Rock, 
Arkansas, October 27,1954", 1.
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Supreme Court to rule on the implementation of the o r iginal Brown decree. On 
the final day of the conference, the Arkansas State NAACP adopted the 
im plementation program of the national NAACP and stated that it would work 
with local School Boards until a t least September, 1955, before taking legal 
action against those districts which had not yet made plans to desegregate.^^ 
During the annual meeting, the Arkansas State Conference also 
inform ed the national representatives in  attendance of the precarious 
financial situation of the State Conference. A statewide fundraising campaign 
which ended the final day of the conference had been a failure, grossing less 
than one-tenth of its ten thousand dollar goal. Weak fundraising, coupled with 
high fees being charged by attorneys representing the NAACP in the 
petitioning process, produced a  potentially disastrous situation for 
desegregation efforts within the state. National representatives, previously 
informed of the situation by Field Secretary Bond and cognizant of the 
importance of Arkansas in the desegregation process, resolved to fix the 
problem  as quickly as possible. Bypassing normal Association procedure. 
Director of the Branches Gloster B. Current appealed to the national Committee 
on Administration to allow the State Conference to withhold half of its 
contributions to the national NAACP for state desegregation efforts.^® Current 
recognized that such a  move would set a precedent, but he nonetheless 
recommended approval of the state’s request.^ ̂  Luckily for the State 
Conference, the National Office agreed.
C o n c lu sio n
79ibid., Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The Chronology of a Contrived 
Crisis", 1.
SOlbid., Part 3 Series C, reel 1, "Memorandum to the Committee on 
Administration from Mr. Current", October 25, 1954, 1.
SlJbid., Part 3 Series C, reel 1, "Cross Reference Sheet, Arkansas School Cases, 
Oct. 1954".
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By the end of 1954, the NAACP had developed a  program to brin g  about 
the desegregation of the South’s public schools. Passed down from the top of 
the Association’s hierarchy, the program  focused on communiiy orga n is in g  
rather than litigation and emphasized the NAACP’s desire to effectuate school 
desegregation as quickly as possible. The National Office planned to oversee 
the process using the NAACP hierarchy, particularly State Conference 
supervision of local Branches. In Little Rock, the local Branch carried out 
relatively little desegregation work by the end of 1954. The Branch completed 
the petitioning process and began to organize the co m m u n ity  to support 
immediate desegregation, but its influence within the com m u n ity  was 
mitigated by prior improvements in community race relations and a desire to 
maintain the harmony that these improvements had established.
Over the course of the next several years, however, support within the 
black community for the Association grew, as did the Little Rock Branch’s role 
in  co m m u n ity  desegregation efforts. This occurred largely because the Little 
Rock School Board, in accordance with the desires of the city’s white residents, 
worked to forestall immediate and substantial desegregation. Superintendent 
of Schools Blossom soon revised the Board's initial, moderate desegregation 
plan and developed a much more gradual program. His alterations heightened 
tensions in the black c o m m u n ity, and raised doubts about the way Little Rock 
was working to desegregate its schools. Within the next year, these tensions 
would culm inate in the filing of a  suit by the local Branch contesting the 
legitimacy and sincerity of the School Board’s desegregation plan. Events 
le a d in g up to and including the suit would highlight the growing support of 
co m m u n ity  blacks for the NAACP and its implementation efforts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Two: Toward Filing a Suit, 195S 
1955 proved to be a crucial year in Little Rock. It witnessed increased 
activity on the part of the local Branch of the NAACP, Little Rock and 
Arkansan segregationists, and the Little Rock School Board. During the year, 
each of these participants in the city's desegregation dram a attem pted to sell 
its ideas about the proper way to desegregate the city's schools, and each 
worked to undermine the opposition. The two key players, the NAACP and the 
School Board, came head to head late in the year, and the result set the stage 
for the battle of Little Rock.
The National Office: 1955
The National Office of the NAACP did not change its stance or its 
program as 1954 ended and 1955 began. The National Office remained 
optimistic about the prospects for desegregation in the South, and it pushed its 
Branches to continue to follow the implementation program outlined in 1954. 
Its directives promoted cooperation with local School Boards and community 
leaders. NAACP conferences, including the 1955 annual convention, attested to 
the perseverance of the National Office's outlook and were indicative of the 
national NAACP's perspective during early 1955.
The first conference of the new year was the 1955 Atlanta Conference. 
Held in late February, this conference affirmed the NAACP's position with 
regard to school desegregation and emphasized its desire for the 
im plementation of the Brown decision a t the earliest possible date. The 
Association reiterated that September 1955 had been chosen as its 'target', or 
m ost desirable, date for southwide school desegregation. ̂  At the Atlanta 
Conference the NAACP also took the opportunity to condemn southern states
iThis position was shortly thereafter reflected in the NAACP's oral arguments 
during the Supreme Court's hearings on the implementation of Brown.
43
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attem pting to evade the Brown decision by passing segregation statutes in 
their state legislatures: "'These undemocratic and unconstitutional methods 
wiU fail.’"2
The Supreme Court announced its ruling on the implementation of 
Brown on May 31. The ruling ordered states with segregated school systems to 
desegregate their schools "with all deliberate speed," but it failed to establish a 
specific time by which this had to be accomplished.^ Acknowledging that 
local considerations needed to be accounted for, the ruling also allowed for 
desegregation delays, for administrative and logistical problems, in school 
districts acting in "good faith." Local courts were to determine exactly what 
embodied "deliberate speed" and "good faitii." In fact, the justices placed the 
responsibility of overseeing the entire implementation process on the federal 
district courts. The NAACP's position on implementation, calling for immediate 
desegregation, a  set date by which desegregation had to be effectuated, and 
only minimal delays for local adjustments, was not accepted by the Supreme 
Court. Most observers viewed Brown 17 as a step back from BrownA
The NAACP held a  second Atlanta Conference, billed as an 'Emergency' 
Southwide Conference on Desegregation, in  June, 1955. Coming on the heels of 
the Brown II decision, the conference focused on the consequences of this 
ruling, and what course of action the Association intended to take. Basically 
the NAACP used this conference as a  forum to downplay assertions that Brown 
11 represented a setback for the NAACP and its cause. The Association argued 
that the ruling clearly reaffirm ed  the original decision and ordered that 
desegregation take place as quickly as possible. Shortly after the conference.
2papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 17, "Press Release, March 3, 1955, 
NAACP IN THE SOUTH WILL PRESS FOR FULL SCHOOL INTEGRATION BY FALL". 
^Kluger, 744-47; Brown v. Board o f Education, Topeka, KS, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
^Kluger, 744-47.
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the National Office reiterated this sentim ent to its Branches: "make no mistake 
about it, this decision in no way cuts back on the May 17th [1954] 
pronouncem ent."^
Finally, the NAACP held its annual convention in late June. Held in 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, this conference provided the Association the 
opportunity to reassess the situation in the South and consider changes to its 
desegregation program. Rather than adopt changes, however, the NAACP 
opted to continue along the lines of its 1954 program and obstinately rejected 
any suggestions that Brown II represented a loss for the Association. The 
NAACP shored up and clarified procedures for desegregation work and 
reiterated its commitment to September 1955 as the date by which the South 
should integrate its schools.^ Thurgood Marshall addressed the assembly near 
the end of the convention, and declared that "it should be emphasized that we 
do not intend to back down one step from this program." ̂
Marshall's militancy a t the annnal convention foreshadowed a  shift in 
NAACP strategy that would come by the end of the year. At the time, however, 
the National Office exhibited an unwarranted sense of optimism. In early 
June, the National Office declared that, "In the overwhelming majority of 
instances it can be expected that compliance without legal action will be the 
rule, perhaps grudgingly and reluctantly in some areas, bu t compliance.
^Qjiote is Papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 14 , "Directive to the 
Branches". June 4, 1955; See also Robert Carter and Thurgood Marshall, "The 
Meaning and Significance of the Supreme Court Decree," Tournai of Negro 
Education (Washington D.C.: School of Education, Howard University), Volume 
24 (Summer 1955), 40003.
^Papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 12 , "NAACP Press Release, June 26, 
1955", 1.
^ibid.. Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), reel 12 , "Thurgood Marshall to the 1955 
Annual Convention", 5.
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nevertheless."® This sentiment, naive with hindsight, formed the basis for the 
NAACP's community approach to desegregation during 1954 and the first half 
of 1955.
By the fall of 1955, however, the Association was singing a different 
tune. Judicial rulings in mid-summer paved the way for the acceptance of 
more protracted school desegregation plans, which confounded the National 
Office.^ As a result, few southern schools desegregated that fall, and the 
NAACP’s target date fell to the wayside. In early 1956, in a sharp break from its 
earlier, more conciliatory approach, the NAACP was forced to launch an all- 
out legal offensive against a num ber of southern states.
L ittle Rock
In the meantime, desegregation work carried on in Little Rock. Vernon 
McDaniel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund field speciaHst, worked 
long hours during the early months of 1955. Based in Little Rock, McDaniel 
attem pted to educate, motivate, and organize the local black community. In 
concert with the local Branch, and carefully following the guidelines of the 
National Office, McDaniel sponsored a num ber of community events relating to 
school desegregation in  the spring of 1955.
One arrangem ent McDaniel developed was a high school assembly 
program  focusing on school desegregation. Organized in the early spring, this 
program allowed community residents of both races, including high school 
students, the opportunity to come together to discuss school desegregation, and 
the Little Rock desegregation plan in particular. The program was carried out 
prim arily by the Little Rock NAACP, though the Arkansas Council on Human
®Ibid_, Part 3 Series C, reel 14, "Memorandum to Emergency Regional 
Conference, from Roy Wilkins and Thurgood Marshall, June 4, 1955", 5.
9lbid., Part 3 Series, reel 17, NAACP Press Release, July 22,1955, 1-2; Finch, 193; 
Briggs V . Elliott, 132 F. Supp 776 (1955); Carson v. McDowell County, 227 F. 2d 789 
(1955); Frasier v. Board o f Trustees, 134 F. Supp 589 (1955).
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Relations contributed to the effort.. Though designed to reach both black and 
white Little Rock citizens, most participants were black. Explaining the 
program  in  a report to the National Office, McDaniel wrote, "The Assembly 
Program a t Dunbar High School is one phase of a  community-wide effort to 
orient the Negro community for desegregation."
The first Assembly Program gathering took place on March 21. It drew 
approximately 120 white and black high school students. Billed as a youth 
forum meeting, the event allowed participants openly to discuss school 
desegregation and the problems it would generate. The gathering went well, 
and by its end the audience concluded that any negative reaction to the 
desegregation of Little Rock's schools would most likely come from adults, not 
the students themselves. ̂  1 On April 4, McDaniel spoke to a crowd of black high 
school students a t Dunbar High School, the all-black high school in Little 
Rock- He focused on preparing black students for the difficulties of enrolling 
in, and attending, a newly-desegregated school. McDaniel outlined the 
difficulties which the first Little Rock blacks to integrate the city's schools 
would surely e n c o u n t e r .  12 Most of aU, he stressed the need to remain 
nonconfrontational in the face of inevitable m istreatm ent.
McDaniel and the Little Rock NAACP worked for the desegregation of 
Little Rock's public schools in other v\^ys during the spring as well. One 
aspect of this undertaking involved m inor restructuring within the Little 
Rock Branch of the NAACP to allow for more consensus in decision-making 
concerning desegregation activities. This change occurred in  February, when
l Opaners of the NAACP. Part 18a, reel 2, "PROGRESS REPORT, by Vernon 
McDaniel, Submitted to: Robert L. Carter", 3.
1 llbid.. Part 3 Series D, reel 1 , "Little Rock: The Chronology of a Contrived 
Crisis", 2.
12ibid., Part 18a, reel 2, "PROGRESS REPORT, by Vernon McDaniel, Submitted to: 
Robert L. Carter", 2.
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the Branch's Executive Committee approved a plan to enlarge the Education 
Committee to include its own members. "Thus, on the problem of 
desegregation, the Executive Committee would act as a committee of the 
w h o l e . " 1 3  Considering the relatively small size of the local Branch, and the 
already established importance of the Executive Committee, this move 
represented less a significant change than it might suggest—the Executive 
Committee dominated the affairs o f the local NAACP.
The local Branch also established a Committee on Desegregation that 
spring. Initially referred to as a separate 'organization', apparently to 
broaden the desegregation effort beyond the confines of the NAACP, the 
Committee was organized during March and early April. The Committee 
selected personnel and prepared m aterials to train them; it also contacted 
other r n m m uTiity  organizations expected to press for desegregation in Little 
Rock. The Committee held several interracial meetings a t a community 
recreation c e n t e r .  15 NAACP leaders hoped the Committee would bring 
together interested parties and strengthen its position requesting complete 
desegregation a t the earliest possible date.
The little  Rock NAACP also opposed a bill in the State Legislature aimed 
a t undermining the Brown ruling. Legislators from eastern Arkansas had 
introduced a  'school ^signm ent' measure designed to maintain segregation in 
Arkansas' public schools. Particularly vehement in their opposition to 
integration, eastern Arkansans would later play an im portant role in the 
confrontation a t Little Rock's Central High. Many of the most influential east
I3ibid., Part 18a, reel 2, "A PROGRESS REPORT-by-Vemon McDaniel TO: Mr. 
Robert L. Carter", 1.
l^This arrangem ent was typical of NAACP Branches. See St. James, A Case 
Studv in Pressure Groups. 77-79.
ISpapers of the NAACP. Part 18a, reel 2, "PROGRESS REPORT-by-Vemon 
McDaniel, TO: Mr. Robert L. Carter", 2.
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Arkansan politicians lived in an  area of the state known as the Delta, a 
football-shaped stretch of land which straddled the Mississippi River in 
southeastern Arkansas and northwestern Mississippi. The area was known 
throughout the South for its virulent racism and narrow-inindedness. 1 ̂
The Little Rock NAACP, in concert with the Arkansas State Conference 
and other Branches, rallied to oppose the school assignment measure, and 
organized a  number of supporters to testify against the bill and speak out for 
desegregation. Among its supporters was a group of ministers who appeared 
"to protest vigorously against pending segregationist büls."^^ Other 
organizations from Little Rock—black, white, and interracial—showed up to 
support the NAACP and oppose the measures as welL In a  report to the 
Association's National Office shortly thereafter, McDaniel wrote "We know now 
that the NAACP wül not have to fight the desegregation batüe alone."
At the capitol, thé NAACP flexed its political muscles. Together with its 
supporters, the NAACP informed the Legislature that the Association's 
influence with Little Rock black voters, and indeed black voters across the 
state, ensured that those legislators who supported the measure would have a 
more difdcult time getting reelected during the next e l e c t i o n s . T h e  threat 
was not an empty one. The relatively large num ber of black voters in the 
state, particularly its capital d ty , apparently convinced a num ber of the 
legislators to reconsider their stand on the issue.^0 The bill passed the lower 
house, but in the Senate Max Howell from Little Rock led the forces which
l^Ibid-, Part 3 Series C, reel 9, Letter to Roy Wilkins from Daisy Bates, February 
24,1955,1; Record and Record, 242. 
l^Campbell and Pettigrew, 64.
l&Paners of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 17, "The Status of Desegregation in 
Arkansas—Some Measures of Progress, POINTS OF DEPARTURE", 12. 
l^ibicL, Part 3 Series C, reel 1, "Arkansas", 1.
20steven Lawson, Rlark Ballnts: VnHng Rights in the South. 1944-1969 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 128; Freyer, 34.
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attached an amendment to the bill delaying its implementation for two years. 
The amended bill passed. Commenting on the blow that these alterations dealt 
Arkansas segregationists, historian Tony Freyer wrote, "The defeat revealed 
the disunity of the state's segregationists and suggested both the influence and 
the tem perament of certain little  Rock voters [i. e. Little Rock blacks]."21 For 
the time being. Little Rock blacks were trium phant; when Arkansan 
segregationists united, however, their victories would become increasingly 
difficult to attain.
Arkansan Siegrs^aUnaists
In early 1955, segregationists established organizations in Little Rock 
and elsewhere in the state. Possibly in  response to the goings-on in the 
Arkansas State Legislature, an organization named White America, Inc., filed 
its incorporation papers with the Secretary of State of Arkansas in early 
February. The papers read: "Object: segregation."22 Based in Little Rock, this 
organization preceded and foreshadowed the development of the Arkansas 
Citizens Councils. In fact, on the group's legal staff was Mr. Amis Guthridge, a 
Little Rock lawyer and businessman who would later become instrum ental in 
the Capital [Little Rock] Citizens Council. For the time being. White America 
busied itself attem pting to recruit members and trying to initiate a rise in the 
segregationist sentim ent of Little Rock.
In April, the Capital Citizens Council (CCC) was formed. A member of the 
Arkansas Association of Citizens Councils, the organization focused its 
attention on Little Rock, and specifically on the issue of school desegregation 
within the city. The CCC was comprised of a diverse collection of Little Rock 
citizens, though its support came mostly from middle- and lower-class whites.
2lFreyer, 34.
22papers of the NAACP Part 3 Series D, reel 1 , "Little Rock: The Chronology of 
a  Contrived Crisis", 1.
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Historian Numan Bartley explained, "Ministers, lawyers and occasionally 
independent businessmen were most prom inent among the organization's 
leadership, with ministers, mainly of Missionary Baptist faith, probably the 
m ost active single g r o u p . " 2 3  At this point, however, the CCC enjoyed little 
support within the little  Rock com m un!^, and it never attracted members 
from the city's leadership. Still, one must be careful not to underestimate its 
influence. Bartley has asserted that, "the Capital Citizens Council undoubtedly 
voiced the prejudices of large numbers of [Little Rock's] white r e s i d e n t s . " ^ ^
The CCC, White America, and segregationists in general benefited from a 
showdown during the summer of 1955 in Hoxie, Arkansas. On June 25, the 
Hoxie School Board unanimously voted to desegregate the community's public 
schools beginning in the summer session, a  move which incorporated tw en^- 
five blacks into a previously all-white school system. The Board chose to do 
this voluntarily—for financial, ethical, and legal reasons. Desegregation 
occurred, and for three weeks things went smoothly. Then, with little 
warning, local segregationists organized and began to exert pressure on the 
Board and local blacks. In late July segregationists pressed the Board into 
reconsidering its decision to integrate the public schools, though the Board 
chose to hold its g r o u n d . 2 5  Shortly thereafter, Hoxie segregationists organized 
a  large outdoor rally and called in  cohorts from across the state. Aims 
Guthridge, from Little Rock, delivered a rousing speech, and the five hundred 
people who attended were subjected to the militancy of the newly-elected state 
rhairm an of White A m e r i c a . 2 6  The following week, Guthridge convinced the 
Board to meet with him, and he took the opportunity to present it with a
23Bartley, "Looking Back a t Little Rock", 107.
24ibidL; Freyer, 24.
25Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York; Random House, 1964), 34. 
26ibid.
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petition demanding the Board's resignation. Nonetheless, the Board again held 
its ground, and the situation in Hoxie began to cool down. Several months later 
the battle switched to a new arena when the segregationists sued the School 
Board to maintain segregation.
Up to this point, segregationists in Arkansas had been fragmented and 
weak. Events in Hoxie, however, allowed diem  to build ties between 
organizations and individuals throughout the s t a t e . 2 7  Hoxie also gave them 
the opportunity to develop and tiy  out techniques for persuading 
noncommittal whites to oppose integration. By late summer, "Segregationists 
had established a statewide organization with interstate connections capable of 
forceful resistance based on states' rights and systematic h a r a s s m e n t . I n  
August, utilizing their increased strength, Arkansas segregationists met in 
litd e  Rock and called for a  constitutional amendment requiring the 
m aintenance of segregation in A r k a n s a s . 2 9  Dubbed the Johnson Amendment, 
after Arkansan segregationist James Johnson, the measure would be approved 
by Arkansan voters in November of the following year.
By late 1955, segregationists were on their way to becoming a  force in 
the state. Still, as 1955 came to a  close, segregationists in Arkansas remained 
relatively weak. Even in eastern Arkansas, where they garnered the most 
support, the segregationists found many whites unrecepdve. Making things 
more difficult was the stance of Arkansas' young and progressive Governor, 
Orval E. Faubus, and many of the states' politicians. These men viewed 
desegregation as a  local choice, rather than a specter of unimaginable evil. 
Indeed, as Bartley points out, "some of the southeastern lowlands' most
27preyer, 24, 63. 
2 8 l b i d . ,  67. 
29ibid., 72.
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influential spokesmen talked of local option and a  flexible program designed to 
lim it and control token social c h a n g e s . "  ̂ 0
In Little Rock, the Capital Citizens Council remained on the fringe of the 
community throughout 1955. The oiganization increasingly received help and 
support &om segregationist organizations around the state, but the CCC found 
little  Rock unsympathetic to its ideas. On the surface at least, most Little Rock 
residents favored the School Board's approach—token compliance with the law 
rather than open defiance. These citizens assumed that desegregation of the 
schools, as the law of the land, would occur. At the end of 1955, the CCC 
remained marginal; it would remain so until late 1956.^^
Ilifi,-LLMLs Rfisk Scha.cd. laaid
The Little Rock School Board had attacked the issue of dese^egation 
with vigor immediately after the original Brown decision. Superintendent 
Blossom, in fact, had followed the five desegregation cases carefully as they 
worked their way up to the Supreme Court, and he expressed no surprise when 
the Court ended school segregation in  1954. Blossom simply knew he faced a 
difficult job ahead. In 1954 he developed and promoted a desegregation plan 
for the Little Rock community. In 1955, after making revisions to this original 
plan. Blossom presented his revised plan to the School Board and gained its 
approval. Afterwards, he worked to secure community support for the plan, 
though often behind the scenes. Blossom feared inflaming emotions 
concerning such a  delicate issue, and he felt the less the community actually 
discussed the Board's plan the better.^^
Blossom spent most of the fall of 1954 selling his original plan to the 
Little Rock community. He gave literally hundreds of public presentations
^ORartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance. 101. 
^iRecord and Record, 286.
32$pitzberg, 52.
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describii^ the plan and how it would be carried ouL He explained that the 
plan was organized into three stages, each representing a  diKerent level of 
integration. The process would begin a t the high school level and progress 
downwards—slowly but surely. In his presentations. Blossom emphasized the 
token nature of the plan, explaining that it was the minimum the courts would 
accept, while also being the maximum that the little  Rock community would 
tolerate. He focused his efforts on winning the support of Little Rock's whites, 
and he argued that a  well-monitored selection process would maintain a high 
degree of segregation, while sparing Little Rock a legal battle over 
compliance. For the most part. Blossom’s presentations went over well, though 
opposition existed on both sides.
Blossom revised the original Blossom Plan in the fall of 1954, His 
revisions, announced in  the spring of 1955, brought the Blossom Plan into 
close conformity with the state of Arkansas' brief for the Supreme Court's 
Brown U hearing. Developed in  part by R. B. McCuUoch, an attorney from 
eastern Arkansas, this brief stressed the need for local flexibility and gradual 
compliance. McCuUoch stated, "’What I don 't want is for the Supreme Court to 
fix a definite deadline for the completion of integration in aU the schools.'"^^ 
McCuUoch and Tom Gentry, the Attorney General of Arkansas, argued that the 
best solution for the Supreme Court would be to aUow the United States 
Congress, which held the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to control the im plementation of its d e c i s i o n . 3 4  BasicaUy, the 
state desired that desegregation be aUowed to take place graduaUy, with some
^^Freyer, 34.
^^Amicus Curiae Brief o f the A ttorney General o f Arkansas, Brown v. Board o f 
Education, 347 U.S. 493 (1954), 14-15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
schools being allowed to remain segregated for the indefinite futnre.^5 
Arkansas supported an elastic interpretation of the original Brown decision.
Superintendent Blossom, following McCuUoch's lead, stressed the need 
for flexibility in the desegregation of Little Rock's schools. His revised plan, 
announced six days before the announcement of Brown U, contained no fixed 
dates for desegregation or specific in stru ctio n  concerning how the Board 
would choose which blacks would attend the previously all-white schools. The 
revised plan, dubbed the Phase Program, also pushed back the tentative date of 
desegregation in the city to September, 1957 because of construction projects 
within the district. That year desegregation would occur in the city's high 
schools, to be followed by the junior high schools in 1960, and the elementary 
schools in 1963. The Superintendent emphasized that these dates were 
tentative. Also, when desegregation did occur, it would be minimal. Thus, 
when the Supreme Court decided Brown II, and indirectly sustained the 
gradualist, community-centered approach to desegregation (along the lines of 
McCuUoch’s brief), it indirectly sanctioned the Phase P r o g r a m .^ ^  
Superintendent Blossom felt as if his revisions had been vindicated.
Little Rock's white community reacted favorably to the alterations. It 
especiaUy appreciated the incorporation of a transfer provision, which would 
aUow students of either race the option to transfer from any school in which 
they were a minority. This would insure that the almost-completed black high 
school, Horace Mann High School, would open almost entirely black, and that 
whites would not be forced to attend it. Blossom's rigid screening process also 
promised to reduce sharply the num ber of blacks who would be aUowed to 
attend the high school chosen for desegregation. Central High SchooL FinaUy,
35ibid., 21-22. 
36preyer, 35.
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a  white high school in  western little  Rock, Hall High School, would remain 
segregated. Blossom pleased the large m ajority of little  Rock’s white citizens 
by reducing the im pact and significance of desegregation.
Blossom's plan limited attendance a t HaU High School to whites who 
resided in  an exclusive neighborhood in  the western part of the city called 
Pulaski Heights. Because of this, upper-class whites would not have to cope 
with the emotional and physical trials of desegregation, while middle- and 
lower-class whites would have to experience them firsthand. Explains Bartley, 
"Thus the Phase Program insured that m uch of little  Rock's civic leadership 
was effectively isolated while those white citizens most likely to hold strong 
racial prejudice were immediately mvolved."^^ When the white community 
named Superintendent Blossom "Little Rock’s Man of the Year" in late 1955, 
then, this was really an expression from the elite of Little Rock, those with the 
influence and the power to make such choices.^® Nonetheless, aU of Little 
Rock’s whites supported Blossom’s efforts to slow the pace of desegregation in 
Little Rock.39
Little Rock Blacks and the School Board
As might be guessed. Blossom’s modifications to the original 
desegregation plan upset blacks in  Little Rock, especially the local NAACP. 
Local blacks and the Branch had originally accepted Blossom's work, though 
w ith reservations. When Blossom announced the changes in his 
desegregation plan, in Late May, 1955, Little Rock blacks reappraised the 
situation and came to different conclusions than before. By faU, the majority 
of blacks within the community had come to question both the motives and 
in tent of a  School Board they had previously trusted. When the Little Rock
37Bartley, "Looking Back at Little Rock”, 103. 
SSgiossom, 26.
39payer and Flynn and Hampton, 36.
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NAACP moved toward filing a  desegregation suit against the Board in  late 1955, 
it noted growing support in die black community for such a move.40
Local blacks increasingly distrusted the School Board and its plan. One 
r e s ^ n  for the growing apprehension was the m anner in which Blossom 
presented the desegregation plan to the general public. Hoping to gain the 
support of die white community, Blossom often stressed the minimalist nature 
of the plan. Then, when selling the plan to local blacks, he argued that the 
plan represented the maximum am ount of desegregation the Litde Rock 
community would accept. Initially blacks accepted this argument, pardy 
because of Blossom's fancy presentations—replete with charts and graphs.
Over time, however. Blossom's constant labeling of the plan as minimalism 
upset the blacks and led them  to believe that Blossom was more interested in 
appeasing the white community than complying with the Brown rultng.'^l 
Nat Griswold, director of the ACHR, explained, "'At first Blacks believed what 
Blossom said, but then they were completely d i s i l l u s i o n e d . * '"*2 The problem 
with his attem pts to prepare the community was his emphasis on the small 
am ount of desegregation that would occur under the Blossom Plan.
In addition, the black community and the NAACP disliked 
Superintendent Blossom's reluctance to work with individuals or organizations 
in  the litd e  Rock community who were concerned about the issue of 
desegregation—black o r white. Instead, Blossom took responsibility for the 
successful desegregation of the city's schools upon himself, and he shared this 
responsibility with no one.^^ He occasionally m et with individuals from the 
community, and he presented his findings and planning publicly, but he
4% ecord and Record, 287; Spitzberg, 53.
4lDaisy Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock: A Memoir (New York: D. McKay, 
1962), 51-52.
42spitzberg, 46, 53; Freyer, 18.
43spitzberg, 52, 46.
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never actually worked with individuals or organizations who might have made 
the process flow more smoothly. In fact, after the Phase Program was 
announced and accepted by most of the city's white community. Blossom shied 
away even from accepting publicly-expressed support of the plan. When the 
local newspapers contacted him about running articles advocating the Phase 
Program, for example. Blossom politely asked them not to do s o .^  Apparently 
he believed that the less the community discussed desegregation, the b e t t e r . 4 5  
To blacks in the community and the NAACP, however, this seemed like 
determ ination on the part of Blossom not to consider their concerns and to 
incorporate their sentiments into the desegregation program. To some degree 
this was certainly the case. Blossom viewed the local NAACP as an organization 
of extremists, and he made a  concerted effort to exclude its members &om 
desegregation planning.^^ Nonetheless, Blossom's reluctance to work with 
others included all aspects of the little  Rock community, and the NAACP was 
wrong to think that it had been singled out for exclusion.^^ In the end, 
though, it was the Branch's, and the black community's, perception that 
m attered, and they felt left out.^®
Blossom's refusal to include community organizations in the 
desegregation planning especially upset the Little Rock NAACP. Following the 
directions of the National Office, the local Branch repeatedly made efforts to 
cooperate with the Board, rather than to be its antagonist. The Branch made it 
d ea r that it hoped to work with the Board on its desegregation plan, but its 
efforts, throughout 1954 and early 1955, produced no tangible results. In June,
^B artley, "Looking Back a t Little Rock", 104.
45spitzberg, 54; Record and Record, 238; Campbell and Pettigrew, 18.
'^Fayer and Flynn and Hampton, 37.
^^Indeed, Blossom made a  concerted effort to handle the issue of desegregation 
on his own, and he chose not to work with any community organizations. See 
Spitzberg, 52.
4®Record and Record, 287.
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1955, State NAACP president D ai^  Bates announced that Arkansan School 
Boards working in  good faith and incorporating the local Branches into their 
desegregation planning would be spared from desegregation litigation.^^ The 
fact that the latter never occurred in little  Rock added to the sentiment that 
the local School Board cared less about desegregation than appeasing local 
whites.
The changes in the Blossom Plan announced in the spring of 1955 added 
to the disillusionment of the black community. More than any other single 
factor, these alterations caused blacks in  Little Rock to lose faith in the School 
Board and its desegregation plaru^O Dr. Georg Iggers, a  white professor a t a 
black college near little  Rock and a  leader in the local NAACP, explained the 
effect of the Board’s changes. In an essay describing the actions of the Little 
Rock NAACP in the 1950s, he wrote, "These drastic modihcations of the original 
plan, undertaken without the advice or consent of the many Negroes who had 
been inclined to go along with the first proposal even if it left much to be 
desired, forced upon them  the conclusion diat the Board and the 
superintendent now intended to integrate the public schools only on a token 
basis, if a t alL"^^
The NAACP and the black community expressed a number of specific 
reservations about the Phase Program. They especially disliked the plan's lack 
of fixed dates for desegregation. Blossom's vague wording, hinting at 1957 as 
the beginning date for desegregation, left local blacks unsettled and wary.
This date, moreover, applied only to the first of the three stages of 
desegregation. When the remaining stages of integration, for elem entary and
49papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The Chronology of 
a Contrived Crisis", 2.
SORecord and Record, 287.
Sllbid.
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junior high schools, would take place was u n k n o w n . 5 2  The black community 
also expressed resentm ent that the plan failed to assign students to the schools 
nearest their homes. Instead, the plan proposed to establish a number of 
criteria, supposedly excluding race, to determine which students would attend 
which schools. The NAACP, for one, attacked this selection process as a sham, 
and it publicly expressed the opinion that race would be the primary 
consideration. Little Rock native Irving Spitzberg explained that, as a result of 
Blossom's revisions and the above considerations, the black community of 
little  Rock "became convinced that Superintendent Blossom was more 
interested in appeasing the segregationists by advocating that only a limited 
num ber of Negroes be adm itted than in complying with the Supreme Court’s
decision."53
The local Branch arranged a meeting with the School Board in late July 
to voice its concerns about the way desegregation was being handled in Little 
Rock. The Branch asked the Board publicly to discuss the Phase Program and 
announce the proposed dates for desegregation. At the meeting, the NAACP 
also took the opportunity to present the Board another petition demanding that 
desegregation begin th a t fall.34 Basically, the group wanted to persuade the 
Board, which had not yet officially adopted the Phase Program, to reject it in  
favor of a  more aggressive plan. As Mrs. Bates explained before the meeting, 
'"We have told Mr. Blossom that we are against his plan because it is too vague 
and it appears it will take at least five years or more to accomplish.'"55
S^Bates, 52; Spitzberg, 47.
53$pitzberg, 46.
54papprs of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 1, "MEMO TO: MR. GLOSTER B. 
CURRENT, DIRECTOR OF BRANCHES, FROM: mildred L bond", July 11-20,1955,1. 
SSibid., Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The Chronology of a Contrived 
Crisis", 2.
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The Board, though willing to listen politely, was not truly interested in 
what the Branch had to say. Superintendent Blossom made a point of acting 
courteously, bu t this was almost assuredly because he wanted to avoid an 
NAACP-sponsored su it contesting the Board’s desegregation plan. Blossom 
tried to walk the fine line between limitirtg the inclusion of the NAACP in the 
desegregation process and being sued for completely excluding it. The Board 
listened to the NAACP’s arguments and promised a  written reply within the 
next week or two.56 it  then adopted Blossom’s Phase Program.
A School Board hearing in North little  Rock that summer related to the 
situation in Little Rock. Facing a situation surprisingly similar to the one in 
little  Rock, the North little  Rock NAACP m et with its School Board on July 14. 
The Board was in the process of deciding upon a  beginning date for 
desegregation, and the NAACP wanted to press for the earliest possible date. 
Local Branch members, Mrs. Bates, and several community residents attended 
the meeting and requested that desegregation begin that fall. At title 
conclusion of the hearing, however, the Board voted to begin desegregation in 
the fall of 1957, a date the NAACP found utterly unacceptable. NAACP 
fieldworker Mildred Bond concluded, "Since this date is unsatisfactory to the 
NAACP, court action may be n e c e s s a r y . "  57
Assuming correctly that the little  Rock School Board would respond in a 
similar fashion, the little  Rock NAACP stepped up its fundraising efforts in the 
weeks preceding its meeting with the Board. Coordinated by Bond, the 
fundraising effort was directed by a  newly-established education fundraising 
committee. The money which the local Branch raised went into a bank 
account, m aintained separately from the general account, which was
56ibid., Part 3 Series C, reel 1 , "Arkansas", 2. 
57ibid., 1.
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established for funding education lawsuits and related expenses.58 This 
fundraising indicated a definite shift in the m indset of the local Branch, and it 
represented a  more open consideration of legal action as a means to bring 
about an acceptable level of desegregation in little  Rock.
Toward Filing a Suit
Interestingly, about this same time the Arkansas State Conference 
began formulating a  legal strategy with representatives of the National Office. 
In early August, Bates wrote to the NAACP’s Southwest Regional Counsel, U. 
Simpson Tate. Bates requested that Tate visit little  Rock in the near future for 
a "strategy conference."59 The two met that falL At the meeting, Tate agreed 
to increase the num ber of lawsuits the Association would file in Arkansas, a 
decision he made public at the State NAACP’s annual meeting in November.^®
The increase in the num ber of lawsuits to be filed in Arkansas also 
coincided with modifications in the National Office’s desegregation program. 
Initially opposed to the idea of filing a num ber of lawsuits in the South to force 
desegregation, the Association had originally focused on cooperation with 
local School Boards and efforts to motivate local communities to accept 
desegregation. By late 1955, however, many staff members within the National 
Office, including prom inent attorneys with the Association’s legal arm, the 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., believed that only a significant 
increase in litigation would hasten the im plementation of Brown.^^
SSibidL, Part 3 Series C, reel 1, "MEMO TO: MR. GLOSTER B. CURRENT, DIRECTOR 
OF BRANCHES, FROM: mildred L bond", July 11-20,1955,1.
Part 3 Series C, reel 1, Letter from Mildred Bond to Robert Carter, 
August 9,1955, 2.
^Ofbid., Part 3 Series D, reel 1 , "Little Rock: The Chronology of a Contrived 
Crisis", 3.
^llbidL, Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Board of Directors Meeting 
Minutes", October 10,1955, 4.
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This rethinking was invigorated by several court rulings in the 
summer of 1955 that allowed southern states to delay d e s e g r e g a t i o n . ^ ^  xhe two 
most im portant decisions, handed down in the Fourth Circuit in July, 
concerned the im plementation of Brown II in South Carolina and Virginia. 
These rulings involved two of the original five cases which comprised the 
original Brown ruling. The cases dealt with timetables for desegregation; the 
NAACP argued for court-mandated desegregation in the fall of 1955, and both 
Virginia and South Carohna argued for permission to operate segregated 
schools throughout the 1955-56 school term. Commenting on the importance 
of these cases early in the summer, NAACP attorneys Thurgood Marshall and 
Robert Carter wrote, "Certainly the hearings in these cases will be of major 
significance because these courts may be the first to give definite and specific 
content to 'a  prom pt and reasonable start' and 'good faith compliance a t the 
earliest practicable date.'"^^
Unfortunately for the NAACP, the courts rejected the deadline and 
allowed delays in  desegregation, though neither agreed to sanction 
desegregation for the entire 1955-56 school year. Still, the decisions led Roy 
Wilkins to predict that the result would be increased evasiveness on the part of 
other southern states. He hoped that the decrees "are not necessarily 'typical 
of what wiU happen th ro i^hou t the South.’" ^
By mid-Pall 1955, the NAACP's National Legal Staff was also extremely 
fiustrated by the lim ited desegregation that had taken place in the South. In 
October, after holding meetings throughout the region with its southern
^^Fmch, 193; Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp 776 (1955) [South Carolina]; jDavis v. 
County School Board, Prince Edward County, VA, 142 F. Supp 616 (1956) 
[Virginia].
^^Robert Carter and Thurgood Marshall, "The Meaning and Significance of the 
Supreme Court Decree," 400-01.
64papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 17, "NAACP Press Release", July 22, 
1955,1.
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attorneys, the NAACP’s National Legal Staff decided that "the only solution [to 
southern resistance] is to file law suits in every s t a t e . "  This sentiment, 
coming from  the well-respected attorneys who won the Brown decision in the 
first place, did not go unheeded by the Association. By late fall, the notion of 
filing suits to force southern School Boards to desegregate was gaining support 
within the National Office of the NAACP.
In Little Rock, however, concerns existed that were not often expressed 
on the national level. Some local members of the NAACP, to be sure, favored 
litigation to attem pt to push the School Board to desegregate more quickly. In 
fact, some members of the local Branch had favored this position from the 
ou tset Moreover, support for litigation in  Little Rock increased over time.
Still, a num ber of local blacks continued to entertain serious reservations 
about the effectiveness and /o r appropriateness of litigation.
Black attorneys in Little Rock, for example, opposed filing litigation in 
school districts th a t voluntarily made any attem pt to desegregate their 
schools.^^ Wary of appearing too m ilitant in local communities, these 
attorneys favored a  more conciliatory approach. Their hope was that local 
School Boards, particularly in communities as progressive as Little Rock, would 
continue to work toward desegregation without having to be prodded by a 
'm ilitant' NAACP. They also e3q>ressed concern that token desegregation plans 
would be upheld and legitimized in  court, which would defeat the purpose of 
litigation re ta rd  genuine racial progress. Little Rock's black attorneys 
also saw token desegregation as a victory for local blacks.^^ At the very least.
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they argued, token desegregation would initiate the integration process, and 
this process would pick up steam over time.
By late fall, however, support for filing a  suit against the Little Rock 
School Board came to outweigh opposition in the black com m uni^. Blacks who 
had before been willing to wait and see how the Board would handle the m atter 
realized that the Board and the community were determined to delay and 
minimize desegregation for as long as possible. Virgil Blossom's unwillingness 
to consider suggestions or concerns from the black community heightened 
their distrust and resentm ent, and contributed to the sentiment that litigation 
would be the only way to ensure desegregation in a reasonable time. Nat 
Griswold, director of ACHR, later explained, "The posture which the 
Superintendent and the School Board took caused distrust in the Black 
community.
Within the Little Rock NAACP, too, sentiment grew in support of filing a 
suit. Blossom’s unwillingness to work with the Branch played a crucial role, as 
did the revisions made to the original Blossom Plan. Executive Board Chairman 
Georg Iggers explained that sentim ent shifted in favor of a suit "not because it 
[the Little Rock NAACP] rejected a  moderate program of integration but 
because slowly but surely it had lost confidence in the good faith of the Board 
to implement voluntarily any program  that would bring an end to the so- 
called 'separate bu t equal’ s y s t e m . ’’̂ 9 gy late faU, the majority of members 
within the Branch viewed litigation as the only way to secure even the 
T n i n i m a l  desegregation that Blossom had promised the community a year 
earlier. Iggers insisted that the NAACP believed that a  suit, "was the sole
^^Spitzberg, 46.
69Record and Record, 284.
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côufsê in the éifeumstâncêS, unless they were willing to abandon for an 
indefinite time all attem pts to secure public-sdhool i n t e g r a t i o n / ^ O
The Phase Program's provision that Little Rock's new high school,
Horace Mann High, would open as a segregated institution in  January, 1956, 
particularly incensed the Branch.^1 Its members believed that schools 
opening after the Brown decision should not be segregated. Branch members 
also opposed Blossom's system of distributing children within the school 
system. Rather than sendh% students to the schools nearest their homes. 
Blossom had developed an elaborate system of registration zones and 
attendance areas which ensured that blacks would only attend the schools 
nearest their homes if the school happened to be for b l a c k s . ^ 2  Finally, and 
most importantly, the local NAACP opposed Blossom's Plan because of the lack 
of a  definite starting date. The plan indicated only that desegregation "may 
start in  1957," which upset the NAACP. This concern contributed greatly to 
growing support for filing a desegregation suit. Mrs. Bates explained the 
importance of Blossom's nonconunittal timetable: "the NAACP challenged the 
Blossom Plan because of the indefiniteness of the desegregation starting 
date."^2
Thus, in December 1955, the local Branch voted to file suit against the 
Little Rock School Board. Because of the reservations of some members, the 
Branch established three provisions which needed to be met before the suit 
would be f i l e d . 7 4  The conditions required that a 'sufficient' number of local 
blacks attem pt to register their children in Little Rock's all-white schools, that 





74Record and Record, 289.
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the late January opening of the newly-built Horace M an n  High, and that the 
Branch secure the services of an inexpensive lawyer to file and present the 
NAACP's case.75 The Branch had discussed the possibility of f ilin g  a suit with 
Regional Attorney U. S. Tate earlier in the fall, and the Branch contacted bim 
and told him of the decision. Due to the stance of the local black attorneys, the 
Branch also sought advice and help from Mr. Tate, which Tate agreed to 
p r o v i d e . 7 6  Finally, the Branch contacted the National Office of the NAACP and 
informed it of the Branch's intention to sue. The National Office gave its 
approval, but it provided no direct input in the suit. The national NAACP left 
the handling of the suit to the local Branch, its attorney, and the Association's 
Regional Attorney for the Southwest.^^ That this would prove a mistake was 
not yet known.
7 5 i b i d .
7 6 p r e y e r ,  4 2 .  
7 7 i b i d . ,  4 3 .
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Chapter Three: Rising Tensions. 1 QSfi 
By 1956 major decisions had been reached in Little Rock* The School 
Board, ignoring the appeals of the NAACP, had decided on a token program of 
desegregation and proceeded to finalize its plans and seek support from the 
white community. In December 1955, the NAACP had abandoned its initial 
optimism and goodwill and voted to file suit against the School Board* 
Segregationists, still weak in Arkansas, opposed any desegregation whatsoever 
and worked to increase their influence within the state and its capital city.
The national NAACP had also reached im portant conclusions by 1956. As 
it noted the absence of desegregation which had occurred after Brown II, the 
Association realized that it needed to alter its approach. Troubled by the lack 
of southern cooperation, and upset with the lack of support from the federal 
government, the NAACP rejected its conciliatory approach in favor of 
widespread litigation.
The National Oflics
The National Office of the NAACP decided to pursue a different tact in 
the southern states by early 1956. During the previous year and a half, the 
Association had instructed its Branches to cooperate with local School Boards to 
bring about the im plementation of the Supreme Court's desegregation rulings. 
In late 1955, however, the National Office chose to adopt the recommendations 
of its legal staff and sharply increase the num ber of desegregation suits filed 
in the South. This change in tactics resulted in a sharp rise in open southern 
resistance to desegregation, and pressure on the NAACP reached new heights 
in  1956.
The National Office announced its new policy shortly after the new year
began. In a press release dated January 3, NAACP Special Counsel Thurgood
Marshall noted the Association's dissatisfaction with the rate of southern
68
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desegregation and declared that the National Office's legal staff would 
henceforth make itself available to more Branches requesting legal advice and 
assistance with desegregation litigation. Marshall made it clear that the 
Association's commitment to cooperation with local School Boards would 
continue where progress was being made, but the NAACP's shift in  strategy 
highlighted the fact that such cooperation was rarely forthcoming.^
The premise behind the Association's increase in  litigation was that 
legal action, though detrim ental to community relations a t the local level, 
represented the most effective tool a t the NAACP's disposal to effectuate school 
desegregation.^ In light of events after Brown, the advantages of legal action, 
particularly its proven effectiveness for the NAACP, began to look more and 
more promising. By 1956, these advantages outweighed the limitations, and 
the National Oftice adopted widespread litigation as its national 
im plementation strategy. "After having 'deliberately remained as quiet as 
possible on the school segregation issue since the May 31st ruling, the legal 
departm ent is now ready to file suit in every conmiunity where such a suit is 
requested to secure compliance with the Supreme Court anti-segregation 
decisions,"' explained Mr. Marshall in January.̂
This approach, however, was not without major drawbacks. The most 
significant was the subsequent rise in  hostility toward the NAACP in the South. 
Because the increased amount of litigation forced the NAACP into the role of a 
more m ilitant agitator for civil rights, segregationists were able to label the 
Association as radical, and thereby rally more supporters than they had
IPaners of the NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 2 , "NAACP Press 
Release", January 3, 1956,
^David C. Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1963), 151; Carter and Marshall, "The Meaning and Significance 
of the Supreme Court Decree," 401.
3paners of the NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 2, "NAACP Press 
Release", January 3, 1956.
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previously. Throughout the South, segregationist activity increased along 
with NAACP lawsuits, and the Citizen Councils led the way. Historian Thomas 
Brooks explains that Citizen Council activity "waxed as the NAACP pressed 
school desegregation cases in  law courts throughout the South.'"*
Citizens Councils, however, were by no means the only organizations 
battling the NAACP and its efforts to desegregate schools. Nineteen fifty-six 
witnessed the initiation of state government-sponsored attacks on the 
Association as well. Beginning in Louisiana, in March, southern state 
legislatures passed numerous laws aimed at disrupting or shutting down 
NAACP activities in their states.^ Historian Davidson Douglas explains their 
rationale: "Although there had been some resistance to Brown during the first 
year following the decision, many southern politicians, understanding that 
political capital could be gained from  resistance, began to take more 
aggressive postures of defiance in early 1956."^ These attacks forced the 
Association to divert precious resources, personnel, and funding to combat the 
new threat.7 Even so, state legislatures succeeded in shutting down NAACP 
operations in  a num ber of southern states by late summer 1956.® In the fall, 
the Association began a southwide membership campaign to replace members.
^Thomas R. Brooks, Walls Come Tumbling Dnfwn: A History of the Civil Rights 
Movement (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prenfice-HalL 1974), 128.
Spapers of the NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Board of 
Directors Meeting Minutes", Apnl 9, 1956, 7; Davidson M. Douglas, Reading. 
Writing, and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte. Schools (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 34; Lewis, 43.
^Douglas, 34.
^National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1956 NAACP 
Annual Report (New York: National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People), 34; The Association's lack of political power in the South is 
covered in Bartley, The Rise o f Massivp Ppsistanre. 213; Brooks, 128.
®Morris, 26-33.
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tunds, and resources lost in these attacks.^ As NAACP Executive Secretary Roy 
Wilkins pu t it, '"We have had our hands fulL’"10
The NAACP’s emphasis on litigation also alienated moderate southern 
whites. Forced to choose between supporting or opposing integration lawsuits, 
most southern moderates retreated from the debate altogether, rather than 
choose the lesser of two evils. Even those whites sympathetic to Negro 
aspirations rarely favored the increased militancy of the NAACP, and the 
desegregation lawsuits invariably caused breakdowns in southern race 
re la tio n s.il in fact, many southern white moderates pleaded for the NAACP to 
slow down its desegregation campaign during 1956, but the Association 
refused. In April, 1956, in an editorial in the Crisis, the NAACP's self-published 
magazine, the Association responded to such calls for moderation:
"Segregation, ’the Southern way of hfe,’ is doomed," it read. The NAACP, 
continued the editorial, was resolved to end racial inequality, and if that 
required significant legal action, so be it. 12
The Association set up a  timetable for the new litigation a t its Atlanta 
Conference in February, 1956. NAACP southern State Conference presidents 
attended the conference with their legal staffs, and representatives of the 
National Office were present as well. The Association's southern field 
secretaries, and the state presidents, presented reports on the desegregation 
situation to the conference’s delegates. 13 it quickly became apparent that 
eight southern states, not including Arkansas, were completely resisting
9papprs of the NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Board of
Directors Meeting Minutes", September 10, 1956, 6.
l^Brooks, 129.
llR ecord and Record, 189.
12ibid-, 200.
13paners of rhp NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the 
Executive Secretary to the Board of Directors, February 14, 1956", 5.
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desegregation. The NAACP decided to concentrate its legal action in these 
states.l"^
Also at the conference, the National Legal Staff worked to establish a 
schedule for filing litigation in  the chosen states. One of its goals at the 
conference was to determine the number and location of suits to file that 
spring.15 Invariably short on funds and essential resources, the National 
Legal Staff expressed wariness of spreading itself too thin. It discouraged 
NAACP Branches outside the eight states chosen for litigation from filing suits 
against their School Boards. Instead, it argued that "’much can be 
accomplished through further negotiations'" in  these s t a t e s .H o w e v e r ,  a 
Branch in one of these states had already decided to sue its School Board, and 
though it had the approval of the National Office, this Branch would receive 
little help from the national NAACP during the next several, crucial months. 
L ittls -E a d s
In Little Rock, the decision to sue the School Board had already been 
made. The Branch had voted in December 1955 to file suit once it satisfied 
three prerequisites: obtaining an inexpensive attorney, garnering support 
and plaintiffs from the black community, and raising funds to pay for the suit. 
In early 1956, Branch members set about achieving these goals, and they 
quickly did. Afterwards, the Branch spent the spring and summer working 
with its attorneys on the logistics of the case, and working to increase support 
for its suit in the community. The Branch received little help from the 
NAACP's National Office.
l^Ibid., Part 3 Series D, reel 3, "Special Report to The New York Times", 
February 20, 1956, 1. The eight states were Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
ISibid., Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the Executive 
Secretary to the Board of Directors, February 14, 1956", 5. 
l^Ibid., Part 3 Series D, reel 3, "Special Report to The New York Times”, 
February 20, 1956, Continued from Page 1 [no page number given].
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The Branch's fundraising and registration efforts, however, did benefit 
from  the help of a new field representative who began working in Arkansas 
in early 1956. Mr. Frank Smith, a  Little Rock native, joined the National 
Office's Branch Department staff in  January, and from Little Rock Smith 
helped organize the State NAACP's desegregation efforts. Despite his 
significant involvement in  the early stages of the Little Rock litigation. Smith 
focused his attention and efforts on other Arkansan communities as the suit 
moved to triaL After the early fundraising and registration work, in fact, Mr. 
Smith played virtually no role in the Little Rock suit.1^
For the first month of 1956, the Branch worked to fulfill the three 
conditions which it established when voting to sue the Board in December, 
1955. The first provision stipulated that the Branch raise three hundred 
dollars by the late January registration deadline for the spring school term. 
This money was to pay for an attorney, and raising it proved easier than 
expected. The Branch raised its three hundred dollar minimum quickly, and 
then continued fundraising to accumulate additional funds. By late February 
the Branch possessed nearly thirteen hundred dollars, some of it from white 
sym pathizers within the community.!^
The second condition m et by the Branch during January involved 
obtaining an inexpensive attorney. The Chairman of the NAACP's State Legal 
Redress Committee, Wiley Branton, agreed to represent the Branch for a 
m odest fee.20 Branton, one of the few black attorneys in Arkansas, hailed 
from  Pine Bluff, southeast of Little Rock. His work as Chairman of the Legal
l^Ibid., Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the Executive 
Secretary to the Board of Directors", February 14, 1956, 4.
1 ̂ Record and Record, 289. Smith's role in the suit was not unusual for a field 
secretary; see Papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 2, "Confidential Report 
on Field Work for Integration in Dallas, Texas", 1-2.
1 ̂ Record and Record, 289.
20ibicL, 290; Freyer, 44.
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Redress Committee placed him in frequent contact with the Arkansas State 
Conference and the Little Rock Branch's Executive Committee, and he bad 
worked with the Branch on its petition drive during the summer of 1954.
Securing the services of Branton proved especially fortunate for the 
Branch because its usual attorneys, Thad Williams and J.R. Booker, refused to 
file the desegregation suit for the Branch. Both of these attorneys disagreed 
with the decision to file suit. Williams in particular opposed the principle and 
direction of the suit. He feared that initiating legal action against the Board, 
which was voluntarily integrating its schools, would disrupt the city's 
progressive race relations. Furthermore, he argued that any suit filed should 
focus on desegregating the elem entary schools, where no date for 
desegregation had been announced.^^ Nonetheless, by early 1956 Williams 
and Booker, who belonged to the Branch's Executive Committee, were 
outnum bered by members favoring the suit and its direction.
During the early part of 1956, the Branch also worked to rally Little 
Rock's black community to dem and desegregation. In order to file its suit, the 
Branch needed a number of local black parents to attem pt to enroll their 
children in  the city's public schools. Hoping to inspire local blacks to 
undertake such risky business, the Branch's Executive Committee went door to 
door through the black community in January. It explained the decision to sue 
and described what the process would i n v o l v e . 2 2
Unexpectedly, the black community showed a high degree of interest m 
the suit. Many supported the decision to sue, and a  dozen parents agreed to
21 Freyer, 42-43. 
22ibid., 43.
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attem pt to register their children in the public schools and become parties in 
the suit if the Board refused to enroll them.23
The positive response to the NAACP's solicitations reflected increased 
support for m ore m ilitant action from within the black community of Little 
Rock.24 Just as militancy within the NAACP developed over time, so did 
support for this militancy within the black community. Thus by 1956, the 
community expressed a willingness, even a  desire, to risk more in order to 
achieve more substantial gains. During the Branch's fundraising efforts in 
January and February, this sentim ent revealed itself as well. Historian Tony 
Freyer hinted a t the significance of increased economic support for the local 
Branch; he wrote that this support indicated "a change of mood among the
city's blacks. "̂ 5
Preparation for registering the children involved the Branch's 
Executive Committee, State Conference President Bates, and NAACP 
Southwestern Regional Attorney Tate. Because the Branch wanted to 
emphasize the principle of attendance based on proximity to school in its 
lawsuit, it had a number of children who Hved near each of the white schools 
attem pt to register. The Branch also sought to gain admission for blacks who 
hoped to take courses offered only at the white schools, and these students 
were also encouraged to r e g i s t e r . 2 6
Because Little Rock's newly-built Horace Mann High School was 
scheduled to open as a segregated institution in late January, the Branch 
carried out its registration and legal work quickly. Registering the plaintiffs 
in late January coincided with the scheduled opening of this school, and the
23ibid., 45; Paners of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, Letter from Daisy Bates 
to Wiley Branton, August 30,1962,1 .
24preyer, 45; Record and Record, 289.
25preyer, 45.
26Record and Record, 289-290.
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tuning indicated a pm nary motive for the suit. The Branch hoped to force 
Horace Mann to open as a desegregated school. To do this the Branch worked 
quickly.
The attem pt to register the children took place on January 23. That 
morning, J.C. Crenchaw, President of the Branch's Executive Committee, and 
State Conference President Bates led twenty-seven black children of various 
ages to Superintendent Blossom's office.27 The group requested that Blossom 
enroll the children in the city's public schools and, as ejqpected. Blossom 
refused. He explained, "I cannot perm it such registrations. We are going to 
follow the School Board's plan of gradual i n t e g r a t i o n . "  28 After being refused 
enrollm ent in the white schools, the parents of the children formally 
requested legal representation from the Little Rock Branch of the NAACP. The 
Branch agreed, and following NAACP procedure, it appealed to the State 
Conference for assistance, which was g r a n t e d . 2 9  Gathering community 
support fulfilled the last of the three preconditions the Branch had established 
for filing suit.
Attorneys for the Branch filed the lawsuit with the Federal District 
Court of Eastern Arkansas on February 8, 1956. The plaintiffs, thirty-three 
black children denied admittance to Little Rock's white schools in late January, 
ranged in age fi’om six to twenty-one, and represented a variety of socio­
economic backgrounds. The suit listed the President and Secretary of the Little 
Rock School District, Superintendent of Schools Blossom, and the school district
27Blossom, 27; Papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1 "Little Rode The 
Chronology of a  Contrived Crisis", 4.
28Blossom, 28.
29papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, Letter from Daisy Bates to Wiley 
Branton, August 30,1962,1.
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itself as defendants.^^ Aaron v. Cooper received its name from the President of
the Little Rock School Board, William G. Cooper, and the frrst-named plaintiff, 
John Aaron.31
The lawsuit attacked the gradual nature of the Blossom Plan and 
contended that the Little Rock School Board had not taken steps to desegregate 
its schools "with all deliberate speedL"^^ The complaint sought the enrollment 
of the thirty-three plaintiffs on the ground that, were it not for racial 
discrim ination, they would normally attend the schools nearest their homes. 
Instead, Little Rock bused black children across town to attend segregated 
schools.^3 The Branch also argued that the Board's revisions to the original 
Blossom Plan represented an  unwillingness on the part of the Board to 
undertake meaningful desegregation a t the earliest possible date in 
accordance with the law of the land. The Branch argued that "segregation 
placed heavy burdens on black children and denied them educational 
opportunity."^^
The suit further argued that the Board, acting in accordance with 
segregation laws prom ulgated by the State of Arkansas, had violated the 
principle of the Brown decisions. It asked that the court issue an injunction 
against the Board and any other officials responsible for school desegregation 
to prevent them from  basing Littie Rock's desegregation plan on Arkansas 
state law, or any other state provision or ordinance that might require racial 
discrim ination or segregation. The suit argued that the School Board's
SOpreyer, 45.
SlRace Relations Law Reporter (Nashville: Vanderbilt University, School of 
Law), Volume 1 (October 1956), 851.
32Blossom, 28; Papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The 
Chronology of a Contrived Crisis", 4.
33Race Relations Law_Renorter. October 1956, 852.
^^Freyer, 53.
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desegregation plan, because it had been based on unconstitutional statutes, was 
itself unconstitutional. The only recourse would be to start anew.35
Thg NaUonal
The National Office of the NAACP played virtually no role in the in itia l 
stages of the little  Rock litigation. The office did review the Aaron briefs 
prepared by Branton and Tate, but they neglected to take part in preparing or 
directing the suiL^^ The lack of involvement by the National Office occurred 
partly because of the hierarchical structure of the NAACP. Responsibility for 
local suits fell primarily upon the shoulders of the NAACP's State Conferences, 
which were instructed by the National Office to work closely with the NAACP's 
Regional Attorneys. The National Office hoped to avoid being labeled an 
"outside agitator" that came into local communities to stir up trouble by filing 
desegregation suits. It therefore avoided becoming involved a t the local level 
when possible. Particularly im portant cases, or incompetent local attorneys, 
might involve the National Office in  a case, bu t generally such legal work was 
left to the State Conferences and their Branches. Cases reaching the appellate 
level o f the federal courts, however, automatically warranted the 
consideration of the National Office. When Aaron v. Cooper reached this stage, 
the National Office, following procedure, became involved.^? Until then, 
established protocol meant that the National Office would not become involved, 
even though the National Office directed the litigation process from above.^® 
The NAACP's Regional Attorneys bore the responsibility of ensuring 
the legitimacy and soundness of local suits. The Regional Attorneys were also
35Race Relations Law Reporter. October 1956, 851-52; Freyer, 57.
36preyer, 51, 61 [Endnote 38]. This protocol appears to be the standard 
operating procedure for the Association; see St. James, A Case Study in Pressure 
Groups. 120.
37Finch, 59; St. James, A Case Studv in Pressure Groups. 119.
38por example, suits were not to be filed w ithout the approval of the National 
Office.
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supposed to help file the suits and argue them in co u rt More than anyone 
else, these attorneys acted as the link between the National Office and the local 
level.3^
U. Simpson Tate served as the NAACP's Southwest Regional Attorney, 
which included Arkansas a t the time the Little Rock Branch filed its suit- As 
Regional Attorney, Tate m onitored the litigation of six southern states.40 He 
often traveled the Southwest performing his duties, and he met with the 
Arkansas State Conference in the fall of 1955 to help plan its litigation. Still, 
relations between the Little Rock Branch, the Arkansas State Conference, and 
Tate waned during the course of 1956. Tate, busier than ever because of 
segregationist attacks on the NAACP in the Southwest region, struggled to meet 
his responsibilities to the Branch. Efforts by the Branch to meet and plan 
strategy with Tate in early 1956 failed, as did efforts to bring him to Little Rock 
a few days before the trial was to begin.^! Tate was simply too busy to handle 
the Little Rock case properly, yet the National Office seemed never to have 
recognized the problem. Explained historian Tony Freyer, "During much of 
the preparation of the suit Tate had been less than totally involved and 
committed, and that behavior continued until the trial began.'"^^
In addition, there was evidence that Tate and the National Office 
expressed some concern about the focus of the Branch's case. Intent on 
securing desegregation within Little Rock, the Branch shied away from 
testing the constitutionality of the Blossom Plan and accepted the idea that the 
Board planned to desegregate, though at its own pace.^^ It hoped to obtain the
39papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 4, Letter from Thurgood Marshall 
to Mr. A1 Kuettner, United Press, August 15, 1955, 1.
40Bates, 2.
LlRecord and Record, 290.
^^Freyer, 56; Record and Record, 290.
43preyer, 56.
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admission of its thirty-three plaintiffs rather than  challenge the Board's 
in tent to comply with B ro w n .^  The National Office, via Regional Attorney 
Tate, on the other hand, stressed the argument that the Board followed 
segregationist state laws when drawing up its desegregation plan, and that the 
plan was therefore unconstitutional. Both of the above argu m en ts were 
incorporated into the suit filed against the Board; but during the trial, 
disagreements between the Regional Attorney and the Branch became aU too 
evident. Ex-Executive Com m itte e  President Georg Iggers, a local white 
involved in the Branch, later recalled th a t "neither the NAACP attorneys nor 
the National Office was entirely enthusiastic about the type of suit the local 
Branch had in mind-**45
Finally, and most importantly, the National Office’s policy of increased 
legal action in the South focused solely on states completely resisting school 
desegregation, a  category in which Arkansas did not belong.^^ Thus, although 
the Association's new emphasis on legal action to force compliance in the 
South was in line with the developments in little  Rock, the National Office 
shifted its attention to the Deep South a t the same time that legal action in 
Little Rock was picking up steam. At the Atlanta Conference in February, the 
National Office encouraged states not chosen for litigation in the spring of 
1956 to redouble their efforts a t negotiation; in June the National Office 
directed states outside of the Deep South "to redouble their efforts to negotiate 
with their local school boards to secure desegregation within a reasonable 
time and to proceed with such negotiations as long as the local board is acting 
in good faith. In those states legal action in the courts is only to be used as a
44ibid.
^SRecord and Record, 288.
46paners of the NAACP. Part 3 Series C, reel 4, Letter from Thurgood Marshall 
to Mr. A1 Kuettner, United Press, August 15, 1955, 1.
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last resort [emphasis added]."47 The National Office's decision to focus on the 
Deep South left little  Rock, which was already involved in the process of legal 
action, w ithout the support it desperately needed.
Aaron v. Cooner
Virgil Blossom and the School Board reacted swiftiy to the filing of the 
desegregation suit. On February 29, the Board asked the court to dismiss the 
NAACP's suit. This move proved unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter. 
Superintendent Blossom added four new attorneys to the School Board's legal 
staff to help with its defense. These attorneys, all from little  Rock> joined A. F. 
House, who had served as the Board's chief counsel since 1952.48 Their job was 
to defend Blossom's desegregation plan against the NAACP's attack.
On March 1 the School Board responded to the Branch’s suit.49 In a 
reply filed with the court, the Board denied that it had based its desegregation 
plan on any Arkansas state segregation law or policy, which the Board had 
regarded as invalid since May 17, 1954. The Board further stated that it 
intended to comply with the Brown decisions a t the earliest practicable date.^O 
The Board attached the revised Blossom Plan to its response, and it pointed out 
that desegregation delays in  little  Rock resulted prim arily from the 
construction of new schools, which Brown JÏ permitted. Above aU, the Board 
strove to show that its plan and its actions m et the Court's requirement of 
'"good faith."'51
47ibid-, Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 4, "Resolutions Adopted", 1956 
Annual Convention, 8.
48preyer, 47. The attorneys were Henry E. Spitzberg, Frank E. Chowning, 
Richard C. Butler, and Leon B. Catlett.
49pape_rs of the NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "N.AA.C.P. Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Monthly Report, March 1956", 2.
SPRace Relations Law Reporter. October 1956, 852.
S lpapers of the NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "NAA.C.P. Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Monthly Report, March 1956", 2.
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On March 9, the Board served notice of the taking of depositions upon 
the Branch's president and the president of the State Conference. The Board 
ordered the two to appear on April 2, and subpoenaed them to produce all 
correspondence between the State Conference and the National Office of the 
NAACP between May, 1954 and April, 1956.52 Tbe latter request reflected the 
Board's belief that the National Office of the NAACP, rather than the local 
Branch, was responsible for the lawsuit.53
In late March the NAACP responded to the Board's requests. Its 
attorneys sought to free Crenchaw and Bates from having to appear for 
depositions, and the attorneys also tried to avoid the defendants' request for 
NAACP c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . 5 4  The attorneys hoped that arguing that Bates and 
Crenchaw were not themselves parties to the litigation would free them of any 
risky obligations. Eventually both efforts failed, and that spring depositions 
were set for May 4 and the trial for August 15.55 By April, the case entered 
"the legal waiting stage," and both sides made final preparations for triaL56 
OllKr Bianth Work, Little Aock, Spring 1956
During the spring of 1956, the Branch worked on several other 
desegregation projects. After the suit entered its "waiting stage," the Branch 
concentrated its efforts on other aspects of life in Little Rock. Some of the 
projects it undertook, such as the desegregation of housing, related directly to 
school desegregation, whereas others related to general improvements in the 
lives of the black citizens of Little Rock. All the while, the Branch kept a
52ibicL; Freyer, 47.
53Record and Record, 288; Freyer, 50.
54papers of the NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "N.AA.C.P. Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Monthly Report, March 1956", 2.
55preyer, 50.
56papers of the NAACP. Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the 
Executive Secretary to the Board of Directors, March, 1956", 7.
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sharp eye on the proceedings in the courtroom, and it continued to seek public 
support for its suit.
That spring, public housing became an issue in Little Rock. An urban 
renewal project in Little Rock raised the possibility of a  low-income, all-Negro 
rental development in the city, and local blacks joined the NAACP in opposing 
the venture.5^ The Branch kept close tabs on the city's plans and relayed 
information to the National Office for consideration. By late spring, the 
Special Assistant for the Housing Department o f the National Office was in 
contact with local Branch members, and together they began planning 
strategies to offset the urban renewal program. Both the Branch and the 
National Office feared the possible impact of increased residential segregation 
on the city's s c h o o l s . 5 8 .
In addition, the Branch worked on the issue of segregated 
transportation that spring. On January 10, 1956, a Federal District Court ruling 
outlawed segregation in interstate travel and in  those terminals which 
supported interstate t r a v e l - 5 9  This ruling, contested by segregationists, was 
upheld on April 23 by the Supreme Court. Immediately thereafter, the Little 
Rock NAACP encouraged the Citizen Coach Company, which operated the bus 
transit system in Little Rock and North Little Rock, to comply with the Court's 
ruling and avoid legal action. Speaking on behalf of the Little Rock Branch, 
Daisy Bates pressed the company to desegregate: "We hope the bus companies 
will voluntarily announce their plans for complying with non-discrimination
57ibid., Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the Executive 
Secretary to the Board of Directors, Apffi 1956", 12; Ibid., Supplement to Part 1 
(1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the Executive Secretary to the Board of Directors, 
March 1956", 10.
58lbid., Supplement to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the Executive 
Secretary to the Board of Directors, March 1956", 10.
59catherine A. Bames, Tourney from Tim Crow (NY: Columbia University Press, 
1983); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp 707 (1956) affirmed the Supreme Court in  
357 U.S. 903 (1956).
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in  transporta tion—in tra-state , in tra-city , and city—thus m aking the transition  
from  segregation to non-discrim ination w ith the least publicity and 
commotion."60 The Branch helped the National Office in  its expanding attack 
on segregation.
In March, the  Branch and o ther concerned citizens attacked Arkansas' 
delegates to the U nited States Congress for signing the "Southern Manifesto."^^ 
The M anifesto, which had  been signed by each m em ber o f the Arkansas 
delegation, supported resistance to the Brow n  decisions and argued th at the 
original decision represen ted  a  "c lear abuse o f judicial p o w e r . ’ " ^ ^  Local 
blacks, and  a  num ber o f sym pathetic whites, form ed an  organization called 
Arkansas Citizens fo r Orderly Compliance which presented the Arkansan 
congressional delegation w ith a  petition dem anding com pliance w ith the law. 
The petition argued th a t the congressm en had  done the state of Arkansas a 
g reat disservice by signing the Manifesto.^^
Finally, in  late May, the Arkansas State Conference held an  NAACP 
Planning Meeting in  Little Rock. Organized to  allow the State Conference the 
opportunity  to review the actions of the spring and to outline fu ture projects 
an d  goals, the m eeting also gave National Office Field Secretary Frank Smith 
th e  opportunity  to highlight the im portance of Branch m em bership 
cam paigns. Smith requested th a t Branches throughout the state focus on 
m em bership drives u n til m id-June, when the em phasis would be shifted to 
raising money for the N ational Office's annual fundraiser, the Fighting Fund 
for F reedom .^  The focus on m em bership cam paigns reflected the concern of
^Opapetrs of the NAACP. Supplem ent to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the 
Executive Secretary to the Board o f Directors, April 1956", 8 .
6 lHays, 206-07.
^2spitzberg, 38; Hays, 206.
63Hays, 206.
^‘4papers of the NAACP. Supplem ent to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the 
Executive Secretary to the Board o f Directors, May 1956", 6 .
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the National Office th a t segregationist attacks on the Association in  the South 
were costing the NAACP significantly—in term s o f m em bers, money, and
resources.^5
The Taking o f D epositions
The taking of depositions occurred in early May. Over the objections of 
the NAACP counsel. Judge John E. Miller allowed the defense to question Bates 
and Crenchaw on May 4. Leon Catlett, defense counsel, directed a total of one 
hundred  twenty questions to  the NAACP leaders.^^ He attem pted to show the 
reasonableness o f the revised Blossom Plan by eliciting specific responses 
from  the Branch leaders. His efforts, for the m ost part, were unsuccessful. 
N either NAACP leader rem em bered exactly when th e  Branch's Executive 
Committee voted to  file the desegregation suit, o r which Committee members 
voted for legal action. The two were also unable to  produce Branch 
docum entation of discussions concerning the suit. More often than not, the 
NAACP leaders answ ered the defense's queries by sim ply reiterating their 
personal views on desegregation—both  agreed th a t they were not in terested in 
any desegregation plan th a t d id  no t provide for desegregation " ' n o w . ' " ^ 7
The deposition proceedings highlighted the difficulties the local Branch 
experienced w ith its legal representative from  the National Office, Mr. U. S. 
Tate. T hat spring, the Branch repeatedly subm itted requests for advice to the 
Regional A ttorney w hich rarely  yielded worthwhile responses, and Tate often 
seem ed oblivious to  the specifics o f the Little Rock case.^® In addition, Tate 
chose no t to attend  the depositions, though the Branch expressed the desire to
65ibid,, Part 3 Series D, reel 3, "NAACP Board of D irectors Resolution, April 9, 
1956". This concern later proved quite justified; see Bartley, The Rise of 
M assive Resistance. 33-34.
^^Freyer, 52.
67ibid, 53.
6 8 lbid, 51.
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have both  o f its attorneys present. A m em ber of the Branch's Executive 
Committee la ter wrote, "The handling of the Little Rock case and the 
developm ents in  several o ther projected cases in  the state were indicative of 
th e  serious lack o f com m unications existing between the Little Rock branch of 
the NAACP and  the attorney  o f the national s t a f f .
A careful look a t the proceedings also provides insight into the legal 
strategy of the Branch and  its attorneys. During questioning, both Bates and 
Crenchaw em phasized th e  im portance of im m ediate desegregation of the city 's 
public school system. They expressed wariness over the Board's revised plan, 
w hich stated th a t "the school year o f 1957-58 m ay be the IBrst phase of this 
program  [italics a d d e d ] . " 7 0  Bates and  Crenchaw also argued th at Little Rock’s 
children should be allowed to a tten d  the schools nearest th e ir homes 
regardless of race. Bates said th a t the Phase Program would not remedy the 
cu rren t situation, w here black children were bused across town to attend 
segregated schools. She expressed anger th a t blacks were "'...being denied... 
th e  righ t to  a ttend  the school nearest their hom e.'"7l A ttendance based on 
proxim ity played a  m ajor role in  the Branch's legal strategy.
The deposition proceedings also m ade clear the objectives of the defense 
counsel The defense's request fo r correspondence betw een the National 
OfBce and the  Branch, m ade earlier in  the spring, h in ted  a t the Board's legal 
strategy and its ideas about who inspired the suit. The defense lawyers, 
perhaps influenced by  the increasingly m ilitant rhetoric flowing from  the 
National OSice of the NAACP, believed th a t the suit stem m ed from the National 
Office and its desire to  increase the am ount of desegregation litigation filed in
^^Record and Record, 290.
7Ĉ c e  Relations Law Reporter. October 1956, 854. 
7lFreyer, 53.
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the S o u t h  C atlett’s questioning tried  to make this connection, b u t he 
succeeded only in  showing th a t the Branch had filed su it based on the 
convictions o f its m embers. NAACP attorneys Branton and  Tate suspected the 
defense team ’s erro r earlier th a t spring, and  their beliefs were confirm ed by 
the defense's insistence upon the subm ission o f correspondence between the 
Branch and the National Office, and  C atlett's line of questioning. In reality, 
the m otivation for the suit came en tirely  from  the Branch itself, and  if 
anything the N ational Office avoided involvem ent.^ 3
One incident a t the deposition proceedings heightened tensions which 
were already strained. During his questioning of Bates and Crenchaw, Catlett 
occasionally referred  to  the NAACP leaders as " ’n i g g e r s . ” ' 7 4  Catlett also 
referred  to the State Conference presiden t by her first nam e during the 
proceedings, which angered her. Bates and Crenchaw expressed 
dissatisfaction during the proceedings, b u t to no av a il Shortly after their 
conclusion, the two issued a public statem ent protesting the defense attorney’s 
behavior, and attem pted to rally support for their cause in  the black 
com m unity. They w rote th a t the inciden t "...shows clearly the contem pt in 
which he holds us [blacks] and  the determ ination to w hich he would relegate 
us to second-class c i t i z e n s . " 7 5
The period betw een the taking o f depositions and  the trial itself was 
spent preparing and  subm itting briefs to  the court. The plaintiffs pushed for 
a  decision defining fiie children 's righ ts and an  injunction barring the Board 
fi-om enforcing state segregation laws. They also em phasized their 
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on proxim ity ra th e r than ra c e J^  The defendants, in  turn , m aintained th a t the 
Board's desegregation plan com plied w ith the Brow n  decisions and th a t it had 
n o t been form ulated in  accordance w ith any Arkansas state segregation 
statu tes. They pointed ou t th a t the plan, intentionally m ade gradual and 
lim ited, provided fo r m eaningful integration while a t the same rime 
preserving the quality o f the city 's public schools and the city’s progressive 
racial atm osphere.^^
T he T ria l
Judge Thomas Trimble, originally chosen to hear the case, stepped down 
shortly after the su it was filed in  February. Trim ble ofhcially disqualified 
him self as the presiding judge because his son was a  lawyer for the 
defendants, b u t he had also expressed wariness about taking the case because 
o f plans to retire in  early 1 9 5 7 . ^ 8  judge John E. Miller, of Fort Smith, 
Arkansas, replaced him . M iller, appointed to the federal bench by Franklin 
Roosevelt, had been a  successful politician before becoming a  judge, and he 
was considered fair and  com petent by all concerned. He personally disagreed 
w ith the Brown  decisions, b u t he vowed to apply them  honestly and as best he 
could.^^ The tria l began on August 15, 1956, in  Little Rock.
The School Board's argum ents a t the tria l focused on the reasonable 
natu re o f the Phase Program . In their opinion, the constitutionality of the 
Board's plan was n o t even in  question. Chief Counsel House argued that the 
"only" question confronting th e  court concerned w hether o r no t the Phase
76ibici., 55; This had  been one o f the goals of the Branch when it decided to sue 
th e  Board—see Record and  Record, 290.
77preyer, 55.
78pat>ers of the NAACP. Supplem ent to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report o f the 
Executive Secretary to the Board o f Directors", March, 1956", 7; S outhern  
School News. "Arkansas' Governor Loses Appeal o f Troop Use Case in Little 
Rock," (Nashville: Southern Education Reporting Service), May 1958, 6 . 
79preyer, 55.
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Program  showed th a t the Board was working tow ard com pliance w ith the 
Brow n decisions "in good faith."®^ He pointed ou t th a t the scheduled delays for 
desegregation were justifiable in  light o f the ongoing construction in  the 
school district, and he stressed th a t the Board's plans bad to be considered 
along w ith local conditions and  attitudes.^! House argued th a t the Phase 
Program  com plied fully w ith the Brow n  decisions.
Relations betw een the Branch and  Tate com plicated things for the 
plaintiffs. Attempts to  bring Tate to Little Rock to plan courtroom  strategy 
failed, and  Tate arrived in  Little Rock the evening before the trial. Then, 
instead o f working on  a  plan of action, Tate re tired  to bed for the n i g h t . ® ^  in  
court the next day, Tate argued for the dism issal o f the Phase Program on 
constitu tional grounds, ra th e r th an  following the Branch's em phasis on relief 
for the plaintiffs involved. Freyer explained that, "No reference was m ade to 
the vague, lim ited natu re  of the Phase Program  or the hardships it created for 
black c h i l d r e n . A  serious lack of com m unication and a  dysfunctional 
working relationship betw een the Branch and  the Regional A ttorney boded 
poorly for the NAACP's chances.
T ate's argum ents in  court, however, reflected his and  the National 
Office's legal strategy all along. Tate was determ ined to test the 
constitutionality of the  Blossom plan, ra th e r than  following the suggestions 
and  desires of the Branch. His hope was to  persuade the court to strike down 
the  Blossom Plan by showing its ties to unconstitutional Arkansas state laws. 
For its p art, the Branch sim ply w anted to alter the Board's plan to ensure
SOibid, 56.
SlRouse referred to Brown JT's m ention of "varied local school problem s" to 
justify delays based on  construction in Little Rock. Freyer, 55-56.
S2xbicL; Record and Record, 290.
83preyer, 56; Record and Record, 290; Race Relations Taw Reporter. October 
1956,859.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
significant an d  substantial desegregation. By shelving the Branch's argum ent 
and  focusing in  court on  the unconstitutionality of the Board's plan, Tate upset 
a  num ber o f people in  Little Rock. After the court's decision was announced, 
the Branch expressed vocal disapproval about the way he handled the case.
On August 28 Judge Miller handed down his decision. His opinion traced 
the h istory  of the city 's desegregation efforts, and  then  ru led  in favor o f the 
defendants. First of ah, he believed th a t there was no constitutional question 
involved. He accepted the Board's argum ent that it had  not based its p lan on 
segregationist Arkansas laws, and  he pointed out th a t the Board had 
voluntarily undertaken efforts to  desegregate the city 's schools. He concluded 
that, "under the pleadings in  this case there is no constitutional question 
involved. The defendants freely recognize their obligation to  provide as soon 
as reasonably practicable in tegration  in  the defendant District."^*^ From 
there, MiUer reasoned th a t the only question was w hether the Board's plan 
would adequately effectuate a  nondiscrim inatory school system  w ithin a 
reasonable am ount of time. He believed it would. Acknowledging the 
significant delays in  the Board's desegregation plan. Judge Miller sided with 
the Board's opinion th a t im plem entation o f the plan should wait un til the 
com pletion o f the new school facilities. He concluded that, "the plan which 
h a s been adopted after thorough and  conscientious consideration of the many 
questions involved is a  plan th a t will lead  to an effective and gradual 
adjustm ent o f the problem , and  ultim ately bring about a  school system  not 
based on color distinctions."^^
M iller's opinion contained one sm all victory for the local NAACP. Miller 
ru led  th a t desegregation would begin in  the fall of 1957. Prior to the trial, th a t
&4Race Relations Law Reporter. October 1956, 853. 
S^Record and  Record, 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
date  had been uncertain. The Phase Program, suggested 1957 as the date for 
in itial desegregation, b u t its deliberately vague wording left the schedule 
unclear. In o rder to shore up its case, the School Board had leaned tow ard 1957 
as a  set date in  the spring of 1956, and the argum ent it presented in  court 
reflected this; Judge M iller's ruling, then, reassured the local Branch in  a t 
least one way—1957 became the established date for the desegregation o f Little 
Rock's public school system.®^
The local NAACP, however, im m ediately expressed dissatisfaction w ith 
the court's decision. Even though M iller established Septem ber 1957 as the 
fixed date fo r desegregation, the Branch began work to appeal Judge M iller's 
decision. In early Septem ber the Branch asked the NAACP's Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc., for assistance in  an  appeal to  the Eighth Circuit Court 
o f Appeals. The Fund, in  charge of deciding w hether lost cases m erited appeal, 
reviewed the case and agreed to assist the Branch. On September 21, 1956, 
attorneys for the  Branch filed notice th a t they intended to appeal Judge 
M iller’s decision.®^
In the weeks following the court's ruling, a guarded optim ism  settled  
over Little Rock. The decision seemingly resolved the issue of desegregation 
in  the city, and  m any residents fe lt assured that peaceful desegregation w ould 
now take place. Even the city 's two m ajor newspapers. The Arkansas Democrat 
and  The Arkansas Gazette, agreed th a t things looked rosy for the near 
future.®® Common sense seem ed to have prevailed—for the time being.
®^Race Relations T.aw R eporter October 1956, 856.
87papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, Letter from  Daisy Bates to Wiley 
Branton, August 30, 1962, 2; Ibid., "Little Rock; The Chronology of a Contrived 
Crisis", 5.
®®Freyer, 58.
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Q-ther B ranch W ork. Fall 1956
During m uch of September, the  Branch worked on m em bership drives 
and  fundraising. Field Secretary Sm ith encouraged the Branch and helped it 
w ith these activities. Smith knew th a t increasing m em berships would no t 
only replenish NAACP support lost to  segregationist attacks in  the Deep South, 
b u t would also gam er critical support fo r the local Branch. Branch m em bers 
knew th a t fundraising would be critical for paying the Branch's p art o f the 
desegregation law suit and  appeal.
In October the Arkansas State Conference held its Annual Meeting in  
Little Rock. The m eeting, held to align local and state NAACP projects w ith 
National Office directives and resolutions, lasted from  October 26-28.^9 Field 
Secretary Sm ith attended, and he led  a  discussion on the desegregation 
situation in Arkansas. Members o f the little  Rock Branch were also present, 
and  they inform ed o ther Branches about the results of Aaron v. Cooper, and 
the m ost recen t goings-on in little  Rock.
In  November and  December the Branch carried on its work, begun that 
spring, to  desegregate bus term inals. After it  appealed to managers in  Little 
Rock and N orth little  Rock to end  segregation in  their term inals, the Branch 
wrote letters to  executives in  the com pany which owned and operated the 
little  Rock lines. The Branch sta ted  th a t since the term inal m anagers had  said 
they had no control over the policies governing their facilities, the hope was 
th a t com pany executives would correct the situation from  the top down. They 
received no replies from  any higher-ups w ithin the Citizen Coach C om pany.^
89papers of the NAACP. Supplem ent to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report o f the 
Executive Secretary to the Board of Directors, October 1956", 9.
^Olbid., Part 3 Series D, reel 1, Letter from  J.C. Crenchaw to Mr. Gare Cobb, 
January 25,1957.
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S-egr^gationists in  A rkansas. Fall AS 5 6
The fall of 1956 also w itnessed an increase in segregationist activity in 
Little Rock and  throughout Arkansas. On October 11, the day before an  
Arkansas Council on  Human Relations luncheon m eeting in  Little Rock, a  cross 
was burned in  the yard of the Bates' home in  Little Rock. Then, on October 27, 
during the State Conference's Annual Meeting, a  larger cross was set ablaze in 
the same place.9l Mrs. Bates later reported  th a t segregationist activity had 
picked up significantly following the Branch's decision to file su it against the 
School Board. A pparently the decision to appeal Judge Miller’s decision again 
raised  the ire o f local segregationists.^^
Also th a t fall, local Citizens' Councils chapters came together and 
organized a statew ide Citizens' Council. Indicative o f the increasing strength 
and  cohesiveness of the state 's segregationists, the organization vied for 
political influence w ithin Arkansas. Even in late 1956, however, its support 
was limited.^3 H istorian Human Bartley explained, "Among the few 
functioning chapters, the Capital Citizens' Council in Little Rock was the most 
active (and was to become of exceptional significance), though it too had 
lim ited m em bership."^^ StUl, as the NAACP continued its efforts to prom ote 
desegregation, the strength  of the opposition continued to  grow. 
Segregationists would become a tru e  force in  Little Rock in 1957.
Even in  1956, however, Arkansas segregationists could take pride in the 
fact th a t th e ir (Jovem or increasingly supported th e ir position w ith regards to 
segregation. Seeking reelection for a  second term , (Jovem or Orval Faubus 
began issuing statem ents su p p o rtii^  resistance to desegregation in  the
9 lib id ., Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The Chronology of a  Contrived 
Crisis", 6 .
92Record and Record, 160.
93Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance. 100.
94ibid., 101.
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sum m er o f 1956. He endorsed m easures p u t fo rth  by the state's segregationists 
to  m aintain segregated schools, and he took pride in  the fact that "’Since I 
have been your governor, no school board  has been forced to desegregate its  
schools against its will.'"^5 Furtherm ore, Faubus increasingly spoke of 
aligning Arkansas "'solidly w ith the Solid South."^^
In November, in  a  move which dem onstrated the growing strength  of 
the state 's segregationists, Arkansan segregationists were able to place th ree 
m easures on  a  statewide referendum  ballot. Each of the measures won popular 
approval.^^ The first, a  pupU assignm ent law, enabled school districts 
throughout the state to Tnaititain segregated schools by allowing them  to select 
which students would attend  which schools w ithin their districts. The State 
Education Commissioner o f Arkansas supported the law; he e)q>lained that it 
"would help districts which vy^mt to  keep their segregated schools."^® The 
second m easure was an  am endm ent to nullify the Brown  decisions. It formally 
placed Arkansas in  opposition to the Supreme Court decisions and aligned it 
w ith m any o f the fiercely-resisting Deep South states. Finally, voters 
approved a  resolution to place Arkansas on the record against desegregation 
in  general. The passage of the th ree m e su re s  reflected the growing 
sentim ent in  Arkansas th a t if a  way to  avoid desegregation were possible, it 
should be found and  im plem ented.
C o n c lu s io n s
W hen 1956 came to a  dose, the situation in  Little Rock was as tense as 
ever. The School Board's desegregation plan, though approved by a  federal 
court, was being appealed by the NAACP. Segregationist power and  pressure
95pat>ers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, " little  Rock: The Chronology of 
a  Contrived Crisis", 4.
96ibid.
97<;outhem School News. December 1956, 8 -
9&Record and  Record, 27. The State Education Commissioner was Arch W. Ford.
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was o n  the rise, and  the School Board had  begun to feel this pressure as w ell 
The NAACP was increasingly isolated w ithin the white community because of 
its desegregation activities, and  race relations in  Little Rock had deteriorated  
significantly. Many blacks had  re trea ted  altogether from  the desegregation 
debate, as d id  m oderate whites. Left in  the spotlight were the segregationists, 
the School Board, and the NAACP; the battle lines were drawn. In 1957, the 
battle o f Little Rock began.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C hapter 4: Showdown in  L ittle Rock. 1957
N ineteen fifty-seven w itnessed the  culm ination o f the controversy over 
desegregation in  Little Rock- The city rem ained relatively calm during the 
spring, as the NAACP and School Board reargued the Aaron  case and busied 
them selves w ith  the logistics o f desegregating the city 's schools. At the same 
tim e, however, segregationists began to gam er the support they bad been 
desperately seeking. The atm osphere o f relative ra lm  th a t had characterized 
Little Rock fo r the previous th ree years gave way as spring became summer.
In late August events came to a  head, and the Governor chose to stand in  favor 
o f segregation. By ordering the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the 
desegregation of Central High, Faubus placed him self in  direct violation of the 
federal governm ent. On Septem ber 25, President Eisenhower responded, 
forcefully, accom plishing w hat the NAACP had been try ii^  to achieve since 
1954.
A ppealing  A a r o n
Following its decision to  contest Judge M iller's ruling in  Aaron^ the 
Little Rock Branch worked w ith the NAACP's Legal Defense and  Educational 
Fund, Inc. (the Fund) on its appeal. Branton stayed on  as the Branch's chief 
legal representative, aided by the Fund's director, Thurgood M arshall. Even 
w ith the involvem ent and support o f the National Office, however, the Branch 
was unable to  convince the Court o f Appeals to ru le in  its favor. In July 1957, 
after its defeat a t the appellate level, the NAACP chose no t to appeal A aron  to 
the Suprem e Court.
Having the National Office, via the Legal Defense Fund, directly 
involved in  the Branch's legal efforts signaled a  sh ift from  the earlier stages 
o f Aaron. The Branch had sought and  been prom ised support from  the Fund
96
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afte r Judge M iller’s r uling, iu  the fall of 1956. Several im portant 
considerations explained the National Office's decision to become involved.
The N ational Office became involved in the A aron  appeal, in  part, 
because the  Branch requested its help through the  Arkansas State Conference. 
U pset w ith Regional A ttorney Tate’s handling of the original case, the Branch 
appealed to  the National Office because i t  believed th a t its case, though 
winnable, h ad  been m ishandled. The Branch hoped th a t the National Office's 
attorneys w ould provide help, no t take control of the case as Tate had  done; 
Branch m em bers desired to m odify Blossom's desegregation plan ra ther than 
test its legality.
The prim ary reason the National Office becam e involved in the appeal 
lay in the NAACP’s legal procedures. NAACP protocol m andated th a t National 
Office attorneys become involved in  suits filed in  the federal appeals courts. 
This guaranteed th a t the National Office retained oversight of the Association's 
legal processes even though its attorneys often chose to  forego involvem ent in  
local litigation. M oreover, the im portance of appeals court rulings, via their 
immediate consequences and the legal precedents they established, 
autom atically com m anded the attention  of the National Office. This system, 
com bined w ith the Branch's request for legal support, brought Thurgood 
M arshall an d  the Fund into the A aron  litigation. 1
ipinch, 59; St. James, A Case Studv in Pressure Groups. 119. Historian Tony 
Freyer has argued th a t the National Office joined the Branch in appealing 
A aron  because of the im portance of the case (Freyer, 92). It was unlikely that 
th is was the  only reason. First o f all, Freyer failed to point out why Aaron  was 
such an  im portan t case for the NAACP. An exam ination of the cases which the 
Fund prepared  and  argued in  late 1956 and early 1957 reveals th a t the little  
Rock case was in  no way exceptional (See Papers of the NAACP. Supplem ent to 
P art 1 (1956-60), reel 1, N.AA.C.P. Legal Defense and  Educational Fund, Inc., 
M onthly Report, January 1957, 1-4; Ibid., Supplem ent to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, 
NJLA.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., M onthly Report,
M arch/A pril 1957). Moreover, if  the National Office had  placed particular 
im portance on the A aron  case, it alm ost assuredly would have involved itself 
in  the ea rlie r stages o f the litigation.
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NAACP attorneys filed the s^peals brief w ith the U ^. Appeals Court, 
Eighth Circuit, on January 22. The b rief asked th a t the court overturn Judge 
M iller's ruling, and th at the plaintiffs' requests in  the original su it be granted. 
Charging th a t the Phase Program unduly prolonged the im plem entation of the 
Brow n  decisions, the NAACP dem anded th a t the appeals court remedy the 
situation by forcing the Board im m ediately to desegregate the city's schools.^ 
The brief fu rth er dem anded th a t the Phase Program  be m odified to require 
im m ediate desegregation in  Little Rock's junior high and elem entary schools 
as well. It argued th a t the School Board's plan delayed desegregation in  an 
attem pt to m inimize it, ra ther than for legitim ate reasons.^
Oral argum ents took place in St. Louis on March 11, and  presiding Judge 
W oodrough Vogel handed down the court's decision on April 26. During oral 
argum ents, attorneys for both sides reiterated  the m ain points of th e ir briefs.^ 
NAACP attorneys presented num erous examples o f federal courts using 
injunctive powers to speed up  integration, b u t they failed to  convince the 
court to adop t their argum ents. Instead, after a  m onth of deliberating, the 
court ru led in  favor of the School Board. Judge Vogel wrote, "There is here 
unqualified basis for the D istrict Court's conclusions th a t th e  proposed plan 
constitutes a  good-faith, prom pt and  reasonable s ta rt tow ard full com pliance 
w ith the Supreme Court’s m andate."^
Following the ruling, the NAACP debated w hether to appeal A aron  to 
the Supreme Court. Some m em bers o f the Branch supported an appeal, bu t
^ibid.. Supplem ent to Part 1(1956-60), reel 1, N.A-A.C.P. Legal Defense and  
Educational Fund, Inc., M onthly Report, January 1957, 1; Race Relations Law 
R eporter. Volume 2 (June 1957), 593-95.
3Race Relations Taw Reporter. June 1957, 593-95.
^Papers of the NAACP. Supplem ent to  Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, NA.A.C.P. Legal 
Defense and  Educational Fund, Inc., M onthly Report, M arch/April 1957; Ibid., 
Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The Chronology of a  Contrived Crisis", 7. 
SRace Relations LawJ&eporter. June 1957, 595.
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others expressed w ariness th a t acceptance of the Phase Program by the 
Suprem e Court would establish an "unfortunate p re c e d e n t.A ls o , several 
Branch m em bers were satisfied th a t the Board's p lan would be im plem ented 
th a t fall, and  they saw no reason to alter this arrangem ent.^ Still, the decision 
ultim ately fell to the National OfBce and its legal staff. In July, after several 
m onths o f consideration, the National Office announced that i t  planned to drop 
the A aron  su it ra th er than  appeal it to  the Supreme Court.®
A lK ansan  S e g re g a tio n is ts
In early 1957, A rkansan segregationists increased th e ir strength  and 
influence in  the state. Before then, segregationists exhibited only lim ited 
effectiveness in  Arkansas.^ In February, w ith the support of Governor 
Faubus, segregationists introduced four bUls in to  the State Legislature. The 
bills, aim ed a t halting desegregation and disrupting the activities of 
in tegrationist organizations by requiring them  to open their records to the 
public and  register as organizations seeking integration, passed by a  wide 
m argin in  late February. Endorsing the segregationist position, the bills 
increased the acceptance o f resistance to desegregation throughout the state.
Hearings on  the segregation bills were held  on  February 17 in  little  
Rock. Approximately 900 people attended, the m ajority of whom opposed 
passage o f the bills. Senator Max Howell, o f Little Rock, attem pted to thw art 
passage o f the bills, b u t his efforts failed. Following this, each of the  bills
®These m em bers were afraid o f having the Court legitimize a  gradual 
desegregation plan. Freyer, 96.
?Bates, 52; Record and  Record, 28: Southern School News. May 1957, 2.
Spaners o f the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, " little  Rock: The Chronology of a 
Contrived Crisis", 8 .
^Record and Record, 286.
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passed bo th  houses of the  L ^isla tu re  by substantial m ajorities and  were 
signed in to  law by Governor Faubus.^®
The first bill established a  Sovereignty Commission. The purpose o f the 
Commission would be to assist the state of Arkansas in  resisting "encroachm ent 
by [the] federal governm ent", which m eant providing legal advice and 
assistance to local school d istricts resisting desegregation. The bill empowered 
the Commission "to examine books, records, investigate, hold hearings and to 
subpoena persons and things." ̂  The second bill allowed students forced to 
a ttend  racially mixed schools exem ption from  Arkansas' com pulsory 
attendance laws. The th ird  required th a t organizations working for 
desegregation register w ith the Sovereignty Commission; though not 
specifically m entioned, this biU targeted the NAACP. The fourth  bill 
authorized local School Boards to hire attorneys to represent them  in 
desegregation suits filed a g a in s t  them  or their m embers. Taken together, the 
bUls represented  a  significant th rea t to the Arkansas NAACP and its efforts to 
desegregate the state 's s c h o o l s .  ̂  2
The Little Rock Branch reacted to the bills w ith trepidation. The 
organization regarded the  bills as alm ost certainly unconstitutionaL Still, a 
legal battle contesting th e ir constitutionality w ould inevitably be draw n-out 
and e?q>ensive, and  the Branch faced increased harassm ent in the m eantim e. 
Passage o f the bills represented a t least a  m ajor nuisance.
The Arkansas State Conference inform ed the National Office of the new 
segregation laws shortly after th e ir passage. In M arch, the NAACP Board of
lOpreyer, 89; Bates, 54; David Halberstam, The Fifties (NY: Random House, 1993), 
671; Record and Record, 28.
l l Paoers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 13, "A Statistical Summary", 
November 1961.
l^ibid-. Part 3 Series D, reel 13, "A Statistical Summary", November 1961; Record 
and Record, 28.
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D irectors considered th e  im pact o f the legislation, particularly the law "aimed 
a t m aking the operations o f the NAACP in  th a t state difhcult, if not 
i m p o s s i b l e . "  1 3  The Board ordered  the NAACP's General Counsel, Robert Carter, 
to  look into the situation and determ ine how the NAACP should react. Later 
th a t m onth, the Arkansas State Conference held a  m eeting to discuss the 
im pact o f the new legislation. Unable to agree upon an  effective defense, the 
participants retu rned  to  th e ir com m unities and  prepared  for the coming 
assault. State president Bates vowed to contest the constitutionality of the new
leg isla tio n .l4
D evelopm ents in  L ittle Rock. Spring 1957
Segregationists in  Little Rock rallied in early 1957. In March, a  pair of 
segregationist candidates ran  for the School Board. The election took place on 
M arch 16. Held to replace two Board members whose term s had expired, the 
election quickly becam e a  referendum  on the Phase Program and the city's 
stance on school desegregation. One of the segregationist candidates was the 
president of th e  Capital Citizens Council, Robert Ewing Brown. Two m oderate 
candidates, supported by the NAACP, opposed the segregationists. In an 
election which split the city along racial and class lines, the m oderates carried 
the day.l3
The School Board election suggested the m ood of the city th a t spring.
The m oderate candidates had  endorsed the Phase Program, whereas the 
segregationists denounced any vestiges of desegregation. Thus, the trium ph of 
the m oderates indicated th a t the city 's residents favored compliance w ith the
13papers of the NAACP. Supplem ent to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the 
Executive Secretary to the Board, M arch 11, 1957", 2.
I'^Ibid., Supplem ent to P art 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report o f the Executive 
Secretary to the Board, April 8 , 1957", 3; Freyer, 96.
l^The m oderates were supported by Little Rock's blacks and upper-class 
whites. Huckaby, 5; Freyer, 92.
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law ra th e r than  outright defiance. Elizabeth Huckaby, Vice-Principal of 
C entral High School, explained, "Their election seem ed an  endorsem ent o f the 
law and  order stand of the superintendent and the board, and  of their plan o f 
gradual (and token) integration." Still, it  was clear th a t the vast m ajority of 
Little Rock's residents still favored segregation. They favored compliance w ith 
the law, b u t only as a  last resort. T hat this was the case would soon become 
quite clear.
After losing its appeal in  Aaron v. Cooper, the Little Rock NAACP shifted 
its efforts toward projects re lated  indirectly to school desegregation. The m ost 
im portant o f these projects concerned housing in the city. Since the spring of 
1956 the Branch had been m onitoring the city 's u rban  renew al project to 
insure th a t it  was nondiscrim inatozy.
One reason the Branch undertook housing work was to insure that the 
city 's renewal plan would no t underm ine the Branch's efforts to desegregate 
schools. The NAACP's National Office had  long recognized the relationship 
betw een residential segregation and school segregation, and it encouraged its 
Branches to consider urban renew al projects as a po ten tial th rea t to 
integration. By the spring o f 1957, Little Rock's redevelopm ent plans 
substantiated  the National Office's fears. The plans prom ised significantly to 
in terfere w ith the desegregation of the city 's schools. Accordingly, the 
Branch filed petitions w ith the Federal Housing A uthority and the Urban 
Renewal A dm inistration to stop the project.
The Branch also worked on  school desegregation th a t spring. In May, 
responding to reports th a t Superintendent Blossom had  begun using a 
discrim inatory selection process to  choose which blacks would desegregate the
1 ̂ Huckaby, 5.
17paoers of the NAACP. Supplem ent to Part 1 (1956-60), reel 1, "Report of the 
Executive Secretary to the Board, April 8 , 1957", 2.
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city 's schools, the Branch dem anded a  m eeting w ith the B o a r d . 18 Blossom had 
persuaded the black principals of two Little Rock schools to lim it the num ber 
o f black children eligible to attend  the city 's previously-white schools for him. 
First, Blossom instructed  the principals to determ ine the num ber of black 
children in  Little Rock in terested  in  attending the  white schools. Next he 
ordered the principals to screen those in terested  according to a set of criteria 
which included I.Q,, personality, citizenship record, and  school grades. The 
principals m et individually w ith each potential student to  determ ine if he or 
she would be a  desirable candidate.
After learning of Blossom's actions, the  Branch organized its meeting 
with Blossom and  the School Board. Blossom chose May 29 to meet. The Branch 
appointed a com m ittee o f Executive Committee m em bers w ith diverse views on 
desegregation to  m eet w ith the Board, and it  drew  up a  list of questions for the 
Superintendent- The Branch hoped to leam  of Blossom's plans for the 
selection process, and to convince Blossom to adopt a nondiscrim inatory 
selection process if p o s s i b l e . 2 0
State president Bates and  Field Secretary Smith accom panied the 
committee to m eet w ith Blossom and the Board. Blossom, as expected, quickly 
took charge o f the m eeting and  provided his rationale fo r the selection 
process. He ejq>lained: "1 feel th a t for this transition  from  segregation to 
integration in  the Little Rock school system , we should select and encourage 
only the best Negro students to  attend  Central High School—so th a t no criticism  
of the integration process could be a ttrib u ted  to inefficiency, poor 
scholarship, low m orale, o r poor citizenship....''^ 1 Even before asking its
18ibid„ Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Report of Conference w ith the Board", 1-4. 
19ibid.
2 0 ib id .
2 1 lbid., 2 .
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questions, the committee realized that Blossom was determ ined to screen 
po ten tial candidates for desegregation and  minimize the num ber of black 
studen ts who would be enrolled in  the previously all-white schools.
Those in  attendance felt th a t Blossom's plans violated the ruling of the 
appeals court. In a  repo rt o f th e  m eeting to  the National Office, Field Secretary 
Sm ith asked the National Office to consider the legal ram ifications of the 
screening process. "The plan [Phase Program] d id  not call fo r screening. This 
screening seems to carry  persuasion and  possibly pressure and  intim idation," 
he  w r o t e . 2 2  The Branch hoped the National Office m ight be able to force 
Blossom to  abandon the procedure.
By late spring, it seem ed as if desegregation, albeit token desegregation, 
was on track in  little  Rock. A segregationist bid to gain influence on the 
School Board had been defeated in March, and the NAACP's appeal of the 
orig inal A aron  decision failed in  late A pril As Blossom began screening black 
candidates for the city 's w hite schools, he expressed confidence th a t his plan 
w ould bring about sm ooth and  effective desegregation. Four new segregation 
laws, passed in  the Arkansas State Legislature in  February seemingly insured 
th a t proponents o f significant in tegration could be effectively checked. 
Ironically, though the laws effectively ended the th reat of increased 
desegregationist activity, they also opened up the Board to  attacks from  the 
o ther side.
T h e-S eg reg atio n ists . F aubus. an d  th e  School Board. Sum m er 19S7
Segregationist pressure increased significantly in  the sum m er of 1957. 
Superintendent Blossom and Governor Faubus became favorite targets for 
abuse, replacing the NAACP as the segregationist's scapegoats. By late August 
segregationists m anaged to  discredit the Board and  the Governor, and  no one
2 2 i b i d . ,  3 .
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in  the Little Rock com m unity knew w hat to  expect w hen the city 's schools 
opened th a t falL
Many southern segregationists viewed Arkansas as a key state in  the 
battle  to  resist desegregation. A border state m ore southw estern than 
southern , Arkansas' handling o f Brow n  prom ised to influence the reactions of 
a  num ber o f o ther southern states. If Arkansas complied, die solid south would 
be fragm ented, and o ther border states m ight follow Arkansas' lead. As 
sou thern  resistance to integration increased in  early 1956, the potential for 
in tegration  in  Arkansas became viewed as a  m ajor th rea t by southern 
segregationist leaders. By 1957, when m ost o ther border states had joined the 
South in  opposition to  com pliance with the  Brow n  decisions, Arkansas 
rem ained somewhat am bivalent.^^ Deep South states, anxious to avoid isolation 
from  the border states, increasingly pressed Arkansas' political leaders to 
resist desegregation. Jam es Easdand, the notoriously racist Senator from 
M ississippi, explained, '"The Deep South is aU right, b u t there is now being 
waged a  trem endous conflict in  the border states, which will determ ine what 
will happen to the Deep S o u t h - ' " 2 4
Accordingly, Arkansas became viewed as a  battleground. The NAACP, 
which had  recognized the sta te 's significance as early as 1954, strove to insure 
th a t the state's schools w ere desegregated as quickly as possible. The National 
Office kept in close contact w ith the Arkansas State Conference, and  it sent 
field w orkers and  then  Field Secretary Frank Sm ith to help the state 's 
desegregation efforts. Segregationists fought against the NAACP and anyone 
else who viewed desegregation as either favorable o r inevitable. In  1957, as 
A rkansan segregationists grew in  streng th  and  influence, segregationists
23Bardey, The Rise of Massive Reslstanrp. 143. 
24Blossom, 30; Record and Record, 250-54.
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from  outside the state joined them  to com bat the possibility of desegregation.
By the sum m er of 1957, residents o f Little Rock noted  a  growing presence of 
out-of-state segregationists in  their midst- Virgil Blossom described the 
scenario, "I had  heard the attitude of segregation leaders from  other cities 
expressed again and  again, in  words like these: 'If the Little Rock integration 
plan succeeds, we will be next. And they were determ ined no t to 'be n e x t . " " 2 5  
Segregationist activity in Little Rock began to pick up  in the spring, 
w hen segregationists in itiated  a propaganda cam paign challenging the idea 
th a t the city had to comply w ith the Supreme Court's rulings. The CGC and 
o th er segregationist-m inded organizations, such as the Constitution Party, 
d istribu ted  leaflets urging opposition to desegregation, sponsored newspaper 
advertisem ents prom oting resistance, and  held  rallies featuring out-of-town 
speakers who attacked desegregation and its supporters. In May 
segregationists dem anded th a t Governor Faubus "order" segregation in Little 
Rock's schools in the f a l l . 2 6
Throughout the spring, however, and  into the summer. Governor 
Faubus ignored the segregationist attacks. Most Arkansans believed Faubus 
had  accepted desegregation, and his public pronouncem ents supported this 
conclusion. In June, Faubus stated  th a t he viewed desegregation in  Little Rock 
as a  "'local p r o b l e m . " ' 2 7  i n  July, dism issing the notion th a t Arkansas' new 
segregation laws gave him the legal authority  to circum vent the Brow n  
decisions, Faubus explained that, "'Everyone knows th a t state laws can 't 
supersede federal laws.'"28
25Blossom, 47-49.
2^Record and  Record, 30-32; Bartley, "Looking Back a t Little Rock", 107. 
27<;otithem School News. June 1957, 9. See Blossom, 46, for more on the 
increased pressure Faubus faced during the sum m er of 1957. 
ZSso u th em  School News. August 1957, 7.
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Nonetheless, prospects for a  th ird  term  concerned the Governor, and 
Faubus m et secretly w ith segregationist leaders in  Little Rock th a t summer. 
Unable to see a  vfay ou t of his predicam ent, Faubus talked in  general term s 
about stopping or delaying segregation a t Central High, b u t he offered no 
indication th a t he considered this viable, m uch less worthwhile. The Governor 
regarded the  issue o f desegregation in  political term s, bu t he was unwilling to 
make com m itm ents o r assurances to the segregationists.29
Meanwhile, segregationists stepped up their attacks on the School 
Board. In July, they publicly challenged the specifics of the Phase Program.
In a  le tter published in  the local newspapers, White America president Amis 
Guthri(%e dem anded to know how the Board intended to resolve the intricacies 
of an  in tegrated  school system , such as after-school program  policies and 
desegregated r e s t r o o m s . 3 0  Segregationists also began attending School Board 
m eetings, where they bitterly  attacked the Board and its plan.^ 1 By late 
summer. Blossom feared for the safety o f his family, and he sent his daughter 
to  live w ith relatives outside the s t a t e . 3 2
Afraid to defy the federal courts b u t personally opposed to  school 
desegregation, the Board was in  a  bind. Seeing no alternative, Blossom and the 
Board stuck the Phase Program. In July, the Board published its reply to 
G uthridge's letter, explaining exactly how it planned to resolve the m any 
logistical problem s associated w ith desegregation. The response stated th a t the 
Board hoped to minimize interaction between the races as m uch as possible. 
Biracial social functions would no t be perm itted, b u t lim ited space m eant that 




32preyer, 95; Huckaby, 20. 
33Record and  Record, 32.
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fu rth e r encouraged segregationists who believed th a t the Board could legally 
forego desegregating its schools to file su it against the Board. Though the 
Board adm itted th a t i t  opposed desegregation in  principle, it argued that it  had 
" 'a  du ty  to obey [the Supreme Court].'"^^
Increasingly w ary o f the increased segregationist fervor, the Board 
began a  desperate search for public support th a t summer.^^ Abandoning sole 
responsibfiity fo r its desegregation plan, the Board doggedly sought 
pronouncem ents of approval from  the Governor and Judge Miller. Blossom 
believed th a t a  statem ent of support firom either of these sources would greatly 
alleviate pressure on the Board. He also sought to relinquish responsibility of 
m aintaining o rder on the  school grounds when desegregation occurred. 
H istorian Num an Bartley described Blossom’s efforts; "Beginning in early 
August, 1957, Blossom, accom panied twice by School Board Secretary Wayne 
Upton and th ree times by the en tire school board, tirelessly pressed the 
governor for a  com m itm ent [forcibly to  keep the peace]."^^ Unfortunately for 
th e  Board, no one was willing to speak ou t for the Phase Program or even for 
com pliance w ith the law.
The increase in  segregationist activity in  the sum m er heightened fears 
in  little  Rock th a t desegregation m ight n o t occur peacefully. As the 
com m unity became increasingly polarized, decision-rnaking became more 
difficult, and preparations for desegregation suffered. Only the NAACP and 
th e  Board rem ained publicly com m itted to desegregation, and the 
segregationists grew stronger each day. Though the com m unity assum ed 
desegregation would be carried out, it sim ply could n o t be sure. A white 
m in ister from  Little Rock later explained that, "Throughout the sum m er
34Blossom, 43.
35Bartley, "Looking Back a t Little Rock", 105-109. 
36ibid, 110.
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m onths persons of both  races, deeply concerned for the problem s of hum an 
relations, became increasingly disturbed as they realized th a t d ie social forces 
o f little  Rock were not being m arshaled to  aid  in  a  sm ooth transition to 
in tegration . No one knew what m ight happen."
T h e  L it t le  R ock  NAACP, S u m m e r  1Q5Î7
Following its m eeting w ith the School Board in late May, the Branch 
focused on  preparing the students Blossom had chosen to be candidates for 
desegregation. Branch m em bers also pressed the Board to Tnaintain open lines 
o f com m unication w ith the black com m unity. In addition, as they became 
increasingly disillusioned w ith the Board's selection process and the 
restrictions placed upon black students who were candidates for 
desegregation, the Branch asked the National OfBce to examine the Board's 
actions. Branch m em bers also worked to prepare the larger black community 
fo r desegregation.
State president Bates coached and  readied the nine blacks chosen by the 
School Board for desegregation th a t sum m er. She prepared the children both 
psychologically and academ ically. Bates taught the children how to ignore 
insults and  physical abuse, and she tu to red  them  to bring their academic levels 
up  to par. Confident o f their ability to  w ithstand the trials and tribulations of 
desegregation. Bates nonetheless knew th a t some academic preparation and 
team -building would make the task easier. The Branch assisted her in 
preparing  the children. Little Rock blacks understood th at, "The teenagers 
needed to  be ready for some of the problem s they 'd  face a t Central once school 
started."^®
37Record and Record, 239.
38Richard Kelso, Days o f Courage: The Little Rock Storv (Austin, TX: Raintree 
Steck-Vaughn Publishers, 1993), 12; Bates, 3.
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The NAACP also prepared the larger black com m unity for 
desegregation. Uneasy about the Board's selection process, local blacks seemed 
m ore supportive of the Branch as the sum m er wore on. In mid-summer, the 
NAACP began planning a  com m unity m eeting scheduled to take place in 
August. The Branch also encouraged local blacks to  press the Board to 
abandon, or a t least m itigate, its discrim inatory selection process.^^ By 
sum m er it was apparen t th a t the black com m unity had rallied behind Daisy 
Bates and  the Little Rock NAACP.^
The Branch carefully m onitored the Board's selection process as well. 
Noting th a t two hundred  black students lived in Central High's attendance 
zone, the Branch expressed disappointm ent upon learning that Blossom listed 
only tw enty as eligible to attend  the school."*! When Blossom cut the num ber 
to  nine, the Branch expressed m ore disappointm ent. In late July the Executive 
Committee asked the National Legal Redress Committee to examine the Board's 
actions and  determ ine if they violated court orders. Bates asked National Office 
attorney  Robert C arter to "determ ine if this is no t contrary to the ruling and 
decision of the Federal and  Circuit Court o f Appeals."*^
The Branch was also upset w ith Blossom's proposals concerning the 
eligibility of the blacks students to  participate in extracurricular activities. At 
a  m eeting in  July, Blossom inform ed the Branch th a t the students would be 
unable to  play sports, ru n  for student governm ent offices, join social or 
service clubs, play in  the school band, o r a ttend  school d a n c e s . * ^  Because m ost
3R eco rd  and Record, 239.
■*®Spitzberg, 127-130, 173.
41papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, Letter from  Daisy Bates to Robert 
Carter, August 2, 1957. Blossom listed twenty as eligible in  the spring of 1957; 
the  num ber was cu t to nine that sum m er.
42ibid.
43Laurie A. O'Neill, Little Rock: The Desegregation of Central High (Brookfield, 
CT: The MiUbrook Press, 1994), 22-23.
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of the  eligible blacks had been involved in  extracurricular activities a t their 
previous schools, this pronouncem ent greatly disappointed them . Blossom said 
the restrictions were necessary because the blacks would be new students, b u t 
the NAACP knew otherwise. The Branch reported  this developm ent as well to 
the National Office in  the hopes th a t som ething could be d o n e .^
L ittle Rock. A ugust 1957
August w itnessed the culm ination o f tensions th a t had brewed all 
sum m er in little  Rock. As the School Board and  the NAACP feverishly 
p repared  for desegregation, the segregationists worked ju st as feverishly to 
halt the process. Governor Faubus rem ained silent, and residents of the city 
expressed uncertain ty  over the outcom e of the battle over desegregation.
Segregationists from  throughout the South had  converged in  Little Rock 
over the course of the sum m er. Pressure on  the Governor and the Board 
reached new heights, and  the segregationists worked frantically to gather 
support in th e  white com m unity. In late sum m er their efforts paid off.
On August 20, segregationists launched a  new organization in  Little 
Rock. Composed o f m others with children in  the city 's public schools, the 
M other's League of C entral High drew  increased support fo r segregation hrom 
the m ore respectable mem bers of the com m unity. Committed to nonviolent 
m ethods, the League convinced a  num ber o f previously apathetic w hites to 
become active in the m ovem ent to halt desegregation. Founded by one 
hundred  women, th e  organization quickly grew in  strength and i n f l u e n c e . 4 5  
It called upon Governor Faubus to stop the "forcible integration" o f the city’s 
schools.^®
44papers of the  NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, Letter from  Daisy Bates to Robert 
Carter, August 2,1957.
45Blossom, 47.
4 6 p a p ers  of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The Chronology o f a  
Contrived Crisis", 9
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Two days la ter, segregationists held  a  rally in  Little Rock. Featuring 
Georgia Governor M arvin Griffin and states rights cham pion Roy Harris, the 
rally a ttrac ted  a  large and enthusiastic crowd. GrifRn told  the crowd that 
Georgia had  developed a  legal means o f avoiding com pliance with the Supreme 
Court decisions, and he hinted th a t Arkansas could do the same. r.han«*ngiTig 
Governor Faubus to support the segregationists and  take a  stand opposing 
desegregation, Griffîn praised those in  attendance as " 'a  courageous bunch of 
p a t r i o t s . ' T h e  rally  rejuvenated those in  attendance and convinced them  
th a t Governor Faubus could legally refuse to desegregate the city's schools. It 
was a  m ajor success for the segregationists.
Im m ediately following the rally, Blossom found it more difficult to m eet 
and  confer w ith Governor Faubus. Upset by the publicity generated by the 
event, Faubus re treated  from  public scrutiny. He lam ented that Griffin's 
speech had  tipped public sentim ent in  favor of the segregationists. At one 
poin t th e  Governor com plained th a t Griffin's speech had  done more than 
'"anything else th a t has happened to solidify public sentim ent against school 
integration.""*® Sure th a t Griffin had  convinced the Little Rock community 
th a t a  legal m eans o f avoiding desegregation existed, Faubus thought th a t he 
needed to  react. In late August, he considered his options. With only three 
weeks le ft before desegregation, the Governor faced difficult decisions.
In  the m eantim e, A rkansas' A ttorney General Bruce Bennett in itiated  
litigation against th e  Little Rock NAACP based on the state 's new segregation 
laws. Hoping to sh u t down the Association's operations in  the state of 
Arkansas, State v. NAACP and State v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
attacked the NAACP for failing to register w ith the state as a  desegregation-
47Record and Record, 32-33; Bartley, "Looking Back a t little  Rock", 108; 
Blossom, 55.
48Blossom, 56; Freyer, 100.
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oriented  oi^anization, and dem anded th a t the NAACP pay fines and open its 
records to state inspectors.'*^ The litigation diverted the Branch's attention 
from  preparing fo r desegregation to defending its own rig h t to e x i s t - 5 0  
T he L ittle Rock NAACP. S u m m e r  1957
Prior to th is litigation, the Branch worked to insure th a t desegregation 
w ould occur peacefully. Concerned about the possibility of violence, the 
Branch m et w ith Blossom, Little Rock Police Chief M arvin Potts, and Pulaski 
Sheriff Tom Gulley on August 25. Though it d id not expect violence, the 
Branch v en ted  to be prepared for th a t eventuality; it  sought a commitment 
from  city officials to  help desegregate the schools. U nfortunately, the police 
chief prom ised only to Tnaintain the peace; the police would not escort the 
children into the school. Instead, Potts h in ted  th a t desegregating Central High 
was the responsibility of the School Board.51
Also on  August 25, the NAACP held  its mass m eeting in  little  Rock. 
Organized to finalize preparations for desegregation and to discuss the black 
com m unity's behavior, the m eeting drew  five hundred  people to a  local 
com m unity center. M inisters, teachers, lawyers, and doctors spoke on good 
citizenship an d  the responsibilities of the candidates for desegregation and  the 
com m unity a t large.^2 NAACP Field Secretary Smith em phasized the 
im portance o f observing C hristian principles. O ther speakers encouraged the 
students to tu rn  the o ther cheek when confronted by ra c k t actions or 
rem arks. Proper conduct, the speakers em phasized, would alleviate the 
difficulties involved in  the desegregation process.^^
49papers o f the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 13, "A Statistical Summary", 
November, 1961. 
sOpreyer, 128.
SlRartley, "Looking Back a t Little Rock", 105-06; Papers of the NAACP. Part 3 
Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The Chronology of a  Contrived Crisis", 8. 
52Biossom, 57.
53Record and  Record, 33.
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In an  attem pt to defend its righ t to  exist, in  late August the Branch 
sponsored litigation testing the constitutionality  the new state segregation 
laws. Filed by ten  black m inisters from  Little Rock, the suit declared that the 
sta tu te  requiring organizations working fo r desegregation to register w ith the 
state, and the statu te estabUshing the Sovereignty Commission, were 
unconstitutionaL U nfortunately, Sm ith v. Faubus quickly became m ired in the 
state 's judicial system , where it rem ained for over a  year, moving from the 
state courts to federal courts and back. A ttorneys for the state, knowing the 
case was unw innable, still labored effectively to delay its resolution.
Eventually the NAACP filed additional suits to  challenge the same laws, bu t the 
state 's attorneys ensured th a t these suits m et the same f a t e . 5 4
Even as the events of late August unfolded, however, the citizens of 
Little Rock expected desegregation to occur. Some w orried that problem s 
m ight occur, particu larly  because o f the large num ber of out-of-state 
segregationists in  little  Rock, bu t m ost dism issed these fears. Unaware of the 
lack of preparation o n  the p art o f the city governm ent and the police 
departm ent, m ost sim ply assum ed th a t all would go welL The city 
underestim ated the difiiculties th a t lay ahead. Historian Numan Bartley 
explained the situation in  late August, 1957: "Little Rock rem ained basically a 
m oderate com m unity, and  m ost citizens assum ed th at preparations for token 
in tegration were proceeding on schedule."^^ No one predicted w hat was about 
to  occur.
54papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, " little  Rock: The Chronology of a  
Contrived Crisis", 8; Ibid., Part 3 Series D, reel 13, "A Statistical Summary", 
November 1961; Freyer, 128.
SSgartley, "Looking Back a t Little Rock", 109.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
T he C risis B reaks
On August 27, the crisis broke. Governor Faubus, via a  representative of 
th e  M other's League, requested an  injunction in  Pulaski Chancery Court to 
h a lt the desegregation of Central High. After the juc^e granted the 
injunction, the Federal D istrict Court which originally heard  Aaron  nuUihed 
the injunction and  ordered  th a t integration proceed- U ndeterred, Governor 
Faubus called out the Arkansas National Guard on September 2 and ordered 
them  to prevent any blacks from  entering Central High. Arkansas’ showdown 
w ith the federal governm ent had  begun.
Faubus had sought a  way to  legally prevent the integration of Little 
Rock's schools following the large segregationist rally o f August 22. After the 
rally, Faubus convinced Mrs. Clyde Thomason of the M other’s League to seek a  
tem porary in junction halting desegregation from  the Pulaski Chancery Court. 
At the trial, Faubus testihed  th a t he supported the injunction because of fears 
th a t violence m ight e ru p t if desegregation proceeded in  Little Rock.^6 The 
School Board, assisted by Branch attorney  Branton, challenged Faubus' 
predictions o f violence.^^ Based largely on the testim ony of the Governor, on 
August 29 Judge M urray O. Reed granted the injunction.58
On August 30 Judge Ronald Davies of the Federal D istrict Court nullified 
Reed's injunction. Davies, from  North Dakota, had  replaced Judge Miller in 
August because o f a  backlog o f cases. Davies ordered the School Board to
SôFreyer, 101.
57papers o f the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, M emorandum from  Miss Geier to 
Gloster B. Current, August 29, 1957. Branton convinced the National Office to 
allow him  to  help the Board by pointing ou t d ia t the School Board so t^ h t the 
same goal as the NAACP a t th is point. For its part, the Board d id  no t believe th a t 
Faubus could legally circum vent desegregation.
SSjbid., Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock: The Chronology o f a  Contrived 
Crisis", 9; Crisis in the South: The Little Rock Storv (Little Rock: Arkansas 
Gazette, 1959), 94.
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proceed w ith its in tegration plan. He also enjoined "all persons in any m atter, 
d irectly  o r indirectly" from  interfering.^^
Faubus ordered the National Guard to Central High on September 2. In a 
television address to the citizens o f Arkansas, Faubus justified his actions; he 
explained th a t he ordered  ou t the Guard because o f "overwhelming evidence of 
im pending disorder w hich could lead to violence and even bloodshed."
Faubus explained th a t the National Guard was needed to  preserve the peace. 
O rdered to refuse adm ittance to any black students, the Guard encircled the 
two-block long building and w aited fu rther instructions. That night, the 
School Board advised the Branch th a t no attem pt to  integrate the school would 
occur un til the Federal D istrict Court considered these new developm ents.^ 1
On Septem ber 3 the Board w ent to Judge Davies for advice. Specifically, 
the Board sought instructions as to w hether it should attem pt to integrate the 
school while Guard surrounded  it. In a proceeding which lasted four m inutes, 
Davies accepted Faubus' self-appointm ent as "preservator of the peace" and 
o rdered  the Board to  proceed forthw ith w ith d e s e g r e g a t i o n . ^ ^  That afternoon 
Governor Faubus announced th a t the Guard would rem ain a t Central.
Following the court’s orders, the Board contacted the Branch and prepared  to 
desegregate the next day.
On the m orning o f Septem ber 4 the nine blacks, a s s is t^  by the Branch 
and mem bers of the com m unity, attem pted to en ter Central High. Turned back 
by the National Guard, the blacks returned  home and contacted the School
59crisis in the South: The Little Rock Storv. 94. See NAACP, Part 3
Series D, reel 1, The Congrf^ijKinnal Record, M arch 24, 1958, 2, for more on 
Davies' replacem ent o f Miller.
60 rrisis in  the South: The Little Rock Storv. 94.
^llbidL, 94-95; Papers o f the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock; The 
Chronology o f a  Contrived Crisis ', 9.
62papers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, The Congressional Record.
March 24, 1958, 2; Crisis in tfae_Soutfa: The Little Rock Storv. 94-95.
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Board. Judge Davies, inform ed of the day's developm ents, ordered the Justice 
D epartm ent to begin an  investigation to determ ine who had circum vented his
orders.^3
The N ational O ffice
The Branch contacted the National Office im m ediately after Mrs. 
Thom ason filed su it in  the Chancery Court on August 27. Seeking perm ission 
for Branton to assist the School Board in  defending its desegregation plan, the 
Branch inform ed the National Office of the developm ents of the past two weeks 
and  the atm osphere in  the city a t the tim e. After receiving approval from  the 
National Office, the Branch began working w ith the Board on legal strategy 
and  desegregation planning. Developments had  brought the antagonists 
together to  push for th e ir com m on goaL^^
As the crisis continued and  the national press moved into little  Rock, 
the Branch asked the  National Office to send help. In early September, 
Clarence Laws, NAACP Field Secretary for Louisiana, arrived in Little Rock to 
help prepare press releases and  organize the logistics of desegregation. The 
Branch quickly praised  Laws as a  capable and invaluable worker.^5 in  the 
following weeks. Laws and  State president Bates frequently contacted the 
National Office to describe developm ents in  the city and  ask for advice and 
instructions. For a  period o f several weeks, the Branch contacted the National 
Office by telephone alm ost daily. The National Office m onitored and directed 
the Branch's actions over the course of the next several months.^^
63papers o f the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, "Little Rock; The Chronology of a 
Contrived Crisis", 9; Crisis in the South: The Little Rock Story. 95.
64papf>rs of fbp NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, Letter from  Daisy Bates to  Robert 
Carter, August 31, 1957.
65ibid., Part 3 Series D, reel 1, Letter from  Daisy Bates to  Gloster B. Current, 
September 9, 1957.
66see Paners o f the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, for transcripts of m ost o f the 
telephone conversations betw een the Little Rock NAACP and the National 
Office.
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T h e  C r is is  R e s o lv e d
On Septem ber 5, the Board asked Judge Davies to  suspend its integration 
plan tem porarily. On Septem ber 7, Davies rejected the Board's request and 
ordered  integration to  begin the following weelq in the  m eantim e Davies 
convinced the federal Justice D epartm ent to seek an  injunction against 
Faubus’ interference with the court’s orders. Davies scheduled the hearing on 
this injunction for Septem ber 20.
Also in  early  Septem ber, President Dwight Eisenhower began to press 
Governor Faubus to  cooperate w ith the federal courts. In a  telegram  to Faubus 
sent Septem ber 5, Eisenhower assured Faubus that he would uphold the 
Constitution ’"by every legal m eans a t my command.’”^^ Still, Eisenhower 
hoped to allow Faubus to extricate him self from  the situation he had placed 
him self in, and  he responded favorably to  White House Staff Sherman Adams' 
negotiations w ith Arkansan congressional representative Brook Hays to 
secure a  m eeting between Eisenhower and  Faubus.^®
On Septem ber 14, Faubus m et w ith President Eisenhower, who was 
vacationing on Newport Naval Base, Rhode Island. The two discussed the 
situation in  Little Rock, and Eisenhower pressed Faubus for a  com m itm ent to 
abide by the court’s orders. A pparently Faubus agreed w ith the President's 
suggestion th a t he simply change the orders of the National Guard to both  
TnaiTitain order and  desegregate little  Rock’s schools.^^ Following the 
conference, however, Faubus acknowledged th a t in tegration was "the law of
^^stephen Ambrose, E isenhow er (New York: Simon and  Schuster, 1983), 414; 
Sherm an Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper, 1961), 346; Robert 
FerrelL ecL, The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: Norton, 1981), 347-348.
68Ambrose, 416.
^^Ibid.; Ferrell 347-348.
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the land" b u t refused to change the Guard's o r d e r s .^ O  Several days later the 
Justice D epartm ent announced th a t it would abandon its efforts to get an 
injunction against Faubus if the Governor would follow the President's 
suggestion. Still, Faubus refused.^!
On Septem ber 20 Davies held the  hearing on Faubus’ actions. Faubus 
him self chose no t to appear in  court, b u t his lawyers attacked the authority  of 
the court before leaving the h e a r i n g . ^ ^  Unconvinced o f the th reat of 
violence in early Septem ber, Judge Davies ordered Faubus to remove the 
National Guard from  Central High and  to cease subverting the orders of the 
federal court. Later th a t day Faubus removed the troops, and then left for a 
governor’s conference in Georgia. Though segregationists from  throughout 
the South had  congregated in  Little Rock, Faubus made no plans to  preserve 
the peace before l e a v i n g . 7 3
The following M onday the nine children entered Central High, but 
disturbances inside and  outside of the school led to their withdrawal before 
noon. Federal governm ent officials on the scene, inform ed of this 
developm ent, called the President and asked perm ission to  use federal troops to 
m aintain order. Eisenhower asked them  to help city officials to prepare a 
form al request seeking federal intervention. Local officials transm itted th is 
request to W ashington on Septem ber 24, and Eisenhower federalized the 
Arkansas National Guard and  ordered the Secretary of Defense to deal w ith 
segregationist resistance using w hatever m eans necessary
7 0par>ers of the NAACP. Part 3 Series D, reel 1, The Congressional Record, 
March 24, 1958, 2.
^Ipreyer, 106.
72Adams m istakenly writes th a t Faubus appeared in  court. See Adams, 353. 
73preyer, 107; Crisis in  the South; The Little Rock Story. 95.
74preyer, 108; Ambrose, 419-421.
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T hat afternoon Eisenhower re tu rned  to W ashington, D.C., to address the 
nation. His address focused on  the reason he had sent troops to Little Rock.
The President's main them e was that the troops had  been sent to Little Rock not 
to  integrate Central High, b u t to  prevent the obstruction of federal court 
orders. Eisenhower em phasized that had  he not sent the troops, the result 
would have been anarchy. "'The very basis o f our individual rights and  
freedom s rests upon the certainty th a t the President and the executive branch 
o f governm ent wUl support and insure the carrying ou t of the decisions of the 
federal courts, even, when necessary, w ith all the m eans a t the President's 
command,"' he e x p l a i n e d . ^ 5
On Septem ber 25, units o f the 101st Airborne of the United States Army 
escorted the nine children in to  the crowded hallways of Central High. Over 
the course o f the next several m onths, the children would face significant 
harassm ent, including verbal and physical abuse. Still, they had accom plished 
w hat the NAACP had  been seeking since May 17, 1954—the desegregation of 
Little Rock's public schools. The long battle of Little Rock was over.
75Adams, 355.
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C o n c l u s i o n
The goals, strategies, and  tactics of the NAACP in the mid-1950s have 
a ttrac ted  the attention  of few scholars. Many studies have examined the 
NAACP’s legal strategies o f the 1930s and 1940s, b u t the post-Brown NAACP has 
n o t received the atten tion  it  m erits. This is surprising, considering the 
im portance of school desegregation to the Association and the nation.
The relationship between the National Office of the NAACP and its 
Branches as the Association worked to im plem ent the Brown decisions of 1954 
an d  1955 played a  key role in  d e te rm in in g  the course of events in  Little Rock. 
The hierarchical chain of com m and w ithin the NAACP, the actions of the 
National Office, local considerations and goals, and  changes in  each of the 
above after 1954, helped the NAACP to overcome significant resistance and 
bring about the im plem entation o f Brown in  Little Rock and throughout the 
South. Achieving desegregation proved an incredibly difficult task, and the 
NAACP accom plished i t  v irtually  on its own.
The National Office was determ ined to oversee the im plem entation of the 
Brow n  decisions from  the beginning. Even before the Supreme C ourt handed 
down its original decision in  May, 1954, the National Office had form ulated 
guidelines which its Branches followed for the next year and a  half. In 1956, 
w hen the National Office chose to  alter its desegregation program  to favor 
w idespread litigation, it  again ordered its Branches to follow its lead. The 
N ational Office m aintained oversight of its Branches through NAACP 
conventions, field representatives, and National Office directives.
The Little Rock Branch followed the National Office's program  
diligently. Beginning in  the sum m er o f 1954, the Branch’s actions 
corresponded neatly w ith the dictates of the National Office. In 1954, for 
exam ple, the Branch fUed the National Office's desegregation petition  w ith the
121
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Little Rock School Board and then  m et w ith the Board to discuss thic petition 
and the d istrict's desegregation plan. Both steps were in  keeping w ith the 
National Office's instructions. Also, the Branch avoided legal action un til it 
realized th a t the Board was side-stepping m eaningful desegregation and 
refusing to  include the Branch in  the desegregation planning. Again these 
actions coincided w ith the evolving position of the national NAACP. At least 
with respect to  Little Rock, th e  National Office's determ ination to oversee the 
im plem entation process was successful. Several o ther local studies support the 
NAACP's success in establishing policy for its local branches.^
In spite of the National Office's determ ination to control policy, local 
considerations always played a  role in determ ining com m unity desegregation 
developm ents. They certainly did  so in Little Rock. Personalities, p rio r 
com m unity developm ents, organizations, and school d istrict logistics 
influenced the course of events in Little Rock. Virgil’s Blossom's 
unwillingness to work w ith the Branch, for instance, led the Branch to  file a 
su it against the Board, just as the national NAACP focused its atten tion  and 
efforts on  desegregating states com pletely resisting integration. This 
developm ent, determ ined by local considerations, placed the Branch in 
opposition to  the directives o f the  National Office. Subsequently, a  lack of 
national oversight o f the A aron  su it m eant th a t inadequate legal 
represen tation  and poor com m unication between the Branch and Regional 
A ttorney Tate went unnoticed, and the su it was lost. Considering the  nation­
wide scope o f the NAACP's desegregation effort, local considerations were 
bound to  thw art National Office control occasionally.
1 William H. Chafe, Civilities an d  Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980); Davidson M. Douglas, Reading. W riting, and Race: The 
Df^segregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University o f N orth 
Carolina Press, 1995).
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Occasionally even the goals o f the national NAACP conflicted with those 
of the  local Branches. In Aaron v. Cooper, for example, the Branch expressed 
m ore in terest in  altering the Phase Program  to effectuate immediate 
desegregation in  the city 's schools than  in  challenging the constitutionality of 
the Board's plan. Both of these sentim ents were incorporated into the suit, but 
the goals o f the  National (Xflce carried the day in the courtroom . The 
bureaucratic and  hierarchical structu re o f the NAACP m eant that the Branch 
had little say in  the m atter.
Examining local considerations and goals, and their impact, is essential 
to better understanding the civil rights movement. Many books about m ajor 
civil rights organizations and  fam ous individuals involved in  the m ovem ent 
exist, b u t exam inations o f the local level have only become popular in  the last 
several years.2 Looking a t the local level clarifies relations between 
desegregation proponents and  opponents, local and national organizations, 
and com m unities and their state governm ents. It simply allows for a  better 
understanding of the com plexities and  intricacies o f the civil rights 
m ovem ents. Relating local developm ents to the position and  pronouncem ents 
of the national NAACP provides a  richer understanding of both the national 
and  local level of the struggle for civil rights.
The National Office was in terested  in  establishing a  policy fo r making 
the prom ise o f Brown  a reality  everywhere. The hierarchical structure o f the 
NAACP and the com m itm ent to th a t priority  inevitably m eant that the National 
Office prevailed in  cases of conflicting interests. By the late 1950s, this would 
cost it  in  term s o f support on the local level. However, in  the mid-1950s the 
au thority  o f the National Office, though questioned, was rarely challenged.
2Arm stead L. Robinson and Patricia Sullivan, eds.. New Directions in  Civil 
Tfiyrhts Studies (Charlottesville, VA: The University Press of Virginia, 1991), 2.
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Little Rock continued to resist desegregation on  and  off for several 
years after the integration o f Central High. In the spring o f 1958, the School 
Board petitioned the the Federal D istrict Court to grant a  postponem ent of its 
desegregation plan due to intolerable conditions w ithin the city's schools.^
The lower court granted this postponem ent, bu t the Appeals Court overruled 
th a t decision, and  the Supreme Court sided w ith the Appeals Court.^ 
Subsequently, Governor Faubus, recently reelected for an  unprecedented th ird  
term , shut down the city 's public schools.
In 1959 the Federal D istrict Court ruled the lav\^ Faubus used to close the 
schools unconstitutional. Shortly thereafter the Little Rock com m unity made 
its support fo r reopening the schools known by recalling several 
segregationist School Board m em bers. Facing pressure from  Little Rock's 
business com m unity, and  segm ents of d ie progressive com m unity which 
existed in littie  Rock in  the early 1950s, the Governor allowed the m odified 
School Board to reopen the schools on a  som ewhat-integrated basis. In 
Septem ber 1960, the schools reopened w ith a  token num ber of blacks.^
Litde Rock today is a  growing, bustling city. Central High sits just south 
o f downtown, in a  qu iet black neighborhood. It is an  im pressive school to 
behold, certainly one o f the m ost beautiful public schools in  the nation. It is 
also segregated once again. The growth of the suburbs outside of Little Rock 
has drained the city o f many o f its form er white residents, and th e ir children 
a tten d  schools miles from  this symbol of southern defiance and black 
determ ination. The whites in  Litde Rock have abandoned Central High.
President Eisenhower m aintained th a t one could not bring about a
SCriKiK in the South. 33. The 'intolerable conditions' referred to general 
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change in  h ea rt by changing laws. Little Rock today, as well as areas within 
the Deep South, seem to  substantiate this po in t of view. Still, desegregation has 
been successful in m any areas throughout the United States, including the 
South. Many Americans today understand som ething not widely accepted two 
generations ago—the color of one's skin will never be his or h er defining 
ch a ra c te r is t ic . Moreover, it  seems obvious to me th a t , in  some instances, 
change will no t occur w ithout forcing a  change in  the laws. W hether this 
change brings about a  change in  attitude, o r simply corrects a historical 
wrong, begs the question. Perhaps here hes the true legacy of the civil rights 
m ovem ent: black Americans now have opportunities which they only 
dream ed o f before.
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